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Abstract 
This thesis traces the development of policy and the regulatory framework for the 
commercial nuclear power industry in the United Kingdom between 1945 and 2005. It is 
argued that throughout the whole period politicians have legitimised their decisions in 
terms of a scientific discourse that represents the scientific community as unified and the 
decisions as thus self-evident. This is illustrated by looking at the key elements of 
legislation relating to nuclear power in four distinct periods: 1944-8, the introduction of 
nuclear power; 1973-8, the mortal wounding of nuclear power; 1992-5, the decline of 
public funding; and 2005-8, the rebirth of nuclear power. 
In each of the periods identified the key policy developments and legislative initiatives 
were based on pragmatic considerations. A distinction is made between two types of 
pragmatic considerations – reactive and proactive. While these types overlap in practice, 
in some cases the decisions were predominantly reactive and taken in relation to 
emergencies and global forces, and in others the decisions were predominantly proactive 
attempts to ensure a suitably balanced and priced energy mix. 
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Chapter 1: 
Background and Introduction 
“The issue back on the agenda with a vengeance is energy policy… [W]e have 
established a review of the UK’s progress against the medium and long-term 
Energy White Paper goals… with the aim of publishing a policy statement on 
energy [which] will include specifically the issue of whether we facilitate the 
development of a new generation of nuclear power stations.”1 
These words formed part of the then Prime Minister’s speech at the Confederation of 
British Industries’ Interactive Conference in November 2005. With them, Tony Blair was 
signalling the first stages of what was to become a major shift in UK policy regarding 
nuclear power. The stated rationale for this decision to reconsider nuclear power was 
based on two key factors. Firstly, a wider scientific argument (“Climate change is 
producing a sense of urgency”2) and, secondly, ideas of price and energy security forcing 
the issue: 
“Energy prices have risen. Energy supply is under threat.”3 
“By around 2020, the UK is likely to have seen decommissioning of coal and 
nuclear plants that together generate over 30% of today’s electricity supply. 
Some of this will be replaced by renewables but not all of it can.”4 
Both of these factors must be considered in turn, in order to as to ascertain the 
importance which should be attached to each. The wider scientific argument about climate 
change, which is championed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
focuses on the widely-held (but by no means universal5) belief that emissions of Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2, termed a “greenhouse gas”) from human behaviour are causing the global 
mean temperature to rise.  
CO2 is one of the products of the combustion of hydrocarbons and carbon-based 
sources (the other is water vapour, itself a greenhouse gas). Since the industrial 
revolution in the mid-nineteenth century, most commercial power generation has used 
hydrocarbons (i.e., oil, coal or gas) as a fuel source and, so the argument goes, finding 
types of power generation which do not use a hydrocarbon fuel source will reduce CO2 
emissions and thus mitigate the damage to the global climate. Using a nuclear reactor to 
generate power creates no emissions of CO2 and therefore, from a climate change 
perspective, this makes the nuclear option an attractive one (or, in the words of eminent 
environmentalist, James Lovelock, there is “no other safe, practical and economic”6 
option). Many politicians across the globe have embraced this idea7 and emphasise the 
                                        
1 Blair, T., 2005, Speech to the CBI Conference 29 November 2005, 10 Downing Street, London. Available at 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8606.asp, accessed on 22/03/10 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 For the counter-argument see, for example: Ramanathan, V. & Carmichael G., 2008, Global and regional 
climate changes due to black carbon, Nature Geoscience 1, 221-227 (which agues that the IPCC modelling 
takes no account of the “deposition of black carbon [which] darkens snow and ice surfaces, which can 
contribute to melting, in particular of Arctic sea ice.”); Scafetta, N., & West, B., 2008, Is climate sensitive to 
solar variability? Physics Today, March 2008, 50-51 (which acknowledges that “The most debated issue in 
contemporary science is the cause or causes of global warming,” whilst simultaneously casting doubt on the 
IPCC’s focus and Lawson, N., 2008, An Appeal to Reason: A Cool look at global warming, London: Duckworth 
Overlook, which argues that even if the climate science is certain, the economics of climate change are not. 
6 Lovelock, J., 2004, Preface, in Comby, B., 2004, Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy, Paris: Editions TNR. 
This is not a new position for Lovelock who has previously stated that “I have never regarded nuclear radiation 
or nuclear power as anything other than a normal and inevitable part of the environment.” Source: Lovelock, J., 
1988, The Ages of Gaia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
7 For example, at the May 2009 meeting of thee G8 in Rome, “language used in reference to nuclear energy 
was more positive than previous G8 statements” Source: WNN, 2009, G8 energy ministers endorse nuclear 
power, World Nuclear News, available at http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/ENF_G8_energy_ministers_endorse_nuclear_power_2605095.html, accessed on 22/12/09. 
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zero-emission benefits of nuclear power.8 There is equally, however, a tendency to ignore 
or deflate the importance of the scientific evidence that the process of mining the uranium 
required by many reactors produces huge quantities of CO2
9 and further that the waste 
produced by nuclear reactors brings other, different environmental concerns. 
The second factor to consider comes under the umbrella of energy security, although 
this is expressed both as security of supply and price of supply. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, 
the overall consumption of energy in the UK had risen from the early 1980s to a peak in 
2005, when the announcement was made. 
Figure 1.1: Primary Energy Consumption 1970-2008, MTE10 
 
Coupled with this, imports of crude oil into the UK were higher in 2004 than they had 
been since the late 1970s, at a time when indigenous production of crude oil was lower 
than at any point since 1975. Figure 1.2 illustrates clearly that 2005 marked the year 
when oil exports fell below the level of oil imports and the UK became a net importer of 
oil. It is not just oil which would potentially need to be imported. In June 2004, 
Edinburgh-based energy consultants Wood Mackenzie estimated that, by 2015, UK gas 
production would have fallen to about half of the 2004 levels, while demand would have 
risen by twenty per cent, leaving the country in a position where “approximately 75 per 
cent of its gas requirements will need to be imported.”11 
Once a country becomes a net importer of any commodity, then it is to a greater or 
lesser extent dependent on the exporting country (or countries) in terms of the price and 
                                        
8 G8 Energy Ministers agreed that “the use of nuclear power can diversify the energy mix, contribute to energy 
security while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.” Source: G8, 2009, Joint Statement by the G8 Energy 
Ministers and the European Energy Commissioner, G8 2009, available at 
http://www.g8energy2009.it/pdf/G8+EC.pdf, accessed on 22/12/09, p3. 
9 The exact figures for CO2 emissions for uranium mining are difficult to predict, but they range from 10 to 50 
tons of CO2 emitted for every ton of U238 produced. Source: Mudd, G M & Diesendorf, M, 2008, Sustainability of 
Uranium Mining: Towards Quantifying Resources and Eco-Efficiency, Environmental Science & Technology, 42 
(7), pp 2624-2630. 
10 MTE = Millions of Tons of Oil Equivalent. Data supplied by the Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
Digest of UK Energy Statistics Table 1.1.4 (DUKES 1.1.4). Available at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/source/total/total.aspx, accessed on 22/12/09. The figures 
include electricity consumption by the manufacturing sector, which have fallen consistently since 1970, as the 
UK’s manufacturing base shrinks. 
11 Wood Mackenzie, 2004, From Surplus to Shortage? The outlook for Britain’s gas and power markets, 
Edinburgh: Wood Mackenzie Research and Consultancy. 
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volume of commodity that are traded. This is as true for oil and energy as it is for coffee 
and tea. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to reduce reliance on the imported 
commodity – increase domestic/indigenous supply, or reduce demand. 
The Prime Minister’s assertion that almost one third of the UK’s existing energy supply 
could be lost by 2020 (and could not be met by “renewables”) fed into this equation. 
Predicted indigenous energy supply was set to fall even further and this would lead to an 
“energy gap,” which could currently best be filled by greater imports; thus creating 
greater reliance on exporting countries. 
The combination of factors which presented themselves at the end of 2005, therefore, 
were that there was increasing pressure on developed nations to reduce their emissions of 
CO2 and the UK was on course to become increasingly (and to some, worryingly) 
dependent on potentially unstable foreign governments for its energy supply. 
Figure 1.2: UK crude oil imports, exports and production, 1920 – 200612 
 
Despite the scales of time and cost involved in their construction, and despite the 
problems associated both with the mining of uranium for fuel and the disposal of 
radioactive waste, a new generation of nuclear-power stations would likely be able to 
meet the criteria of helping to reduce CO2 emissions and increasing indigenous energy 
supply (and, thus, energy security). The announcement in the speech of an investigation 
“specifically [into] the issue of whether we facilitate the development of a new generation 
of nuclear power stations”13 was, therefore, the logical and practical response to the 
situation. 
Having briefly explored the statements of intent, this thesis will focus on two themes 
as ways of best understanding the process of justification underlying what was, in effect, a 
reversal of previous policy. Firstly, the need for politicians to argue that they make 
decisions based on ‘common sense’ and what is practicable and, secondly, the ways in 
which politicians tend to make use of science and scientific data to ‘trump’ other 
arguments. These themes, which can be loosely allied to concepts like pragmatism and 
Technocratic Decision-Making (‘TDM’), need to be further unpacked in turn. 
In order to ascertain the possible meanings of the themes, the academic and 
theoretical interpretations will be considered along with the “every day” dictionary 
                                        
12 DBERR, 2007, Special feature – UK oil imports since 1920, London: Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform. Available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file43846.pdf, accessed on 27/12/09. 
13 Blair, T., 2005, op cit, n1. 
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definition. Whilst it is acknowledged that this latter is not necessarily a standard approach 
in some social sciences, in law, the methods which have been employed by the court 
system in order to try and give meaning to sometimes obtuse legislative drafting mean 
that:  
“It clear… that the court is entitled to have regard dictionary definitions as an aid 
to construction to ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in 
their relevant context. It is also clear that words are to be interpreted in the way 
in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them; and the standard 
of the reasonable commercial person is hostile to technical interpretations, undue 
emphasis on niceties of language or literalism.”14 
What the Master of the Rolls is elucidating here is the well-established “golden rule” 
approach to judicial interpretation, which goes back to the mid-nineteenth century to 
cases such as Stephenson v Higginson (1952)15 and Attorney General v Sillem and Others 
(1863).16 Although its roots can be traced to much earlier cases,17 the “golden rule” is 
usually held to have been first stated in Grey v Pearson (1857).18 In that case, 
Wensleydale LJ states that “the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is to be 
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or 
inconsistency”19 and thus, it is argued, in this discussion the “grammatical and ordinary” 
senses of the terms being explored cannot be overlooked. 
The first of the themes to consider is pragmatism. 
 
1.1: Pragmatism 
Taking the Golden Rule as a start point, “Pragmatic” and “Pragmatism” are defined by 
the Oxford English Dictionary thus: 
“pragmatic /præg’mætık/ adjective dealing with matters from a practical point of 
view. 
pragmatism /’prægmətız(ə)m/ noun 1 pragmatic attitude or procedure. 2 
Philosophy doctrine that evaluates assertions according to their practical 
consequences.”20 
The philosophical concept of pragmatism seems to have evolved in the nineteenth 
century and most (including himself) attribute the naming to the American philosopher, 
Charles Peirce, in an article in Popular Science.21 Other philosophers (William James22, 
John Dewey23 and Ferdinand Schiller24, for example) developed the concept of 
                                        
14 Heronslea (Mill Hill) Ltd v Kwik-Fit Properties Ltd [2009] EWHC 295 (QB) per Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. at para 
19 
15 George Stephenson v Henry Theophilus Higginson (1852) III House of Lords Cases (Clark's) 638, 10 E.R. 252 
per Truro LJ at 688 
16 Attorney General v Sillem and Others (1863) 2 Hurlstone and Coltman 431. Indeed, the case report explicitly 
uses Todd’s Johnson’s Dictionary, the French Dictionary de l’Academie, Burn’s Naval and Military Technical 
Dictionary of the French Language, Falconer’s Marine Dictionary (at 491-2) and Webster’s American Dictionary 
(at 525).  
17 See, for example, Becke, Assignee of Wm. Ashton, an Insolvent Debtor v Smith (1836) 2 Meeson and Welsby 
191, Elizabeth Warburton v James Loveland, Lessee of George Ivie, Henry Ivie, and Others (1832) VI Bligh, NS 
1, and possibly the Irish case of Latouche v Lord Dunsany (1802) 1 Sch. & Lef. 160 
18 John Grey and Others v William Pearson and Others (1857) VI House of Lords Cases (Clark's) 61 
19 John Grey and Others v William Pearson and Others (1857) VI House of Lords Cases (Clark's) 61, per 
Wensleydale LJ at 106 
20 Elliott, J., ed., 2001, Oxford Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p581 
21 Peirce, C.S., 1878, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, Popular Science Monthly, January 1878. Peirce claimed that 
the idea came to him while studying Kant. 
22 James, W., 1904, What is Pragmatism, in James, W., Writings 1902-1920, The Library of America. James 
argued that “There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle 
used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.” 
23 Dewey, J., & Boydston, J.A., 1976, The Collected Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press 
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pragmatism further, spurring Peirce to rebrand his original idea as “pragmaticism” in order 
to differentiate it from these developments. Dewey’s ideas of what pragmatism might 
mean built on the earlier work of both Peirce and James25 and he believed that the most 
interesting and useful version of pragmatism could be termed ‘instrumentalism’ or 
‘experimentalism.’26 
The fact that, within a short period of time, Peirce’s idea had been broadened to such 
an extent that he felt the need to distance himself from what it had become, gives an 
indication of how widely the idea of pragmatism would be stretched by the end of the 
twentieth century. For that reason, the area on which this thesis will focus is that of 
political pragmatism. 
 
Political Pragmatism 
The idea of political pragmatism as a separate concept from the other variants of 
pragmatism is no more a new concept than pragmatism itself was in the late nineteenth 
century. Professor Thompson attributes its modern origins to “the work of early twentieth-
century African Americans such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson”,27 but 
accepts that they would probably no more have described themselves as political 
pragmatists28 than F.C.S. Schilling would have described himself as a pragmatist. She 
claims that political pragmatism “differs from classical pragmatism” and requires attention 
to be paid to “the consequences of ideas and action.”29 What Thompson appears to 
arguing is that political pragmatism, as she sees it, is taking the exercise in exploring the 
consequences of all possible actions, which Peirce suggested,30 and putting a practical use 
to it. Roberto Diego takes on the idea of political pragmatism effectively demanding the 
most practical course of action, although he gives it rather negative connotations: 
“Political pragmatism … [is] the idea that the proper action is the one that is most 
likely to work. The idea of principled action based upon moral premises is 
anathema to political pragmatists who live in a precarious world where only 
‘“what works’ is the hallmark.”31 
What we are left with, therefore, is a basis for decision making in which the perceived 
success of a measure is possibly of greater importance than the details of the method 
itself – in other words, for political pragmatists it is “what works” that is the measure by 
which actions are primarily judged; as opposed to the underlying philosophy which led to 
the action.  
Although many use “pragmatic” as a shorthand for registering their disapproval of 
decisions they feel are somehow not particularly far-sighted,32 it is also possible, as 
Professor Jacobsohn suggests to use the term in a laudatory fashion, viz.: 
“The pragmatist… is likely to be seen as modest, unpretentious and tolerant – 
possessed, in other words of all the qualities considered virtuous in a liberal 
                                                                                                                                   
24 Schiller, F.C.S., 1910, Riddles of the Sphinx: A study in the philosophy of humanism, London: Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co. 
25 Hickman, L.A., Alexander, T.M., eds., 1998, The essential Dewey, Vol. 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, p ix 
26 Hlebowitsh, P.S.,2006, John Dewey and the Idea of Experimentalism, in Kidal, C., et al, eds, 2006, 
Acknowledging the Fiftieth Anniversary of John Dewey’s Death, Education and Culture, Vol 22(1) 
27 Thompson, A., 1996, Political Pragmatism and Educational Inquiry, Philosophy of Education 1996 
28 Thompson, A., 1997, What to Do While Waiting for the Revolution: Political Pragmatism and Performance 
Pedagogy, Philosophy of Education 1997 
29 Thompson, A., 1996, op cit., n27 
30 Peirce, C.S., 1910, ‘Additament,’ comments on ‘Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’ CP 6.490 
31 Diego, R., 2004, Political Pragmatism vs. Practical Action, Available at 
http://www.robdiego.com/pragmatism.htm, accessed on 21/12/09. 
32 See, for example Sull, D., 2009, Pragmatisms Fatal Flaw, Financial Times, August 28. 
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society.”33 
This thesis will argue that political pragmatism can thus be aligned more closely with 
the first of the OED meanings, and thus to the idea of practicality (“a practical matter, a 
practical feature or aspect of an affair”34), and the following chapters will explore whether 
this fits the examples of nuclear-related decisions much more accurately. 
The second area which will be explored in the following chapters is that concerning 
the use of science, scientific data and scientific rhetoric by politicians as a rationale for the 
decisions they make regarding nuclear power. 
 
1.2: The Use of Science 
“Scientific data and techniques do enter into political decisions and governmental 
programmes, where they have a variety of effects.”35 
As will be shown in the main body of the thesis, the prime tool utilised by both 
decision makers and those who oppose them is ‘science’. From the first public speech on 
atomic energy, when Clement Attlee claimed that “scientists agree… we cannot stop the 
march of discovery” to the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP 10) in December 2009, the use of scientific data has to a greater or lesser extent 
helped to define the debate surrounding nuclear energy. As with the pragmatism, 
therefore, a useful starting point would be to look at the definition given by the OED: 
“science ● n. 1 the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the 
systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world 
through observation and experiment. 2 a systematically organized body of 
knowledge on any subject. 3 archaic knowledge.”36 
“scientist ● n. a person who is studying or has expert knowledge of one or more 
of the natural or physical sciences”37 
Science, therefore, has been seen at times as both the search for understanding and 
knowledge about a particular topic and the knowledge itself. In John Gribbin’s Science,38 
he suggests (as do many others) that science, or more specifically “Western science,”39 
started to become a separate and identifiable discipline in the middle of the fourteenth 
century, with the work by Nicolaus Copernicus on astronomy and Andreas Versalius on 
anatomy.40  
Yet whilst science claims to offer universal objective truths, scientific explanations 
have not always been accepted unquestioningly but, rather, viewed with mistrust by non-
scientists. Thomas Kuhn,41 for example, argues that science works within a set of 
assumptions which are taken for granted and that, rather than science progressing by a 
series of small steps, this paradigm remains intact until suddenly replaced by another 
paradigm in a “scientific revolution.” Before the eighteenth-century Enlightenment period, 
the belief in and use of science as we understand it today was often the trigger for 
religious intervention, particularly in the Christian world. Clearly, the UK never felt the full 
force of the Inquisitions suffered elsewhere in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries but, nonetheless, many people regarded (and still regard) science as somehow 
                                        
33 Jacobsohn, G.J., 1977, The "Pragmatic Dogma" of the Political Thicket: The Jurisprudential Paradox of "One 
Man, One Vote” Polity, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1977), pp. 279-301:279 
34 Elliott, J., ed., 2001, op cit, n20 
35 Ezragi, Y., 1980, Utopian and pragmatic rationalism: The political context of scientific advice, Minerva, 18 (1) 
March 1980, pp111-31:111 
36 Elliott, J., ed., 2001, op cit, n20 
37 Ibid. 
38 Gribbin, J., 2002, Science: A History 1543-2001, London: Penguin Press 
39 Gribbin, J., 2002, op cit, pxix (italics in original) 
40 The publication of De Humani Corporis Fabrica by Versalius and De Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium by 
Copernicus were both published in 1543. Source: Gribbin, J., 2002., op cit, pxvii 
41 Kuhn T.S., 1970, the structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
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incompatible with religious belief in general and Christianity in particular.42 Dr John 
Habgood43 who, on his appointment as Archbishop of York in 1983, was described as 
“perhaps the highest-ranking prelate anywhere with a professional background in 
science,”44 had previously written of the “uneasy truce” which had developed in the 
conflict between science and religious belief, and suggested further that it might not be a 
permanent ceasefire.45 The LSE’s Professor Worrall takes Habgood’s arguments further, 
arguing in 2004 that: 
“Science and religion are in irreconcilable conflict…. There is no way in which you 
can be both properly scientifically minded and a true religious believer.”46 
It should not be thought, however, that, since the Enlightenment, there has always 
been an unquestioning support for scientists or any other type of ‘expert’. In 1877, the 
three-times Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, said: 
“No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experience of life as that you 
never should trust experts…. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by 
a very large admixture of insipid common sense.”47 
This links back to the point made earlier regarding a constant, and consistent, desire 
of politicians: to reduce the often contested and usually complex data provided by 
‘science’ to simple ‘common sense’ terms which can then be used to provide justification 
for a pragmatic decision. This may be for undisclosed political reasons, but is also due to 
the fact that science is often too abstract to be used for policy formation.  
A considerable amount of scientific research, can be classed as “blue-sky” or 
fundamental research; that is, research which “essentially aims at improving our 
understanding of Nature”48 and which is “typically curiosity-driven.”49 Fundamental 
research, however, is generally contrasted with applied or pragmatic research which is 
“designed to solve practical problems of the modern world, rather than to acquire 
knowledge for knowledge's sake.”50 Richard Posner, the US Appeal Court Judge and “most 
cited legal scholar of all time”51 who has written extensively on pragmatism:52 
“urges that political and legal decision makers should be guided by what he calls 
‘everyday pragmatism.’”53 
In his treatise on pragmatism, Peirce identified that those who we regard as scientists 
                                        
42 Professor John Draper, for example, argued in 1874 that “The antagonism we thus witness between Religion 
and Science is the continuation of a struggle that commenced when Christianity began to attain political 
power.” Source: Draper, J., 1874, A History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science, New York: D Appleton 
& Co, piv 
43 Technically the Rt Rev and Rt Hon. the Lord Habgood PC. Dr Habgood gained his PhD in Physiology at the 
University of Cambridge in 1952 and was subsequently a lecturer in Pharmacology before taking the cloth in 
1954. 
44 Boffey, P., 1983, Religion and Science: Archbishop of York: Prelate started his career as scientist, Gainesville 
Sun, Gainesville, Florida. 17 December, p1B. 
45 Habgood, J., 1963, The Uneasy Truce between Science and Theology, in Vidler, A.R., ed., Soundings: Essays 
concerning Christian understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.23-41 
46 Worrall, J., 2004, Science Discredits Religion, in Peterson M., & Van Arragon, R., eds., 2004, Contemporary 
Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p60 
47 Cecil, Lady G., 1921, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, London: Hodder & Stoughton, p54. 
48 Petit, J-C., 2004, Why do we need fundamental research? European Review (2004), 12:2:191-207 
49 UL, 2008, Fundamental Research, Leiden: Universiteit Leiden. Available at 
http://www.research.leiden.edu/about/fundamental-research.html, accessed on 16/02/10. This would include 
the research undertaken by Röntgen, Becquerel, and Pierre and Marie Curie which underpins the whole of the 
nuclear industry, sand is discussed in more detail on Chapter Two. 
50 LBL, nd, What is applied research? Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory/ US Department of 
Energy, Available at http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/research-main.html, accessed on 16/02/10 
51 Shapiro, F. R., 2000, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, 
vol. 29(1), pp. 409-26. Whilst any suggestion of bias is unintentional, it should be noted that Posner was the 
founding editor of the Journal of Legal Studies. 
52 See, for example, Posner, R. A., 2003, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
53 Somin, I., 2004, Richard Posner's democratic pragmatism and the problem of ignorance, Critical Review, 16 
(1), pp1-22 
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are somehow “different” to other people and, further, that there is a tendency towards 
isolationism among the scientific communities: 
“Every physicist, and every chemist, and, in short, every master in any 
department of experimental science, has had his mind molded [sic] by his life in 
the laboratory to a degree that is little suspected.”54 
What Peirce is alluding to is the role played by scientists as the experts who gather 
empirical evidence to support (or dispute) theories. However, as with the other terms 
considered, ‘science’ is a contested area and it should not be assumed that there is 
currently an homogeneous community of scientists, either in what they believe, or in how 
they behave. Indeed, such a thing may never have truly existed. Professor Nowotny, 
writing in 1980 about the 1977 Austrian referendum on nuclear power, states that: 
“The fictitious ‘scientific community’ has long since given way to numerous 
communities, pluralistic in their status claims and codes of professional conduct 
as well as in their competence.”55 
This is not to say, however, that politicians will not use the idea of some sort of 
“unified” (and simplified) science as a means of putting opponents onto weaker ground, or 
simply to make a political point. Neither does it necessarily follow that scientists will not 
move beyond the realms of their expertise to become advocates of a particular course of 
action. In a speech given almost exactly a year after announcing the forthcoming energy 
review at the CBI conference, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech to the 
Royal Society in Oxford in which he claimed that the Stern Review,56 published the 
previous week “set out, unanswerably, the scientific case that our actions are changing 
our climate”57 and argued that “the brilliant light of science”58 would light the future of the 
country. 
The Stern Review, chaired by Lord Stern of Brentford59 actually said that “an 
overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a 
serious and urgent issue,”60 and the causes are “mostly attributable to human 
activities,”61 but the Review adds the caveat that: 
“Attributing trends to a single influence is difficult to establish unequivocally 
because the climate system can often respond in unexpected ways to external 
influences and has a strong natural variability.”62 
This is clearly not quite as “unanswerable” as the Prime Minister made out in his 
speech and, as mentioned above, arguments about the influence of humans on the global 
climate are ongoing and are increasingly becoming less muted.63  
One of the constraints which politicians have placed on their reporting of scientific 
data is the fact that the majority of politicians and, indeed, the majority of the audiences 
to which they are speaking, do not have a scientific background. This has as an inevitable 
                                        
54 Peirce, C.S., 1905, What Pragmatism is, The monist, Vol 15, No 2, pp161-181. This point is revisited in 
Chapter Two with discussions of the remote siting of the two NIRNS laboratories in Warrington and Culham. 
55 Nowotny, H., 1980, The Role of the Experts in Developing Public Policy: The Austrian Debate on Nuclear 
Power, Science, Technology & Human Values, 5 (2) 14. 
56 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was published on 30 October 2006, and is available 
from the HM Treasury website at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.  
57 Blair, T., 2006, Speech to the Royal Society, Oxford. Available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10342, 
accessed on 22/03/10. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Lord Stern of Brentford was previously Professor Nicholas Stern, and had been the Head of the Government 
Economic Service. Source: OCC, 2009, Stern Team, Office of Climate Change. Available at 
http://www.occ.gov.uk/activities/stern.htm, accessed on 12/03/10. 
60 Stern, Lord, 2006, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p2 
61 Stern, Lord, 2006, op cit, p4 
62 Stern, Lord, 2006, op cit, p5 
63 See, for example, the comments of Australian MP Dennis Jensen who has been reporting climate change 
science as “dubious to say the least” since early 2009. 
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consequence the fact that much of the complexity of scientific reports is “lost in 
translation.”64 This is especially true when considering the specifics of nuclear power 
generation. In 1999, Professor Worcester proposed five ideas which he argued could form 
the basis of a guide to study the interaction between science, scientists and society65 and, 
since politicians and their audiences all form part of the wider society, some of his points 
are worth exploring. 
The first key point that Worcester makes is that the British public tends to assume 
that a scientific advance is likely to be detrimental rather than beneficial, unless they are 
told the purpose behind it.66 This was illustrated by the fiasco which surrounded the 
publication of an article by Dr Andrew Wakefield in the Lancet, in which he suggested that 
there might have been a causal link between the combined Measles, Mumps and Rubella 
vaccination (MMR) and childhood autism.67 Despite repeated reassurance by medical 
institutions68 that there was no evidence of a link and the eventual retraction of the paper 
from the Lancet,69 MMR vaccines fell from over 92 per cent to under 80 per cent and the 
number of cases of measles rose sharply.70 
The second of Worcester’s key points is that scientists working for NGOs are more 
likely to be trusted than those working for the government or industry. The rationale for 
this is stated as being that government and industry scientists are often regarded as 
somehow ‘shady’71 and motivated by money, and being equally willing to present skewed 
data which favours their sponsors. NGO scientists, however, have a tendency of 
portraying themselves as the under-resources, independent champions of whichever 
cause the NGO relates to. The reality is somewhat different, and some research has 
suggested that in the environmental sphere, “NGO researchers are not generally different 
in terms of their environmental views”72 to any other researchers. This has important 
ramifications for the discussions about climate change and energy security put forward as 
the rationale for the change in energy policy in 2005, as will be discussed in more depth 
below. Despite Worcester’s points, there is strong evidence that the arguments of 
Gellner73 that science is still regarded as having more influence on a debate than anything 
else – if it were not, then the use of science by politicians that we will see below would not 
be necessary. 
However, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have to some extent side-
stepped this issue by appointing in 1997 as the arbiter of all things sustainable (and thus 
the “government scientific advisor” in all but name), the Sustainable Development 
Commission, under the Chairmanship first of ex-Green Party Leader and co-funder of 
Resources for the Future, Jonathon Porritt and then, from September 2009, Will Day.74 By 
having as ex-heads of NGOs successive heads of its advisory body, the government can 
claim to be engaging scientists on both the industrial and NGO sides of the climate change 
                                        
64 CNAS, 2009, Lost in Translation: Closing the Gap between Climate Science and Climate Policy, College Park, 
MD: Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the Joint Global Change Research Institute (JGCRI).  
65 Worcester, R., Science and Democracy: Public Attitudes to Science and Scientists, Budapest: UN World 
Conference on Science. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Wakefield, A., et al., 1998, Ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive 
developmental disorder in children, The Lancet, Volume 351, Issue 9103, Pages 637 – 641. 
68 Including in the UK, the Medical Research Council (1998, 2001 & 2004), the British Medical Journal (2001), 
St George's Hospital, London, UK, and the Institute for Child Health (2001) and the Royal Free Hospital (2002) 
69 The article was retracted in March 2004. Source: BBC, 2008a, MMR research timeline, London : BBC News, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1808956.stm, accessed on 16/02/10 
70 Deer, B., 2009, MMR doctor Andrew Wakefield fixed data on autism, The Sunday Times, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article5683671.ece, accessed on 16/02/10 
71 The scientists at the Hadley Centre for Climate Change have been repeatedly referred to as ‘shady’ in blogs 
since the revelation that their data may have been not as objective as was first thought. 
72 Campion, C., & Shrum, W., 2002, Environmental Attitudes of Scientists in Ghana, Kenya, and Kerala: 
Evidence on NGOs and Traditional Research Sectors, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 17-42 
73 Gellner, E., 1992, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, London: Routledge 
74 Day was previously the Funds Director for Comic Relief, CEO of CARE International, and is currently Special 
Advisor to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Source: SDC, 2010, Who we are: Will Day, 
London: Sustainable Development Commission 
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debate.75 
Even though the MMR vaccine and the arguments about climate change science 
support Worcester’s premise, it does not mean, however, that scientific data surrounding 
the processes of nuclear fission should necessarily all be regarded as open for scientific 
debate or uncertainty: at all but a quantum level, the physics surrounding the reactions 
occurring inside the core of a nuclear reactor are certain.76 Worcester’s arguments are 
more about the way in which scientific arguments and information are used and abused by 
different bodies and for different purposes.  
One of the areas in which science is used greatly by politicians and environmentalists 
alike is in the interpretation of the Precautionary Principle. According to the European 
Commission, the Precautionary Principle (enshrined into EU Law by the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, which did not trouble to define it): 77 
“may be invoked when the potentially dangerous effects of a phenomenon, 
product or process have been identified by a scientific and objective evaluation, 
and this evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient 
certainty.”78 
Whilst the phrase “scientific and objective evaluation” would suggest a level of 
certainty and lack of ambiguity in the results, there are many examples where the same 
data have been used to suggest two different courses of action.79 
The 2001 Lowell Statement on the Precautionary Principle,80 which supported the 
earlier Wingspread Statement, made wide-ranging calls for improvements in science 
policy, research and funding with the eventual target of: 
“creating a new interface between science and policy that stresses the continuous 
updating of knowledge as well as improved communication of risk, certainty and 
uncertainty.”81 
In their 1990 paper, Jordan and Davidson argue that there is even further conflict as 
“science can no longer deliver what governments expect of it”82 but, at the same time, 
“politicians like consensus and encourage the political closure of scientific controversy.”83 
This would suggest that the new “interface between science and policy” has been needed 
for some time. In some fields there have even been arguments for the legal system to be 
initiated to counteract decisions which have been based on political motives: 
“while the courts should not generally interfere in the affairs of science, they can 
be a useful mechanism to reverse irrational ideology-driven science policy and 
                                        
75 Although the government rhetoric in unswerving in its attachment to the idea of anthropocentric climate 
change. See, for example, Jowit, J., 2010, Ed Miliband declares war on climate change sceptics, The Observer, 
31 January 2010, p1. 
76 See Appendix VI for a summary of the nuclear chain reaction that is at the heart of a reactor. 
77 EC Treaty Article 174(2) which was inserted by Maastricht, requires only that the Community's environmental 
policy is based on the principle. 
78 Europa, 2005, Summaries of EU Legislation: The Precautionary Principle. Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/general_provisions/l32042_en.htm, accessed on 
22/03/10 
79 See, for example, Ponte, L., 1976, The Cooling: Has the Next Ice Age Already Begun, London: Prentice-Hall, 
which argued that man made pollution and greenhouse gases in the environment would cause a new ice age” 
and Rasool, S.I., & Schneider, S., 1971, Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Aerosols: Effects of Large Increases 
on Global Climate, Science, Vol. 173. no. 3992, pp. 138 – 141, which states that CO2 could be responsible for 
future warming, and aerosols for future cooling. 
80 The Statement was the outcome of an interdisciplinary conference held at the Toxics Use Reduction Institute 
at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts. Source: Lowell, 2001, Statement from the 
International Summit on Science and the Precautionary Principle, 17 December 2001, Lowell Center for 
Sustainable Production, Lowell, MA: University of Massachusetts Lowell 
81 Ibid. 
82 Jordan, G., & Davidson, S., 2000, Science and Scepticism: Expertise and Political Decisions, Public and Policy 
Administration, 15 (1) 58-76:58. 
83 Jordan, G., & Davidson, S., 2000, op cit, n82, p75 
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decision-making”84 
This thesis does not go quite as far as Professor Don K Price85 in attempting to 
polarise politicians and scientists as representing power and truth respectively for, despite 
the attractions such a concept brings with it, it is sometimes science which has the power 
and, occasionally, politicians who represent truth. Price’s ideas are closely allied to those 
put forward more recently by Dr Joseph Corkin, who argues that the European Court of 
Justice (in the cases of Pfizer86 and Alpharma87) believed: 
“Scientists [to be] arbiters of fact, who conduct risk assessments to identify and 
characterise risks and thereby generate reliable information – the raw factual 
data – upon which the institutions, as the legitimate arbiters of value, make 
policy decisions.”88 
The thrust of the thesis becomes an investigation as to whether a particular decision 
was made because it was the way of dealing with matters from a practical point of view, 
because it was the underlying philosophy of the government at the time, or because there 
was a technocratic imperative to do so. What this thesis will further suggest is that 
politicians have always been willing and ready to use scientific rhetoric as a tool and will 
emphasise a false unity in scientific thinking when it suits their own political purposes, 
whilst simultaneously overriding scientific evidence or emphasising the discord in scientific 
thinking when it does not - in other words, revisiting Jordan and Davidson’s idea of 
“political closure of scientific controversy.”89 
 
1.3: Technocratic Decision Making 
The idea that there is some sort of technological imperative behind decision making 
has links to existing ideas of technocratic decision making (TDM), in which “experts are 
increasingly becoming a part of our decision-making structures”90 although it does not fit 
exactly, since the opinions of the experts are picked up and dropped at will by the real 
decision makers.  
Professor Kantrowitz argued, in 1975, that policy decisions could be separated into 
three categories:  
Technical Decisions, based solely on the application and extrapolation of scientific 
issues; 
Value Decisions, concerned with the resolution of important normative of societal 
issues; and 
Mixed Decisions, with both technical and value elements.91 
Clearly, although Kantrowitz is clear in his categorisation, and all decisions will fit 
somewhere within the designations, these are more of the “ideal type” designations of the 
sort promoted by Weber,92 and are not necessarily meant to exactly match all of the 
policy decisions. DeSario and Langton expand on Kantrowitz’s ideas, arguing that:  
“Technical decisions rely on scientific techniques and extrapolations to determine 
                                        
84 Singh, J. A., 2009, Using the courts to challenge irrational health research policies and administrative 
decisions, Acta Tropica, 112S (2009) S76–S79, p76 
85 Price, D. K., 1965, The Scientific Estate, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
86 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-03305 
87 Case T-70/99 Alpharma inv. v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR pt. 139 II-03495 
88 Corkin, J., Science, legitimacy and the law: regulating risk regulation judiciously in the European Community, 
E.L. Rev. 2008, 33(3), 359-384. 
89 Jordan, G., & Davidson, S., 2000, op cit, n82, p58 
90 DeSario, J., & Langton, S., eds., 1987, Citizen participation in public decision making, New York, NY: 
Greenwood Press, p7 
91 Kantrowitz, A. 1975, Controlling technology democratically, American Scientist 63:505-509:506 
92 Coser, L.A., 1977, Masters of sociological thought: Ideas in historical and social context, New York, NY: 
Harcourt, p223-4  
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the potential of ‘what is.’ Value issues involve normative determinations of ‘what 
should be.’ Although scientific information can provide guidance with respect to 
value decisions, it is rarely the sole determinant.”93 
As will be seen below, the focus on “what is” which they say is a feature of technical 
decisions (and thus, by extrapolation, decisions made using TDM) has strong links to the 
doctrinal or black letter approach to legal analysis, which will be discussed further below. 
In Professor Teichman’s work on decision making in Mexico and Argentina, she argues 
that “small technocratic élites insulated themselves from both extra and intra state 
pressures.”94 Even though her work is focused on Central and Southern America, this 
understanding may fruitfully be applied to the early days of nuclear power in the UK, 
where there was certainly an élite separated from “extra and intra state pressures” 
although doubt remains about the extent to which those politicians involved could truly be 
classed as a “technocratic élite.” 
Professor Jasanoff argues that society may already be starting to evolve beyond TDM, 
into a form of decision making where: 
“dependence on scientific experts, whose judgements are necessarily influenced 
by their moral beliefs and social aspirations, may well replace rule by a 
technocratic élite for democratic process.”95 
What Jasanoff seems to be implying is that the current state is of rule by a 
‘technocratic élite’ which, as will be shown, is at least party true in relation to the early 
years of the nuclear industry in the UK. However, the shift to a replacement of this by 
“dependence on scientific experts” does not seem to have happened and, indeed, it is 
argued here that we never really arrived at TDM in the first place. Using Kantrowitz’s 
classification, which is by no means an absolutist or prescriptive one, it will be argued 
here that most of the decisions which have been taken in relation to nuclear power are 
closest to mixed decisions. This differs from the view of the ECJ in the Pfizer and Alpharma 
cases above, that the role of scientists is solely to provide factual evidence, as decisions 
made on that basis would fit the value decision category better. 
An assessment of the decisions covered below will be made as to whether they fit one 
of Kantrowitz’s categories,96 or even Jasanoff’s position of scientists as rulers,97 and that 
assessment will be paired with further discussions about “everyday” political pragmatism 
and the use of science by politicians. 
 
1.4: The 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak 
To illustrate the approach of this thesis, it is useful to give examples of political 
decisions which have been made on the grounds of political pragmatism, and for which the 
language and arguments of science have been used as political justification. 
One of the best examples of recent years where a major policy change has come as 
the result of purely pragmatic considerations was the response to the outbreak of Foot & 
Mouth Disease (FMD) in the UK in the spring and summer of 2001. Much has been written 
both in the mainstream media and specialist journals concerning the pathology of FMD, 
and the success or otherwise of the methods employed to tackle it,98 but it is not the 
                                        
93 DeSario, J., & Langton, S., eds., 1987, op cit, n90, p8 
94 Teichman, J., 1997, Mexico and Argentina: Economic reform and technocratic decision making, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 32 (1) 31-55. 
95 Jasanoff, S., 1994, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymaker, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 
96 Kantrowitz, A., 1975, op cit, n91 
97 Jasanoff, S., 1994, op cit, n95 
98 See, for example, Campbell, D., & Lee, R., “Carnage by Computer”: the blackboard economics of the 2001 
foot and mouth epidemic, Social and Legal Studies; 12 (4) Dec 2003, pp.425-459; Mepham, B., 2001, Foot and 
mouth disease and British agriculture: ethics in a crisis, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 14, 3 
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pathological aspects of the disease or an ex post facto assessment of the methods which 
is are of interest here. One caveat which should be included, however, is that responses to 
a situation, which may or may not be pragmatic, are clearly reactive. Drawing up the 
plans for a future policy, however, which also may or may not be pragmatic, is proactive, 
and thus the solution for one may not be the solution for the other. This difference 
between proactive and reactive pragmatism will be explored further in the body of this 
thesis. 
The first outbreak of the disease on a farm in Essex was announced by Baroness 
Hayman in the House of Lords on 21 February 2001.99 When the Secretary of State for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Nick Brown, spoke to the Commons about the outbreak 
the following week he said that: 
“the United Kingdom Government and the European Commission acted swiftly to 
prohibit temporarily the export of live animals, meat, fresh milk and other animal 
products from the UK”100 and that 
“We immediately ceased issuing export health certificates for export to third 
countries for any animals or products which cannot also be exported to other 
European Union member states.”101 
These decisions, Baroness Hayman revealed, had been taken partly on the basis of a 
strategy adopted after the 1967 FMD outbreak, and partly on the advice of scientific 
advisors from the (subsequently dismantled) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF).102 As history has revealed, the pragmatic decisions made in relation to FMD were 
slow to take effect, and did not work effectively. The spread of the disease could have 
been prevented if the rules set out for controlling livestock movements had been put in 
place sooner,103 although the National Audit Office pointed out that “it [was] unrealistic to 
expect that any contingency plan could have coped with all the problems.”104 This could 
make the decisions contrary to the fundamental tenet of political pragmatism – that it is 
“what works” which is important. It is argued that “what works” can only be assessed 
retrospectively and, at the point of the decision, it is “what looks most likely to work at 
the time” which should be the standard by which political pragmatism is measured. 
Having looked at the underlying themes that will run throughout this work, and seen 
how they might work in an example decision, it is necessary now to turn to look at the 
approach taken by this thesis to the research itself. 
 
1.5: Methodology 
Various approaches were considered for this research before being rejected on the 
grounds of unsuitability. This section includes brief discussions of the backgrounds to, and 
methods used, by some of these approaches, along with the rationale for their rejection. 
Since “most researchers would accept that it is sensible to use a mixture of methods”105 
this section will show the combination of approaches that will be taken in the body of the 
thesis. The broad categorisation of methods into qualitative and quantitative and, 
                                                                                                                                   
339-48; Guardian, 2009, Foot and Mouth: Special Report, available only at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/footandmouth, accessed on 05/01/10. 
99 Hayman, Baroness, 2001, Foot and Mouth disease outbreak, HL Deb 21 February 2001 vol 622 c866 
100 Brown, N., 2001, Foot and Mouth Disease, HC Deb 26 February 2001 vol 363 c598 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hayman, Baroness, 2001, op cit.,n98, c867 
103 “By the time MAFF’s 5-mile exclusion zone around the first farm was put in place, the disease had already 
spread beyond it” Source: BBC, 2003, Beginnings of a Crisis, London: BBC News. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2144168.stm, accessed on 16/03/10 
104 NAO, 2002, The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, London: National Audit Office/TSO 
105 McNeill, P., & Chapman, S., 2005, Research Methods, London: Routledge, p22 
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comparatively recently, the growth in interest of Q methodology106 provided the first 
obstacle. This work does not make any significant use of statistical data, and thus any 
quantitative or numerical approach would not be suitable. 
Clearly, given the six-decade time span, face-to-face interviews with the main 
protagonists would not have been a practicable option, this impracticability being 
compounded by the death of so many of the early players. McNeill and Chapman echo this 
reason when talking about the unsuitability of surveys, saying: 
“there are certain topics that simply cannot be studied by this methods. Many 
historical themes are an example, since no respondents are available.”107 
There are myriad socio-legal methodologies which could have been considered as 
approached to this work, and many could have been partially successful. However, as 
Professor Reza Banakar suggests:  
“Despite the social make-up of law and the kinship between legal theory and 
social theory, the former being a branch of the latter, and despite the efforts of 
socio-legal scholars over the past hundred years to integrate legal and 
sociological ideas, law and sociology remain apart.”108   
Indeed, Schmidt and Halliday argue that scholars within the socio-legal sphere 
referred to by Banakar not only want to change the way that law is regarded in terms of 
research, but further “believe that law’s claim to autonomy and superiority must be laid 
bare.”109 
There exists, therefore, a clear tension between some of the legal approaches to 
research and some of the sociological approaches. There are also areas of overlap, 
however, and these will be where this work sits. 
The approach taken here must focus on primary and secondary texts as sources of 
information. The basis of this work is in law; namely, the legislation which forms the 
backbone of the regulatory structure surrounding nuclear power. Part of what this work 
will do is to uncover what the legislation said at the time, subsequent amendments where 
applicable and how it was interpreted by the courts; the clearest mechanism by which 
policy makers give effect to their policies. The downside of considering legislation and case 
law is that, as Becher and Trowler suggest, “there is a constantly changing body of 
material arising from new legislation, and everything is in a state of flux.”110 However, 
bearing this constant flux in mind, there are several ways of discovering what the 
legislation means, and as Professor Cownie states: 
“Traditionally law has been analysed from a doctrinal or “black letter” perspective, 
which concentrates on examining statutory materials and the reports of judicial 
decisions as the sole means of understanding the law.”111 
This doctrinal approach, which is also referred to as positivist112,113 and 
                                        
106 Q Methodology was invented in the 1930s and combines statistical analysis with value statements, allowing 
the creation of dominant discourses on a particular topic or set of topics. Source: McKeown, B., & Thomas, D., 
1988, Q Methodology: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, London: Sage. 
107 McNeill, P., & Chapman, S., 2005, op cit, n105, p30 
108 Banakar, R., 2009, Law Through Sociology's Looking Glass: Conflict and Competition in Sociological Studies 
of Law, in Denis, A., & Kalekin-Fishman, D., eds., The New ISA Handbook in Contemporary International 
Sociology: Conflict, Competition, And Cooperation, London: Sage. 
109 Schmidt, P. and Halliday, S., 2009, Introduction: Beyond Methods – Law and Society in Action, in Halliday, 
S. and Schmidt, P., eds., Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and Practices, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p4 
110 Becher T., & Trowler, P., 2001, Academic Tribes and Territories: intellectual inquiry and the culture of 
disciplines, Buckingham: Open University Press & SRHE, p31 
111 Cownie, F., 2004, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p35 
112 Positivism, in short, takes the view that “there is a body of knowledge that existed independently of whether 
people knew it or not, and that the task of the scientist was to uncover that knowledge piece by piece, building 
up a more complete understanding of the laws of nature.” Source: McNeill, P., & Chapman, S., 2005, op cit, 
n105, p116 
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tecnocentric114 has been criticised for being too narrow in its scope, and thus, as Adams 
and Brownsword argue: 
“to say black-letterism is concerned with describing the operation of the law 
would be to overstate its scope; for what it purports to describe is the content of 
the formal legal materials, not the operation of these rules in practice.”115 
Some aspects of the black letter approach will be retained as part of the “mixture of 
methods” and, in order to give effect to that approach, there are various other methods 
for interpreting the meaning of legislation which are used in case law. The three best-
known approaches are the “literal”, “golden” and “mischief” rules.” 
The literal rule was discussed in the case of Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 
where Viscount Dilhorne said that the objective of the court was to discover the intention 
of Parliament as expressed in the words used in the statute and nothing else.116 This is 
potentially a very limited approach because, as will be seen during the course of this work, 
the wording of legislation is often ambiguous and, occasionally deliberately so. 
The golden rule is used as a bolster to the literal rule and is used on occasions where 
a literal interpretation of the statute would produce a result that is patently absurd. In the 
case of Adler v George [1964], for example, the defendant was appealing against a 
conviction under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 for obstructing a member of the 
RAF in the vicinity of RAF Marham. The appeal was on the basis that the statutory wording 
was specific about the need to be “in the vicinity of” a prohibited place, and that since he 
was in the prohibited place, he was technically not covered by the statute. Lord Parker CJ 
felt that this would be an unacceptable result, and that: 
“I am quite satisfied that this is a case where no violence is done to the language 
by reading the words ‘in the vicinity of’ as meaning ‘in or in the vicinity of.’ Here 
is a section in an Act of Parliament designed to prevent interference with 
members of Her Majesty’s forces, among others, who are engaged on guard, 
sentry, patrol or other similar duty in relation to a prohibited place such as this 
station. It would be extraordinary, I venture to think it would be absurd, if an 
indictable offence was thereby created when the obstruction took place outside 
the precincts of the station, albeit in the vicinity, and no offence at all was 
created if the obstruction occurred on the station itself.”117 
The final of the three main rules of interpretation is the mischief rule, which is 
sometimes referred to as the “rule in Heyden’s case.”118 It allows for quite a broad 
interpretation of the wording of the legislation, and it bases the interpretation on the 
‘mischief’ which previous statute allowed, but which the current law was brought in to 
address. 
A combination of these three approaches, using a further combination of the Hansard 
records of Parliamentary debates, contemporary first-hand accounts and later more 
reflective accounts, will be used to ascertain the reasons behind the particular changes in 
legislation. The legislation as passed and as amended will be accessed using the major 
online legal databases which are available, including LexisNexis®Butterworths,119 
Westlaw,120 the website of the Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI) and, more 
                                                                                                                                   
113 “The positive study of laws is concerned with the specific content of laws.” Source: Pendlebury, G., Action 
and ethics in Aristotle and Hegel: escaping the malign influence of Kant, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
p64 
114 Thomas, P.A., 1997, Socio-Legal Studies: The Case of Disappearing Fleas and Bustards, Thomas, P.A., ed., 
Socio-Legal Studies, Aldershot: Dartmouth. The link to the concerns of “what is” in technical decision making 
was outlined above. 
115 Adams, J., & Brownsword, R., 1999, Understanding Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p30 
116 Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 948, per Viscount Dilhorne at 951. 
117 Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7, per Lord Parker CJ at 9. 
118 Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. 
119 LexisNexis®Butterworths is a subscription only service available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal 
120 Westlaw is a subscription only service run by Thompson and Sweet & Maxwell, and is available at 
http://login.westlaw.co.uk/wluk/ 
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recently, the UK Statute Law Database run by the Ministry of Justice.121 These databases 
are highly useful for twenty-first century legal research, as they give the researcher 
access not only to the elements of the legislation itself, but also to journal articles and 
cases which relate to the particular sections of an Act. 
It is important to keep in mind when looking at the legislation, whether from a black 
letter, golden rule or any other perspective, that “there is a tradition that law is ‘value 
free.’”122 In other words, the law is concerned with what the rule in an area is, “not as it 
ought to be, nor why it came to be as it is.”123 
This thesis therefore will use as a start point a doctrinal, black letter, technocentric 
analysis of the legislation passed in relation to the nuclear-power industry in the UK. 
Having looked at “what the law is”, it will them move on to consider, using predominantly 
primary data, how the law came to be the way it is. Once the underpinning evidence has 
been collected, the third strand of this thesis will assess why the law came to be shaped 
the way it is – in other words to bring in the ideas of pragmatism and technocratic 
decision making and with them the use of science for their own purposes by politicians.  
 
1.6: Introduction to the Thesis 
In this work, which focuses on the nuclear power industry in the United Kingdom, four 
time periods are considered to illustrate the influences on the decisions that were taken 
relating to nuclear power. The periods were chosen as they represent different stages in 
the life of nuclear power: the beginning; middle; end and rebirth. Although the later 
decisions about nuclear power are very easily distinguishable from those relating to 
nuclear weapons, in some of the earlier stages in the development of the technology the 
two are intrinsically linked, and will be dealt with together where necessary. 
The first time period is 1944-1948, which covers the time between the run up to the 
end of the Second World War and the passage of the Atomic Energy Act 1946, which was 
the first statutory reference to the nuclear industry in the UK. The 1955 White Paper “A 
Programme of Nuclear Power”124 envisaged nuclear power to be “contributing 1500 to 
2000 MW of electricity to the grid and replacing five to six million tons of coal a year by a 
few hundred tons of uranium,”125 and the potential benefits of nuclear power were not yet 
overshadowed by any real growing awareness that this new capacity carried significant 
risks. 
The second time period covers the years 1973-1978, which is the period of the 
beginning of the slump in nuclear power’s popularity, both in the UK and globally. The 
extremely long lead times between commission and completion of a nuclear power station 
meant that the effects of this disillusionment took up to a decade to become apparent. It 
is also the period of the OPEC-generated fuel crisis and resulting stock market crash. 
According to the IAEA: 
“From 1974 to 1975 orders dropped abruptly from 75 GW(e) to 28 GW(e). 
Moreover, all 41 reactors ordered after 1973 were subsequently cancelled, and, 
indeed, more than two-thirds of all nuclear plants ordered after January 1970 
were eventually cancelled.”126 
The third time period runs from 1992-5, and covers the years between the completion 
of Sellafield B, the last nuclear reactor to be built in the UK, and the decision by the 
                                        
121 The UK Statute Law Database was set up in 2007 by the Ministry of Justice. It is available at 
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/ 
122 Becher T., & Trowler, P., 2001, op cit, n110, p31 
123 Adams, J., & Brownsword, R., 1999, op cit, n115, p69 
124 Lord President of the Council, 1955, A Programme of Nuclear Energy, Lord President of the Council and 
Minister of Fuel and Power White Paper (Cmnd 9389), London: HMSO. 
125 Jay, K., 1956, Calder Hall: The Story of Britain’s first Atomic Power Station, London: Methuen & Co Ltd, p83. 
126 IAEA, 2004a, 50 years of nuclear energy: 48th IAEA General Conference, Vienna: International Atomic 
Energy Agency, p4 
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government not to fund any future development of nuclear power from the public 
purse.127 In addition to apparent government policy, the comparative weapons-related 
calmness in the immediate post-Cold War period meant that its overshadowed sibling 
nuclear power slipped from the headlines as well, other than for the publicity surrounding 
specific actions.128 As a result of this “quiet period” the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency (the NEA) published a report in 
2000 on the need for focused training of the next generation of nuclear scientists. In the 
report, entitled “Nuclear Education and Training: Cause for Concern?”129, the NEA says 
that the average age of faculty members in academic institutions is almost 50 – in other 
words, would be rapidly approaching retirement age by the time replacements could be 
trained.130 They called for a push on the teaching of nuclear disciplines at undergraduate 
and postgraduate level and, to that end, established the annual International School of 
Nuclear Law (ISNL) in France in 2001.131 Approximately 500 doctoral level students have 
passed through the ISNL since its inauguration,132 which is starting to redress the shortfall 
predicted by the NEA. Not only did the closing year of the twentieth century see a lack of 
interest in nuclear technology amongst the public, the media and politicians therefore, 
even academics were, to paraphrase Samuel Goldwyn, staying away from the subject in 
droves. 
The lack of new recruits to the industry relates well to the idea that nuclear had all 
but disappeared from mainstream consciousness. This is reinforced by the apparent lack 
of interest from the media. A search of the online database of the Times newspaper 
reveals that between 1 January and 31 December 2000, there were just four articles 
published which included the term “nuclear power.” By contrast, in 2006 (the year 
following the announcement of possible nuclear “new-build”) the same newspaper 
published 1,104 articles including those same words.133 
All of this could suggest that the nuclear industry in the early part of the twenty first 
century was, if not dead, certainly dying. This, however, is far from the truth. As the New 
Internationalist put it, in 2005:  
“Not long ago, you could have been forgiven for thinking that nuclear technology 
was on its way out. After major disasters such as Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl, officials were sizing up the nails for the industry’s coffin. But it would 
seem that nuclear power wasn’t dead – just resting.”134 
Despite all of this apparent surface calmness, the nuclear industry was merely 
regrouping after a relative downturn in its fortunes. Global industry bodies such as the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators, the World Nuclear Association, and the World 
Nuclear Fuel Market linked together with regional and national bodies such as the Uranium 
Information Centre in Australia, the US-based Nuclear Suppliers Association, and the UK’s 
Nuclear Industry Association to share information about the different nuclear 
                                        
127 DTI, 2005, The prospects for nuclear power in the UK: Conclusions of the government’s nuclear review 
(Cmnd 2860), Department of Trade and Industry, London: HMSO 
128 The opening of Sizewell B in 1992, for example, provoked a brief resurgence in mainstream press interest. 
129 NEA, 2000, Nuclear Education and Training: Cause for Concern? A Summary Report, Issy-les-Moulineaux: 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. 
130 Ibid., p11. 
131 NEA, 2001, Press Communiqué: The First International School of Nuclear Law Opens in Montpellier, France, 
Issy-les-Moulineaux: Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. More discussion of the issue of shortages of trained 
personnel can be found in Lovins, A.B., & Sheikh, I., 2008, (The Nuclear Illusion, RMI Report E08-01, 
Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute), who state that “40 per cent of those working at US plants are 
eligible for retirement before 2015.” Gribben claims that up to 9,000 graduates and 4,500 skilled workers will 
be needed before 2018, and Bleasdale says that the number of people involved in nuclear Research and 
Development has fallen from around 9,000 in 1980 to just over 1,000. See also Catto, I., 2007, Where are the 
People? Nucl. Eng. Intl. 512(637), 29 
132 NEA, 2009, International School of Nuclear Law, Issy-les-Moulineaux: Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. 
133 The search of the Times database (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/) was carried out on 04/07/07. 
134 Ma’anit, A., 2005, Nuclear is the new black, New Internationalist, Issue 382, pp1-9:1. 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 18 
environments across the world.135 
The final period starts in 2004 and runs until 2007. This is the period in which both 
the US President, George W Bush, and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced 
plans to return nuclear power to their countries, for reasons ostensibly linked to climate 
change and energy security. 
Figure 1.3: Numbers of reactors (UK and Global)136 
 
Underpinning all four time periods are the statistical figures relating to nuclear 
reactors. Figure 1.3, above, is a graphic representation of the annual figures for number 
of nuclear reactors ordered, under construction and operating for each year from 1953 to 
2006 for the UK, and 1960 to 2006 for the rest of the world. Both graphs show a similar 
curve in terms of the growth, peak, and decline in reactor orders, and this could 
theoretically be mapped onto the idea of a product life cycle first used in relation to 
marketing new products 1965.137 There are, however, many conceptual differences 
between introducing a new type of product into a free and open market, and the 
introduction of nuclear power into the national grid, not least of which is the idea of 
consumer choice.  
The time periods are examined first in terms of the statutory and other legislative 
measures which are put in place relating to nuclear technology. This enables a framework 
to be created which can then be used to further examine the political situation at the time 
– in terms of foreign policy, economic policy and so on. Once this is complete, the 
influence of these policies on the reactions to technology will be revealed. In October 
1946, for example, the then Foreign Secretary, Bevin, is reported to have said in one of 
the meeting of the GEN 75 cabinet committee that issues of cost were irrelevant in 
relation to the atomic bomb, and that it “would have a bloody Union Jack on top of it” 
regardless of the expense. It is important to note, however, that Bevin’s comments must 
be seen within the post-war context of a declining Imperial power and, as such, could not 
be expected to necessarily take into account the associated costs. 
Any discussion of the legal development of the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom 
must first clarify what is meant by “the nuclear industry.” The focus of this work will be on 
the nuclear-power industry as categorised by commercial nuclear-power generation. It is 
important to reiterate that in the early years of nuclear research in the UK, the military 
                                        
135 WANO, for example, launched a revised website in 2001, including a “searchable Good Practice database” 
for industry members to use. Source: Lawrence, R., 2001, WANO Website re-launch, Inside WANO, 9 (1) 13. 
136 The left hand graph shows the power generation equivalent (MW(e)) of the nuclear reactors at various 
stages of operation in the UK. Source: IAEA, 2006, IAEA Power Reactor Information System, Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The right hand graph shows the reactor capacity under construction 
worldwide (in GW(e)). Source: IAEA, 2004a, op cit, n126. 
137 Levitt, T., 1965, Exploit the Product Life Cycle, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 43, pp 81-94. 
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and civilian programmes ran very closely with each other, to the extent that the two were 
often entwined. Indeed, until 1973, the UK Atomic Energy Authority had responsibility for 
both power and weapons research.138 Despite this, the development of nuclear 
armaments will not be discussed here, except where provisions overlap with nuclear 
power. The rationale behind this deliberate omission is that the debates surrounding 
nuclear weapons involve different areas of concern – the idea of Mutually Assured 
Destruction, coined by Robert McNamara,139 for example, was of grave concern to debates 
about nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, but has little or no direct relevance 
importance in discussions about energy generation. 
 
1.7: Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the general rationale and background to the thesis, and 
has set out the approach that will be taken in sourcing and assessing the relevant 
information. The twin rationales put forward by the Government in 2005 for reconsidering 
nuclear power were climate change and energy security, both of which are areas too 
complex to be reduced in any meaningful way to glib soundbites. Even so, the Prime 
Minister simplified the ideas greatly in his announcement, saying “climate change is 
producing a sense of urgency”140 and “energy supply is under threat.”141 We have seen 
that this decision was based on an over emphasis on some of the scientific data on climate 
change (variously described as “unanswerable”142 and “overwhelming”143) and an excision 
of the caveats which accompanied that data (it is “mostly”144 anthropogenic). This fits one 
of the themes running through this work, which is that politicians are willing to use what 
Jordan and Davidson call the “political closure of scientific certainty”145 in order to justify 
their decisions. Politicians adopting this approach would be heartened by Professor 
Mehta’s view that in order to generate a “relatively uncritical acceptance of science on the 
part of the public,”146 decision making without public participation is preferred. 
The economic arguments for and against nuclear power have fluctuated over the 
years and, at the point at which the Prime Minister made his 2005 speech, the economic 
situation was looking more favourable to nuclear than it had in previous years. This was 
illustrated by the graph in Figure 1.2, which showed that the UK will soon be importing 
more crude oil than it exports, and thus become vulnerable to global price fluctuations to 
an extent not previously experienced. 
We have seen from the example of the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease how 
decisions are taken by politicians which are certainly informed by scientific understanding, 
but are also based on decades-old contingency plans. Notwithstanding this basis for the 
decisions, they were justified by the relevant Ministers as being based on the advice of 
MAFF scientific advisors.147 Since there is rarely, if ever, true consensus among the 
scientific community, presenting a “best case” scenario as the solution to a problem is 
another example of the “political closure of scientific certainty.”148 
The consideration of the use (or abuse) by governments of science and scientific data 
                                        
138 The weapons responsibility of the UKAEA was separated by the Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) 
Act 1973. 
139 McNamara was US Secretary of Defense when he developed the concept of MAD in 1961. “I determined that 
the United States needed 400 surviving warheads to deter the Russians from a first strike” McNamara, R., 
2000, Mad is not Bad, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 17(3). 
140 Blair, T., 2005, op cit, n1. 
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143 Stern, Lord, 2006, op cit, n60. 
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145 Jordan, G., & Davidson, S., 2000, op cit, n82, p58 
146 Mehta, M., 1998, Risk and Decision-Making: a theoretical approach to public participation in techno-scientific 
conflict situations, Technology in Society 20; 87-98 
147 Hayman, Baroness, 2001, op cit, n99, c867 
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in this technology-heavy area of policy-making will be based around ideas of political 
pragmatism, in the sense of “what works” that Diego uses, refined slightly to “what looks 
most likely to work at the time.” This will be coupled with an exploration of the extent to 
which they match concepts of Technocratic Decision Making, requiring the presence of a 
technocratic decision making élite and one or other of Kantrowitz’s three categories of 
decisions.149 
We have also seen the temporal importance of political pragmatism. The resulting 
success or otherwise of particular decisions or policies should not be used as the gauge by 
which the pragmatic basis is measured, however easy it is to do so. Hindsight is a luxury 
that is available only to researchers, and it is one which decision-makers are never privy. 
it is cleat that the scientists involved in the (unauthorised) experimentation at Chernobyl, 
for example, would not have carried out their actions, yet, at the time, they appeared to 
be relatively risk-free.150 The temporal aspect of pragmatism is also revealed in the ideas 
of proactive political pragmatism and reactive political pragmatism, which have different 
goals in view. 
The combination of these measures will allow us to see the reasons behind key pieces 
of legislation decisions that have shaped the use of commercial nuclear power in the UK 
over the past six decades. As has been suggested already, it is the legislation which 
provides a framework without which policy is ineffective, and thus it is an exploration of 
the White Papers, Parliamentary Debates and wording of the statute, using one or more of 
the rules of statutory interpretation, that allows this examination to take place. 
The first period that will be covered is that which begins with Britain still in the grip of 
the Second World War, when nuclear reactions had not yet moved beyond the laboratory, 
and the focus was on using the technology for weapons production. 
                                        
149 Kantrowitz, A., 1975, op cit, n91 
150 The Chernobyl accident is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. The scientists who carried out the 
unauthorised experiments were later convicted of gross negligence and “sentenced to 10 years in a labor 
camp.” Source: NYT, 1987, Chernobyl Officials Sentenced to Labor Camp, New York Times, July 30, 1987, Page 
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Chapter 2: 
1944-48: The Introduction of Nuclear Power 
2.1: Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the short period from 1944 to 1948, although it also considers 
events from outside that period which have a significant impact on decisions made during 
it. At the beginning of the period, scientists and politicians from the United Kingdom were 
working closely with their counterparts in both Canada and the United States on the 
development of atomic weapons. By the end of the period, however, the US had 
withdrawn from international cooperation and left the UK and Canada to continue this 
development alone. This chapter looks at some of the reasons behind that decision and, 
more importantly, what bearing it had on the decisions made in the UK. 
The first part of the chapter lays out the general common background to nuclear 
research. It was never a field in which any nation claimed exclusivity and, indeed, even 
though American scientists led the way in the mid part of the twentieth century, the US 
did not claim that only it had the right to carry out the work. Since it would be neither 
feasible nor desirable to detail all atomic research here, only the key moments will be 
considered to lay the framework into which the political decisions will fit. 
The second part of the chapter examines the international, regional and national legal 
frameworks within which the UK operated. The political decisions which are the focus of 
this work cannot, and do not, exist in a vacuum and, in the main, they will require 
passage of some form of legislation to move them from the realms of theory to practice. 
The third and fourth sections examine the backgrounds to, and impacts of, the Atomic 
Energy Act 1946 and the Radioactive Substances Act 1948. The 1946 Act attempted to put 
in place a regulatory framework for an industry which not only did not exist, but was also 
one which many people thought would never exist. The 1948 Act, on the other hand, was 
considerably more prosaic in its intentions, regulating as it did an aspect of the industry 
which had been flourishing for some time. 
The final section of the chapter assesses the success or otherwise of post-war 
attempts to keep atomic information secret from other governments, regardless of the 
diplomatic relations that might otherwise exist. The secrecy legislation is considered as is 
the seemingly limitless ability of atomic spies, such as Klaus Fuchs, to infiltrate the 
industries and pass highly sensitive information on to enemy governments. 
The key decisions which were made in the UK during this period will be examined to 
assess extent to which they fit within the ideas of “everyday pragmatism,” and 
Technocratic Decision Making, outlined in the previous chapter. The role that politicians 
have given to science will also be examined, as it underpins much of both concepts. 
The period of time covered in this chapter, therefore, begins and ends before nuclear 
reactions had been put to any commercial use in the field of electricity generation, running 
as it does up to the year in which the existence of the UK’s nuclear-weapons’ programme 
was finally revealed to the House of Commons, although the Secretary of Defence, the Rt 
Hon Albert Alexander, went on to say that he did not feel it would be in the public interest 
to give any more detailed information.151 What is of particular interest here, therefore, is 
the background which enabled those policies to be put into place which would create an 
environment into which commercial nuclear power could later emerge. 
 
2.2: Background and Development 
Indirectly, the roots of nuclear theory can be traced back to the Greek philosopher 
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Leucippus who, in the fifth century BCE,152 started to develop the idea that matter was 
created from particles that were too small to see. For practical purposes, however, the 
theories behind nuclear power can be traced directly back to the end of the nineteenth 
century. In 1895, Wilhelm Röntgen had discovered x-rays. The following year, Antoine 
Becquerel had discovered the phenomenon of natural radioactivity in uranium salts and, in 
1898, Pierre and Marie Curie discovered the main radioactive elements in uranium ore 
(which they named radium and polonium). This was all fundamental or “blue-sky” 
research, which had no particular purpose other than “improving our understanding of 
nature.”153 Becquerel and the Curies shared the Nobel Prize for Physics for this work in 
1903154 and both they and Röntgen have given their names to measurements in nuclear 
physics.155 Other scientists, notably Ernest Rutherford, Enrico Fermi, Léo Szilárd and 
Albert Einstein followed up on this research in the early part of the twentieth century. 
Szilárd, who was convinced of the importance of keeping nuclear technology out of the 
hands of the Nazis,156 convinced Einstein to read the manuscript by him and Fermi in 
1939. Einstein agreed with Szilárd on the seriousness of the situation and wrote to US 
President Roosevelt in August of that year, encouraging him to “speed up the 
experimental work, which is at present being carried out within the limits of the budgets of 
University Laboratories.”157 Very little of this work was understood by politicians or 
legislators and, consequently, there was next to no regulation of the work which was 
being carried out, other than in terms of budgetary constraints. 
Without the work of these pioneers, the development of nuclear technology would 
have been delayed by many years and may have followed a completely different path. 
These early discoveries created the foundations of scientific knowledge upon which the 
nuclear industry was built. To paraphrase Newton158, if the nuclear industry has advanced, 
it has done so by standing on the shoulders of giants, such as the Curies. 
The work on atomic research had been started by scientists working at least 
ostensibly independently from any government body. Pierre and Marie Curie, for example 
claimed to be self-funded, but were actually given materials by the Austrian government 
and laboratory space and support from the French Radioelements industry.159 Enrico Fermi 
too was granted $6,000 of funding by the US Armed Forces in 1940 to continue his work 
at the University of Columbia.160 Just as politicians use the language and information of 
‘science’ when it suits them to do so, scientists who claim to be independent will often 
accept funding from industry or governments, and move beyond their field of expertise to 
advocate particular courses of action. At the time of the Curies and Fermi, this was not 
regarded as problematic although it has now led to what Professor Worcester identified as 
a situation where government scientists are less trusted than those working for NGOs,161 
as we saw in the previous chapter. 
Despite this knowledge, the generation of electricity through the use of nuclear fission 
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(i.e., through “splitting the atom”) did not become a possibility until December 1942. A 
team of 50 physicists and chemists, led by Fermi and Szilárd,162 successfully completed 
construction of the first self-sustaining nuclear reactor (Chicago Pile-1, or CP-1) in the 
converted Squash Courts underneath Stagg Field, at the University of Chicago.163 The first 
experimental reactor in the United Kingdom was the Graphite Low Energy Experimental 
Pile (GLEEP) built at Harwell in 1946, which began operating in 1947.164 Much has been 
written on Fermi and Szilárd, especially the latter’s growing disillusionment with the 
increasing use by the United States of atomic technology for weaponry,165 but it will not 
be discussed further here for two reasons. Firstly, nuclear weapons are beyond the scope 
of this work and, despite the brief overview above, this is not intended merely to be a 
biography of the key players in this vast field. 
It was not until 1951,166 a further nine years after CP-1, that the experimental 
breeder reactor EBR-1, funded by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (US AEC), 
was built by Westinghouse at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) site in Arco, Idaho. In December of that year, EBR-1 achieved an 
historic milestone by producing usable amounts of electricity from a nuclear reaction for 
the first time.167 Whereas the Fermi-Szilárd reactor was self-sustaining, meaning it 
required no external power source to keep it going, this reactor produced more power 
than it consumed. Although the power produced by the EBR-1 reactor in Idaho was 
usable, the first reactor to be connected to a grid was at Obninsk, near Moscow, on 26 
June 1954.168 The small (5MWe) reactor provided enough electricity for about 2,000 
homes.169 
In the early stages of the development of nuclear power, the threat as accepted by 
governments was that if the development of this technology was not pursued, then a 
division would rapidly emerge between the “haves” and the “have nots.” British Prime 
Minister, Clement Attlee, recognised this threat and argued in 1945: 
“Scientists agree that we cannot stop the march of discovery. We can assume 
that any attempt to keep this as a secret in the hands of the USA and the UK is 
useless. Scientists in other countries are certain to hit upon the secret…. The 
most we may have is a few years’ start.”170  
In the years covering the end of the Second World War and the immediate post-war 
period, this fear of being “left behind” was evident in both the penalties imposed under 
the McMahon Act in the US and the counter-espionage efforts made by the UK, both of 
which will be discussed below.  
 
2.3: The Legal Framework 
Having briefly looked at the background to the introduction of nuclear power, it is now 
                                        
162 ANL, 2003, The Chicago Pile-1 Pioneers, Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory. 
163 The CP-1 reactor went critical on 2 December 1942. It had been constructed by the Nobel prize-winning 
Italian physicist Professor Enrico Fermi, and the Hungarian nuclear physicist and biologist Dr (later Professor), 
Léo Szilárd. Source: Lanouette W., Silard, B., & Salk, J., 1994, Genius in the Shadows: A biography of Léo 
Szilárd, the man behind the Bomb, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
164 UKAEA, 2004, Harwell Project Profiles: GLEEP, Harwell: United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 
165 See, for example, Lanouette W., et. al, 1994, op. cit, n163. 
166 EIA, 2001, Energy in the United States: 1635-2000, Washington DC: US Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Administration. 
167 INEEL, 2003, INEEL’s Historical Contributions, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, 
San Francisco, CA: US Atomic Energy Commission. The reactor, an experimental “breeder” type reactor known 
as EBR-1 first produced electricity on 20 December 1951. 
168 IAEA, 2004b, From Obninsk Beyond: Nuclear Power Conference Looks to Future, Vienna: International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Hennessey, P., 2006, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties, London: Allen Land Publishing, p137. National 
Archives, nd, Transcript: Extracts from a memorandum on the Atom Bomb from Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
28th August 1945. Catalogue Ref CAB 126/257. 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 24 
necessary to consider the legislation that gave rise to the structure within which the 
nuclear industry operated. In total, there have been over thirty Acts of Parliament and 
almost 130 pieces of secondary legislation concerning the nuclear power industry since 
1946.171 Scientific guidance in preparation of legislation comes from, inter alia, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and UKAEA, the development of all of which 
will be discussed below. This guidance has strong persuasive powers, but it is not all 
binding on governmental policy-making decisions. As will be shown, this legislation will 
have been triggered at one of three levels: 
(1) National. Generally, the UK government instigates legislation following a 
national consultation process.172 This process begins with the issuing of 
Green Papers and consultation documents which are then followed by 
White Papers. A White Paper forms the basis of a Bill which is then 
debated at length before both houses of Parliament. Once the debating 
process is complete, the amended Bill may receive Royal Assent and 
become a full Act of Parliament.173 
(2) European. The UK has been a member of the EEC (now EU) since 1973 
and, with the passing of the European Communities Act 1972, must 
incorporate European Directives into national law.174 The atomic energy 
aspect of the EU is covered by Euratom, which was founded as one of 
the three parallel communities in 1958. Euratom merged with the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic 
Community under the Merger Treaty in 1965 to become part of the new 
EEC.175 This means that the UK, unlike the founding members of the 
EEC, has only ever belonged to the merged Community, which dealt 
with atomic power as an integral part of economic policy.176 
(3) International. The UK is a signatory to a large number of international 
treaties (mainly, but not exclusively, through its membership of the 
United Nations and EU), which have had a bearing on several of the 
pieces of statute to be discussed below. International Law is generally 
separated into ‘hard’ law (created through the recognized procedure of 
law-making in international law)177 and ‘soft’ law (the more informal 
stages in the conception of rules of international law, when these have 
not yet crystallized)178 and is rarely, if ever, binding on individuals.179  
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UK policy on nuclear power has rarely, if ever, existed outside some form of 
international control thus, theoretically, this section could cover the whole of the UK’s 
policy over six decades. However, it will be limited to those international efforts which 
directly impacted on UK legislation or which created bodies to oversee global and regional 
nuclear policy. 
In practice, a good example of hard law would be the 1980 Vienna Convention on the 
Physical Protection on Nuclear Material discussed below. The Convention is binding on the 
35 signatory states and, if there is a dispute between two signatories, there is a 
mechanism for resolution. Non-signatory states are not affected by the terms of the treaty 
in any way, and can neither enforce its terms nor be subjects to sanctions for non-
compliance. A specific example of soft law in the area of nuclear power is somewhat 
harder to find, however. The guidelines of the French-based OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 
would be one possibility. As a voluntary organisation, the NEA has no real binding power 
but, instead, it works as: 
“a forum for sharing information and experience and promoting international co-
operation; a centre of excellence which helps Member countries to pool and 
maintain their technical expertise; a vehicle for facilitating policy analyses and 
developing consensus based on its technical work.”180 
Whether hard or soft, international law provides the framework within which national 
legislation tends to operate. This means that the events and bodies discussed below, 
which all either led to the creation of international measures, or were created because of 
them, all have a bearing on the UK’s nuclear policy which is to a large extent outside the 
control of our own politicians. 
In addition to the different levels at which legislation has been triggered, it can be 
shown that there are several thematic motifs running thorough the legislation. The 
overlying approach of government in this area has consistently followed the traditional, 
top-down, command and control (CAC) model of regulation, in which standards are set 
that have to be met by all operators in the area, with compliance with those standards 
being monitored regularly.181 CAC strategies are the most straightforward to put in place, 
but they “will normally not be cost effective”182 even though “cost effectiveness… depends 
on local circumstances.”183 This is because the initial simplicity of any CAC model has two 
inherent weaknesses: 
(1) it presupposes the same ambient environmental standards across wide 
geographical areas; and 
(2) it is generally based on baseline and background data which, due to the 
inherent scientific complexity of ecosystems, can never be relied upon 
completely. 
Despite these weaknesses, the generalised CAC approach was revived in the UK in 
2007 with the pre-approval of new reactor types which is discussed in the appendix. 
Of all of the time periods covered here, this will be the most straightforward to 
address in terms of the domestic legislation which was passed in relation to the 
commercial nuclear industry. To put it simply, there were only two Acts passed in the UK. 
There were, however, interesting developments internationally which had an equally 
important bearing on the UK’s policies, and these will also be discussed here. 
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2.3.1: Background – International 
In January 1946, with the very first resolution of the General Assembly, the United 
Nations had formed an Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to ensure that atomic energy 
was only used for peaceful purposes and that all atomic weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction were eliminated from national arsenals.184 Membership of the UN Atomic 
Energy Commission consisted of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
(USA, UK, USSR, France and China185), along with Canada, which was included because of 
its wartime role in nuclear weapons research. The members could not, however, come to 
an agreement on the issue of elimination and the UNAEC was dissolved by the General 
Assembly in 1952.186 Four years later, a successor body, the IAEA, was finally established 
by the UN, albeit with a slightly different remit, having abandoned its seemingly futile 
quest to eliminate atomic weapons: 
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so 
far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military 
purpose.”187 
In March 1946, James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, made public a 
Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (the Acheson-Lilienthal Report).188 
This report made a strong link between future research into atomic energy and the 
dangers of atomic warfare, and proposed a series of plans to avoid the occurrence of the 
latter. The report also came to two further conclusions: 
“Inspections could not be relied upon to ensure that States were complying with 
prohibitions on developing nuclear weapons whilst simultaneously allowing them 
to develop atomic energy; but 
If a way could be found, it could not only ensure security, but also foster 
beneficial and humanitarian uses of atomic energy.”189 
Partly in order to address the issues raised in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and, 
partly to ensure its own continued superiority in the field, the United States also passed 
an Atomic Energy Act in 1946.190 Unlike its UK counterpart, which is covered below, this 
Act established a body to oversee the development of atomic energy, the US AEC,191 
which was authorised to establish safety and health regulations for the possession and use 
of fissionable and by-product materials; thus, effectively, regulating itself.192 The US AEC 
took over the work of the Manhattan Project at midnight on 31 December 1946,193 after 
some debate in Congress as to whether or not nuclear technology should remain 
exclusively under military control194 – an argument which was diametrically opposed to 
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that put forward in the Baruch Plan.195 Also, like the UNAEC, the US AEC no longer exists. 
After increasing criticism of the AEC’s double role as the proponent of the use of atomic 
energy on the one hand, and the industry regulator on the other,196 it was abolished in 
1974 by the Energy Reorganization Act, which will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
Of the three bodies set up at the start of their relevant atomic power programmes, 
therefore, the UKAEA (which was set up few years later) is the only one which has not had 
to be abolished – although its twenty-first century remit is far removed from that of 1954. 
The extent of the threats posed by the wartime use of nuclear technology was not 
accurately predicted prior to report of the Manhattan Engineer District on the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had limited publication in June 1946.197 Some side effects 
were noted, but it had been suggested that these could be screened,198 making the 
widespread commercial and private use of nuclear power viable and turning “the Era of 
Atomic Energy into the Age of Plenty.”199 The potential for risk, therefore, had been 
acknowledged, but the scale of the impact were that risk to occur, had not, so it was not 
felt to be serious enough to warrant standing in the way of such a great technological leap 
forward. This is perhaps best illustrated in the United States’ legislation, particularly the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which states: 
“It is a field in which unknown factors are involved…. It is reasonable to 
anticipate, however, that tapping this new source of energy will cause profound 
changes in our present way of life.”200 
The US statute, illustrated the seriousness with which the science behind nuclear 
reactions was regarded by imposing harsh penalties on anyone who broke the law. Section 
10(b) relates to the disclosure of restricted information and allows for a range of 
punishments – from a $20,000 fine, through maximum terms of imprisonment of 20 years 
or life to, in the most serious cases, the death penalty.201 
Despite collaboration with the UK and Canada during the Manhattan Project, a 
combination of the McMahon Bill (which, as was shown above, had made passing nuclear-
related secrets into a potentially capital offence) and “the deepening rift between the US 
and the USSR… the US moved closer to the McMahon concept and drew a veil of total 
secrecy over all nuclear matters”202 in 1946. As an important, but relatively minor, partner 
in the development of nuclear technology, the UK had been heavily reliant on progress 
made in the US and this move would have left the UK out of the race towards nuclear 
power. Having been cut off from this research, however, the Government set up its own 
“atomic energy project… under the Ministry of Supply”203 at the end of 1945. This project 
was to remain more of a theoretical idea than a practical one, as the creation of a single 
agency in the UK to take on this responsibility remained nine years away.204  
It was, perhaps, too soon after the end of the war to expect countries to share the 
technology they had spent years developing – either through their own research or by 
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espionage. It is argued that this air of selfishness in research had started when the United 
States was so quick to ban its own collaboration with Canada and the UK in 1943. Attlee’s 
passionate support for the Baruch plan, and the readiness of the UK and Canada to 
endorse it, seem to give the lie to that argument, until it is realised that the UK and 
Canada had more to gain than to lose by sharing atomic information – since the US had 
the lion’s share of the data, the UK and Canada would have been net beneficiaries. This 
situation fits comfortably with the ideas of both Jasanoff205 and Teichman206 of a 
technocratic élite controlling policy making – some of those in the United States calling 
with the loudest voices against information sharing were the atomic scientists.207 
There existed a further common point about the UNAEC, US AEC and AEA 1946. 
January 1946, when UN Resolution 1(I) was passed, was only five months after the use of 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and five months prior to Major-General Groves’ 
report into those bombings),208 and just over three years after the successful inaugural 
test of the Fermi-Szilárd reactor in Chicago (see above). The United States passed its own 
Atomic Energy Act in August, with the UK not far behind in November – still only fifteen 
months after Hiroshima. All three also pre-date the first production of usable electricity 
from a nuclear reaction and illustrate the speed with which both the national and 
international communities were working to set up agencies when the practical science had 
yet to be developed. As was stated at the beginning of this section, this fits effectively 
within the theory that policies were being adopted with a level of precaution as to their 
effects. This is nothing new: there has seldom been a government policy put into place 
without at least some thought having been given as to its effects. What is new here is an 
appreciation of the potential scale of the effects if the policy were to be flawed, and the 
measures that were put into place to make sure it worked: harsh prison terms for anyone 
who refused to give up information; sweeping powers to acquire land; a Ministerial duty to 
promote the use of the new technology and further Ministerial “control of [the] 
development”209 of atomic energy. 
The speed of decision-making also served to emphasise the political repercussions of 
the use of atomic weapons by the United States. As we have seen, international reactions 
can be broadly categorised into two camps: on one side, those countries without an 
established programme for developing weapons, which supported the Baruch Plan’s 
proposed ban on all atomic weapons and wanted the benefits of nuclear power and, on the 
other side, those which had already invested heavily in their own weapons-research 
programmes and saw the development of atomic weaponry as a matter of national pride, 
or security, or both. Despite Attlee’s efforts, the UK fell quite definitely into the latter 
camp.  
 
2.3.2: Background – Domestic 
The fact that any statute on atomic energy was passed in the UK at all would not have 
been predictable only a few years before the Atomic Energy Act 1946. The MAUD 
Committee, which had been set up in 1939, was an independent scientific body which 
carried out research into atomic reactions.210 The committee, chaired by the physicist 
Professor (later Sir) George Paget Thomson, was, in effect, a sub-committee of the Royal 
Society’s Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Warfare, and its mandate was to carry 
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out “an in-depth review of atomic energy from uranium fission for military purposes.”211 
The Chairman of the contemporaneous Aeronautical Research Committee, the chemist, Sir 
Henry Tizard, “failed to see much of a future for nuclear power at all.”212 
During the negotiations for what was to become the Quebec Agreement of August 
1943213 Winston Churchill and the Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, 
echoed this sentiment, telling the American Secretary of War, Henry L Stimson, that the 
prospects for Britain’s post-war commercial exploitation of nuclear power were “remote 
and hardly worth considering.”214 Churchill and Anderson’s statement served two 
purposes. Firstly, it satisfied the fears of the Americans, who had been reluctant to 
continue working with the British on atomic research because of the risks of Britain using 
the technology for its own purposes. Secondly, it meant that the British could ensure that 
the Americans could not “secure a monopoly in a field of enormous potential military and 
industrial value.”215 Even though both countries publicly stated that they felt a nuclear-
power programme was something of a lame duck, neither seems to have wanted to forgo 
the possibility of reaping economic and spin-off benefits from pursuing such a programme. 
Despite Churchill and Anderson’s statement to the contrary only two years earlier, 
immediately after the war, decision-making in the nuclear research field was controlled by 
an “ad hoc committee of Cabinet ministers, called GEN.75,”216 which was created by Attlee 
in October 1945. The Committee, also known as the “Cabinet Committee on Atomic 
Energy”217 did not include the Minister of Fuel and Power, Emanuel Shinwell.218 Shinwell 
was to oversee the post-war nationalisation of the coal industry and the creation of the 
National Coal Board in 1947. He was also in charge of coal stocks, which had been run 
dangerously low by the exceptionally cold winter of 1947, although “some of the problem 
with coal stock was undoubtedly Manny Shinwell’s weakness as Minister for Fuel and 
Power.”219 This is illustrative of the fact that, in its early years, nuclear energy was little 
more than a by-product of the manufacture of plutonium for atomic weapons. The decision 
to restrict its discussions to a small portion of the Cabinet can therefore be attributed to 
Diego’s idea of political pragmatism – as it was not yet seen as an important area itself, 
despite being a spin-off from nuclear weapons, and “what works” in terms of getting a 
decision made is reducing the number of consultees to a minimum. It would therefore 
have been unnecessary to have discussed it with the full Cabinet. This was emphasised 
within a few days of the formation of GEN.75, when Attlee was asked by the Conservative 
MP, Lt Col (later Sir) Martin Lindsay, during a House of Commons’ debate when a full 
debate on atomic energy was likely. Attlee replied that he did not “think a Debate could 
usefully take place; but a statement will be made as soon as possible.”220 
GEN.75 only survived for about eighteen months before evolving into a further, even 
more exclusive committee, GEN.163, but, in its short lifespan, it did authorise the 
construction of the atomic pile at Windscale; which was intended to irradiate uranium in 
order to produce plutonium for the nuclear-weapons’ programme.221 One of the final acts 
of GEN.75, however, was for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, and President 
of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, to argue strongly that the creation of a British 
nuclear weapon at £30-£40m222 was becoming far too expensive,223 an argument to which 
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the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, responded: 
“We’ve got to have this thing over here whatever it costs. We’ve got to have the 
bloody Union Jack on top of it.”224 
The new GEN.163 committee consisted of the same members as GEN.75, only without 
the two chief doubters, Sir Stafford Cripps and Hugh Dalton.225 It only met once, and its 
sole purpose appears to have been to make the decision to produce an atomic bomb226 – 
once this was done, the committee was disbanded. 
Both GEN.75 and GEN.163 were working on the basis that the major drive of research 
should be towards the development of atomic weapons and thus atomic energy production 
was a sideline to the plutonium-enrichment process. This was backed up by the fact that 
“the first Controller of Production of Atomic Energy (within the Ministry of Supply) was 
Marshal of the RAF Lord Portal of Hungerford.”227 Portal’s chain of command for this role 
led directly back to Attlee and the activities in which his team were involved were “beyond 
question by anyone, even the Ministry of Defence.”228 Partly, it can be argued, this focus 
on atomic weaponry as opposed to power can be linked to the state of development of the 
technology itself, since no reactor had yet been constructed which actually produced a 
usable amount of electricity. Equally, if not more so, the focus will have been created by a 
combination of the cooling of relations and mutual suspicion of the Soviet Union by the 
Western powers229 (which Bernard Baruch was to refer to, in 1947, as “a cold war”230) and 
the desire to see Britain in the vanguard of technological development (as evidenced by 
Bevin’s “bloody Union Jack” comment, above231). This would suggest that, unlike the early 
discussions on the possible dead-end technology of nuclear energy, discussions on nuclear 
weapons brought with them a raft of other issues. Britain’s place in the post-war world, 
for example, was seen by Cripps as being dependent on development of an independent 
nuclear weapon “whatever it costs.” 
All of the decisions made by GEN.75 and GEN.163 were kept secret until the 1970s, 
and this lack of accountability in relation to Britain’s atomic programme was later to lead 
to accusations that the “British [nuclear] industry continues to exhibit little enthusiasm for 
freedom of information.”232 As we have seen, the decision-making body did not include 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister for Fuel and Power or the President of the 
Board of Trade. Put very simply, this meant that there was no representation from, or 
oversight by, the members of the cabinet in charge of money, business or the energy 
industry; all of whom should have been essential elements of a nuclear industry. 
Returning to the ideas put forward by Jasanoff233 and Teichman,234 above, about rule by a 
technocratic decision making élite being the hallmark of TDM, this does not really ring 
true. The combination of Attlee, Cripps, Dalton and Bevin which made up GEN.75, and 
Attlee and Bevin which made up GEN.163 was certainly a decision making élite, at the 
very least in the sense of being “a group of people considered to be superior in an 
organisation,”235 but shows little sign of being technocratic.  
The rationale given for the decisions taken by the various Cabinet Committees is 
interesting. At home, in public, Attlee was using the rhetoric of science and arguing that 
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since “[s]cientists agree that we cannot stop the march of discovery”236 it was beholden 
on all of the British Government, Parliament and people to support the development of 
nuclear technology. Within a month or two, however, he had announced not only that 
there would be no parliamentary debate at that time, but that it would not even be useful 
to have one, as the science (relating both to weapons and energy) was so complex.237 In 
cabinet meetings, however, Attlee seemed to move away from this stance, claiming that: 
“the only hope for the world is that we should all lay aside our nationalistic ideas 
and strive without reservation to bring about an international relationship in 
which war is entirely ruled out.”238 
Again, this illustrates the distinction between atomic energy and atomic weapons – 
the former was regarded at the time as being a sideline, and so could be dealt with on a 
pragmatic basis, whereas the latter was subject to many different political and personal 
positions, including those of Cripps, who was primarily concerned with Britain’s place in 
the world, and Attlee, who wanted to work towards an end to war itself.  
Away from home, in the UN General Assembly, Attlee was again arguing passionately 
that the plan for the eventual global elimination of atomic weapons outlined by US 
representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch,239 gave 
communities “a choice between life and death.”240 Attlee had also written the previous 
year to President Truman arguing that “if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb 
without changing the political relationships of States, sooner or later these bombs will be 
used for mutual annihilation.”241 
In addition to playing up the inevitability of atomic discoveries and the associated 
need to change the control of atomic weapons from nations to the UN (an argument which 
was initially supported by President Truman242), Attlee and Bevin were determined to 
press ahead with the independent development of an atomic weapon (and, as a sideline, 
atomic energy) because they felt they had been let down by the US Government and the 
terms of the McMahon Act, regarding the latter as a “breach of faith.”243 Bevin, in his 
determined arguments at the GEN.75 meeting in October 1946, gave a clue as to his 
reasons for insisting so strongly that the UK had its own nuclear programme, saying:  
“I don’t mind for myself, but I don’t want any other Foreign Secretary of this 
country to be talked at or to by a Secretary of State in the United States as I 
have just had [sic] in my discussions with Mr Byrnes.”244 
At about the same time as the Baruch Plan was being rejected by the United Nations, 
the Nobel Prize-winning physicist and MAUD Committee member, Professor PMS Blackett 
(later Lord Blackett of Chelsea), was arguing that this failure was inevitable as “it 
attempted the impossible. The attempt to find complete security was bound to fail in the 
field of atomic energy as in all other fields of life.”245 Blackett, who had been a member of 
Sir Henry Tizard’s Aeronautical Research Committee, also rather scathingly pointed out 
that the American public “became so frightened [by publicity surrounding the dangers of 
atomic weapons] that nothing but the prospect of 100 per cent safety became 
acceptable.”246 That this fear was evident so early in the development of atomic weapons 
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is interesting, since the American public were forbidden from knowing anything about the 
technology. It is also likely to have provided a good rationale for keeping the information 
secret. 
Here then we have a situation where the Prime Minister, a man described variously as 
“no intellectual”247 and “singularly free of the certainty that he knew what was right for 
party and country,”248 using ideas inherited from unnamed scientists to push for the 
country’s involvement in a new form of weaponry and energy; albeit to develop 
technologies which he intended would later be passed to the United Nations. Two of his 
senior Cabinet Ministers (Cripps and Dalton) disapproved on economic grounds of the 
decision to continue with the atomic-weapon plan, but the decision was forced through by 
Bevin, whose opinion that President Truman and Secretary Byrnes lacked judgement249 
may have been exacerbated by his perceived poor treatment by them, outlined above. 
The wider public, and even the wider membership of the Government, were being told 
as little as possible about the developments, even while the parliamentary debate was 
underway for the Atomic Energy Bill. Whilst it again sounds like an élite of sorts, it also 
suggests that the premise outlined in the previous chapter, that politicians will use 
scientific discourse to camouflage pragmatic decisions by “blinding the public with 
science”250 may not be entirely accurate. In this case, there was no information revealed 
to the government, parliament or the public, and thus there was no need to camouflage 
anything. Either way, in the case of deciding to construct the UK’s atomic bomb and the 
associated energy-producing plants, the few politicians who were aware of it flatly refused 
to admit that they had made a decision in the first place. 
 
2.4: The Atomic Energy Act 1946 
Out of this maelstrom of secret deals, public denials and political wrangling was born 
the first-ever piece of legislation in the UK concerning nuclear-power generation, the 
Atomic Energy Act 1946. When he introduced the second reading of the Bill in the House 
of Commons in the afternoon of 8 October 1946, the Prime Minister had made several key 
points, including: 
“The full economic significance of atomic energy is not yet known” 
“The programme of work already approved will cost something like £30 million” 
“We are anxious that research should be encouraged — not merely not impeded, 
but encouraged — and research is being undertaken by universities and by 
commercial firms under contracts placed and financed by the Government.”251 
The Act was one of 55 Acts passed by the Attlee government in its first fifteen months 
after taking power,252 and formed part of the busiest parliamentary year in terms of new 
Acts since 1939 and the third busiest since 1925.253 Given the finite time available for 
parliamentary debates, and the fact that nuclear energy was still predominantly seen as 
an interesting sideline, it is perhaps not surprising that the House of Commons discussions 
surrounding the Act lasted for only three hours on 8 October and four hours on 11 
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October.254 
Described (in the Long Title to the Act) as “An Act to provide for the development of 
atomic energy and the control of such development, and for purposes connected 
therewith” it was a relatively short and general Act containing only 21 sections and two 
Schedules, which is to be expected since the Act was controlling an industry which did not 
yet exist. The Act was entered onto the statute books on 6 November 1946, slightly less 
than a month after it was introduced to the House. This is a far shorter time period than 
one would expect an important, though comparatively short, Bill to take. The imprecise 
nature of the long title suggests that the science had not yet been fully developed, and 
the discussions around it imply that it would be far better for the Minister (and hence the 
government) to control it than it would be to leave it to the open market. This gives the 
framework within which Attlee’s comments (above) about research being carried out by 
universities but financed by the government could operate. 
Section 1 gives a wide duty to the Minister of Supply “to promote and control the 
development of atomic energy.” Section 2 of the Act supplemented the Minister’s duty 
with further powers, relating to the “production use and disposal”255 of atomic energy and 
associated research, combined with any steps that were considered necessary for storage 
and transport of any of the articles required to carry out these powers. The catchall 
section included the power to do “all such things… as appear to the Minister necessary or 
expedient for the exercise of the foregoing powers.”256 Section 2 is clearly a pragmatic 
measure, since it is broad and is the section which gives practical effectiveness to the duty 
given in section 1 – in other words, section 2 is what is needed to make section 1 work, 
when it is “what works [that] is the hallmark”257 of political pragmatism. Section 1 on the 
other hand gives a strong duty to the Minister to promote the development of atomic 
energy, which is harder to classify directly as pragmatic, either in the “everyday” or 
political sense, since without the passage of the Act, the development of atomic energy in 
any commercial sense was not even mentioned, let alone being an inevitability. However, 
what was inevitable, given the thrust to create atomic weapons was that some energy 
would be created as a by-product. The “development” mentioned in the section is focused 
primarily on scientific development rather than the commercial development – this latter 
would not become a possibility for several years yet. Indeed, one of the suggested 
additions to the section while it was being debated in the House of Commons was: 
“by assisting and fostering private research and development and by a 
programme of Government-conducted research and development, in order to 
encourage maximum scientific progress.”258 
Under the powers given to the Minister in section 2 of the Act, the Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment (AERE) was created to “provide the basic scientific data and 
understanding needed to launch and underpin Britain’s atomic energy projects.”259 The 
first AERE Director was John Cockcroft, who had previously worked with the Ministry of 
Supply as Assistant Director of Scientific Research, in which role he oversaw the 
development of radar in the early 1940s.260 Cockcroft, who by then had been awarded the 
Nobel Prize for Physics,261 would later become one of the first committee members of the 
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UK Atomic Energy Authority in 1954,262 making the natural transition from research itself 
to overseeing the research of others. 
The Act further gave the Minster the ability to compel members of the public to 
surrender any information pertaining to atomic power263 and imposed criminal liability 
upon anyone who refused to concede to such a demand. Offences under the Act were 
punishable by a period of imprisonment of up to three months or a fine of up to £100 (or 
both) on summary conviction. If the offence led to a conviction on indictment, the penalty 
was far stiffer – imprisonment of up to five years, a fine of up to £500, or both.264 The 
prison terms remain unchanged, but the levels of the fines have subsequently been 
changed, so that the fine for a conviction on indictment under the amended Act can be “of 
any amount.”265 The potential for an unlimited fine and imprisonment purely for non-
disclosure of information is considerably stiffer than others that are now imposed under 
other statute. 266 When the Bill was introduced, the Prime Minister admitted that some of 
the proposed powers might appear to be rather drastic, but justified them by arguing 
that: 
“[W]e are dealing with an unusual subject. I think it essential the Government 
must be able to inform themselves fully of unauthorised activities, not, as I said 
before, only in the interests of this country, but in view of the fact that we are 
working to try to get international control in which we must play our full part.”267 
In contrast to many subsequent Acts, it is somewhat surprising to find that there was 
no provision made in the Atomic Energy Act 1946 for the situation where false information 
pertaining to nuclear-power declaration is given to an Inspector. This led to the potential 
for a situation whereby, if one refused to supply relevant information to the Minister (or, 
more likely, those who were acting on his authority), one could end up in prison for up to 
five years. If, on the other hand, one provided information which was false, there was no 
sanction available. This can partly be explained by the fact that it would only be the 
atomic scientists who would have been able to correctly assess the veracity of 
information, and so to specifically seek to punish the public for issues they could not 
control would be seen as unfair. These powers are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, 
they can only work if there is a presumption that members of the public have “information 
pertaining to atomic power” at a time when, globally, there was not a great deal of such 
information in existence. Secondly, in light of the earlier discussion which suggested that 
the Minister was unlikely to have any in-depth knowledge of atomic and would, therefore, 
be unlikely to be able to tell who was giving false information. Finally, there is no 
distinction in the Act between “relevant information” which concerns the physics of a 
nuclear reaction, and “relevant information” which pertains solely to the whereabouts of a 
particular individual. Section 11 of the Act268 generated the longest and most detailed 
discussion in Parliament when, as Clause 11 of the Atomic Energy Bill, it was debated for 
well over an hour. Labour MP for Wimbledon, Arthur Palmer, was particularly concerned 
that the Clause was being drafted in terms that were too wide, and proposed various 
scenarios illustrating his concerns.269 His arguments were supported by Labour MPs 
Frederick Cobb and William Warbey, but were rejected by the Minister of Supply, John 
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Wilmot.270 The debate is revisited in section 2.6, below. 
The rationale behind such measures were explained in terms of security, but there 
was also an element of reciprocity involved, since the United States had refused to share 
its own atomic information and the Soviet Union were no longer considered as allies. The 
irony of the push for secrecy is that the time of the Act is also the time when Klaus Fuchs, 
Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Anthony Blunt were beginning to become involved in 
passing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union. The spying discussion is considered in more 
depth later in the chapter. 
The final powers that were granted to the Minister were those relating to the 
acquisition of property. Under section 6 of the Act, the Minster could acquire any land or 
property (subject to various rights of objection by the owner) which was considered 
“necessary for the purpose of discovering whether there is present… any minerals from 
which in his opinion any of the prescribed substances271 can be obtained.”272 As uranium, 
for example, is “is a metal approximately as common as tin or zinc, and it is a constituent 
of most rocks and even of the sea,”273 this power was theoretically an enormous one. 
Granite rocks, for example, such as those found in Cornwall, contain uranium,274 so the 
Minister had power under the Act to acquire any land in Cornwall. In practice, however, 
the power was tempered by the words “from which any of the prescribed substances can 
be obtained”275 – the concentration of uranium in granite is only 4ppm (parts per 
million)276 and is far lower than that which would be required to obtain workable 
quantities of uranium. 
The powers and duties conferred upon the Minister by the Act were wide-ranging and, 
it could be said, rather sweeping and imprecise. The purpose of this, as shown by the long 
title to the Act, was to ensure that the Minister maintained “control of [the] development” 
of atomic energy. At the time, there were relatively few scientists working in atomic 
research in the UK. Many of those who had been involved in the field had been transferred 
to the United States in 1943 and joined Major-General Groves’ Manhattan Project working 
on the development of an atomic bomb.277 The Project which, at its peak, directly and 
indirectly employed 600,000 people,278 existed in an atmosphere of excitement and 
creativity, and was guided “by the necessity to get the best answer in the shortest 
possible time rather than by questions of formal organization and prestige.”279  
Despite the surge in parliamentary activity outlined above, there is no evidence to 
suggest that atomic energy was not being taken sufficiently seriously by the Government. 
As was shown above, Attlee had addressed the UN General Assembly on 19 June 1946, 
urging the adoption of the “Baruch Plan”, for the creation of an International Atomic 
Development Agency to control nuclear research across the world.280 
The Soviet Ambassador to the UN, and future President of the Soviet Union, Andrej 
Gromyko, presented a rival proposal to the Baruch Plan on the same day as Atlee’s 
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address, which would have strengthened the position of the Soviet Union.281 Behind the 
scenes, the Soviet Union at that time was working on its own nuclear reactor, which was 
to go critical on 25 December 1946,282 and was also developing its own nuclear-weapons’ 
programme.283 As a result of the Soviet plans, Stalin rejected the Baruch Plan and so the 
International Atomic Development Agency never came into existence. The failure of the 
Baruch Plan was an important point in the development of the global nuclear industry, as 
it would have led to much greater levels of international cooperation and collaboration in 
the field. 
Having looked briefly at the wider international events which both preceded and 
surrounded the creation of the 1946 Act, it is worth reiterating that the primary effects of 
the Act was to give the Minister of Supply various powers and duties relating to the 
development of nuclear power in the UK. It was very much an inward-looking piece of 
legislation which could be argued to have been designed to increase Britain’s sphere of 
influence in this new technological age, but was actually intended to put in place a series 
of mechanisms for controlling access to, and development of, a source of energy which 
was initially little more than a side benefit from the weapons programme. 
 
2.4.1: Powers and duties 
Bearing in mind the wide-ranging powers and duties given to the Minister, it is 
important to note at this stage the distinction between a ministerial power and a duty. As 
a power, the Minister would have been given the ability to act in ways which would 
promote the development of nuclear power, but would have had no compulsion to use this 
ability. This is also called a discretionary power. By imposing a duty, the Act put a much 
higher responsibility onto the Minister, so that not only did he have certain abilities, but 
also he had to use them. This meant that the Minister had no option but to promote the 
development of atomic energy, which is of crucial importance in tracing the reasons 
behind the UK’s development of a nuclear industry. Even if all the scientific and economic 
knowledge had suggested that atomic power was not to be recommended, technically the 
Minister could not have given any weight to this information and would still have had to 
promote atomic power. 
In deciding whether Ministerial powers are discretionary or not, if it is not made 
explicitly clear, it is necessary to consider “the whole statutory context in which the power 
is given.”284 In the case of the 1946 Act, most of the powers given to the Minister were 
discretionary, with the only duty being the “general duty… to promote and control”285 the 
way that atomic energy was to be developed. Davis, writing in 1969, expands upon this 
and argues that when given discretionary powers, “a public officer has discretion 
whenever the effective limits of his power leave him free to make a choice among possible 
courses of action and inaction.”286 
Concerns about misuse of a discretionary power had often been expressed and in 
1809, the Tavistock MP, George Ponsonby,287 questioned the use of a Ministerial 
discretionary power in relation to the grant of assistance to the Austrian government 
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following the invasion by Napoleon.288 
The concerns expressed by Ponsonby and others did not die away and, in the early 
1930s, the Donoughmore Committee (The “Committee on Ministers’ Powers”) was 
created, inter alia, to investigate these concerns. The Committee, which reported in 
1932,289 felt that there needed to be guidelines in place controlling the power of Ministers 
to use the so-called “Henry VIII” clauses290 which conferred upon them the power to 
modify an Act with or without the consent of Parliament.291 The Donoughmore Committee 
believed that the guidelines would prevent misuse of the powers, although seven decades 
later, in 2002, Lord Dahrendorf, the Chairman of the House of Lords Delegated Powers 
and Regulatory Reform Select Committee said that the use of Henry VIII clauses in 
relation to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 went “right to the heart of 
the key constitutional question of the limits of executive power.”292 In other words, even if 
the Act itself had gone through the full parliamentary debate procedure, an amendment 
could be pushed through without recourse to Parliament.  
An implicit part of the Ministerial duty to promote atomic energy was a requirement to 
find a location in which the necessary research could be carried out. 
 
2.4.2: Locating the sites 
When the AERE was established under section 2 of the AEA 1946, the site chosen for 
it was the recently disused RAF Harwell site, in Oxfordshire. In 1957, the National 
Institute for Research in Nuclear Science (NIRNS) was created at the Rutherford High 
Energy Laboratory in Culham,293 also in Oxfordshire.  
“[The] main object of the Institute [was] to provide, for common use by 
universities and others, facilities and equipment which are beyond the scope of 
individual universities and institutions carrying out research in the nuclear 
field.”294 
Oxfordshire and the Thames Valley soon became an established area for nuclear 
research, with the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment in Aldermaston being just 
twenty-five miles away from Harwell. The Harwell site was later to gain the Joint European 
Torus (JET) nuclear fusion research project, and is still the Headquarters of the UKAEA, 
the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB, absorbed into the Health Protection 
Agency in 2004), and the HSE Nuclear Directorate’s Office for Civil Nuclear Security. 
Appendix VII gives a map of the key nuclear sites in the United Kingdom. 
The second of the NIRNS laboratories was the Daresbury Laboratory in Cheshire, 
which was established in 1962. NIRNS carried on working until 1965, when the Science 
Research Council took over both of the NIRNS laboratories, along with the Rutherford 
Appleton Laboratory, and the Royal Greenwich and Edinburgh Observatories.295 The 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 hived off some of the businesses of UKAEA to the 
newly-created British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL). The new company set up its 
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headquarters in Risley on the other side of Warrington from the NIRNS Laboratory, and 
remained there until 2003.296 
This geographical clustering of so many research laboratories in Oxfordshire, at the 
time a comparatively sparsely populated area (see the comparison between Oxfordshire, 
Cheshire and the national average in Figure 2.1297), could been interpreted as an example 
of the government beginning to appreciate the potential risks associated with the work. 
This reiterates the point made earlier in the chapter by Bonnell that it is easier to move 
tens of people in the event of an accident than it is to move thousands. The more prosaic 
explanation is that both Culham and Harwell were old World War Two airfields and, as 
such, were already owned by the government, and were both within relatively easy access 
of London. The combination of the relative remoteness of the laboratories and a dedicated 
police force was useful to keep ‘prying eyes’ away from the developments of nuclear 
technology. 
The remoteness would also be potentially useful if there was any kind of accident, In a 
1965 paper, Dr John Bonnell, the Deputy Chief Nuclear Health and Safety Officer of the 
CEGB, would later argue that precaution had already become the watchword of the 
industry by the 1950s, and formed one of the three main categories of public health 
protection.298 He went on to say that the construction of atomic power stations in sparsely 
populated areas was a deliberate decision to mitigate the potential impact of any 
unforeseen incident: 
“It is easier to deal with tens of people rather than hundreds or thousands. Such 
a policy reduces the scope of the problem but does not remove it.”299 
Figure 2.1: Population Densities in Oxfordshire and Cheshire 1800 – 2000300 
 
As the graphs show, the population density of Oxfordshire in the 1951 census was 
around half that of the country as a whole, with a rate of approximately 1.5 persons per 
hectare. Cheshire too, despite the urban centres of Chester, Warrington and Ellesmere 
Port was still significantly less densely populated than the country as a whole. By 
comparison, the 1952 census for London shows a population density of over fifty persons 
per hectare.  
Overall, the location of the early atomic sites appears to have been deliberately linked 
to their remoteness. Partly this fulfilled the loose criteria of what might be termed a 
“proto-precautionary” approach, as scientific data concerning the potential dangers of this 
technology was starting to exist: 
Recognition of potential risks (posed by espionage or accidents); 
Growing scientific certainty (of the inherent dangers of radioactivity); and 
Early action being taken to minimise the risk of both. 
                                        
296 In 2003, BNFL’s headquarters transferred to the Daresbury site itself. 
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Available at http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/, accessed on 22/03/10. 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 39 
Equally, perhaps, the remoteness of the sites may have hampered the primary 
purpose of NIRNS, which was to make access to nuclear technology easier for academic 
institutions. There is a certain synchronicity between the enforced geographical isolation of 
the scientists working in the fledgling industry, and their intellectual and educational 
isolation, echoing the comments made five decades earlier by Peirce that scientists are 
moulded to an enormous extent by their isolated lives in laboratories.301 
The duty to promote nuclear power given to the Minister gave him a considerable 
influence on the future development of an entire industry. Although not a scientist, the 
Minister was supported in his role by Sir John Cockcroft, the Nobel-prize winning physicist, 
in his unelected role of Director of the AERE. This seems to place both men as the 
members of an élite which is at the very least semi-technocratic, and fulfils part of the 
requirements set out by Teichman302 and Jasanoff303 for the presence of TDM. If TDM is 
present here, then the decisions taken under its guise in relation to secrecy and the 
location of the NIRNS sites both fit Kantrowitz’s “mixed decision” category, as they contain 
both technical (what the situation is304) and value (what the situation should be305) 
elements. 
 
2.5: The Radioactive Substances Act 1948 
The Atomic Energy Act 1946 was covered in detail in the previous section, and it 
marked the starting point for the general powers and duties of the Minister of Supply in 
relation to atomic energy. The Radioactive Substances Act 1948, however, marked the 
first attempt at regulating the production and sale of other radioactive substances which 
had not been covered by the 1946 Act. It did not receive a smooth passage through 
Parliament and was actually introduced twice; once in April 1947 and then in revised form 
in April 1948. The overriding rationale behind the Act was that there had been rapid 
technological advances made and: 
“Though potent tools in the hands of the scientist and the doctor, these new 
substances and apparatus have added greatly to the need for protection.”306 
Section 1 of the 1948 Act expanded the powers given to the Minister under the 1946 
Act, and added the power to “manufacture…, buy…, treat, store, transport and dispose of 
any radioactive substances.”307 The substances themselves were defined in rather broad 
terms by section 12 as “any substance which consists of or contains any radioactive 
chemical element, whether natural or artificial.” The Minister of Supply was not the only 
one to be given powers by this Act, however. The role of making exceptions to the 
licensing requirements was given to different Ministers, based on geographical 
locations:308 
England and Wales – the Minister of Health 
Scotland – the Secretary of State309 
Northern Ireland – the Minister of Health and Local Government for Northern 
Ireland. 
The Act was not directly concerned with atomic energy and, instead, focused more on 
the use by professionals such as doctors, dentists, and pharmacists of radioactive 
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materials in the course of their work. The rationale for considering its impact here is the 
effect it had upon the portfolio of the Minister, which had been steadily increasing since 
the creation of the new Ministry of Supply in April 1946.310 By 1948, the Minister of Supply 
was responsible for everything which would later devolve to the War Office and Air 
Ministry (these would, in turn, form part of the Ministry of Defence in 1974), the Ministry 
of Aviation (which was to form part of the Board of Trade in 1967) and the UKAEA, which 
made it a post with an increasingly wide remit. 
The governmental control of the use of radioactive substances was fine-tuned by 
section 6 of the Act, which established an Advisory Committee. The role of the Committee 
was to give advice to any of the Ministers given powers by the Act on the exercise of their 
powers. On some issues, the Ministers were required to consult the Committee and, on 
others, the Committee’s advice did not have to be sought. The existence of an Advisory 
Committee to guide the decision-making of the Ministers seems, on the surface, to be a 
useful check on the powers of the government. There are two caveats to this, however. 
Firstly, there were no statutory requirements as to the weight which needed to be given to 
the advice issued by the Committee; thus Ministers were effectively free to ignore the 
Committee. Secondly: 
“the members of the Committee shall be appointed by the following Ministers 
jointly, that is to say the Minister of Health, the Secretary of State, the Minister of 
Supply and the Minister of Health and Local Government for Northern Ireland.”311 
In other words, the membership of the Committee whose role was to advise on the 
use of radioactive substances was decided by the same individuals who were responsible 
for making exceptions to licensing requirements. The Ministers also had to carry out 
whatever consultation they felt necessary with “scientific, professional and technical 
organisations and persons”, but the end result was that they were able to choose their 
own watchdog and then, should they feel minded so to do, ignore it. This is a pattern 
which was repeated in the rebirth of nuclear power discussed in Chapter Five, when the 
government effectively “farmed out” the decision-making process to an unaccountable, 
unelected Quango. The Advisory Committee set up by the 1948 Act was one of the earliest 
occasions of a formalised structure being given to this opportunity for politicians to “pick 
and choose” the scientific advice which they would take or ignore.312 
Table 2.1: Consultation requirements Committee under RSA 1948 
Power of control over Granted in Consultation with Advisory 
Committee required under 
Sale and supply of radioactive 
materials 
Section 3 Section 3(11)313 
Use of irradiating apparatus for 
therapeutic purposes 
Section 4 Section 4(6) 
Making safety regulations for 
occupations involving radioactive 
substances and irradiating apparatus 
Section 5 Section 5(5) 
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There is also no consistency within the Act as to when the Advisory Committee 
needed to be consulted. Any situations not mentioned by the Act fall outside its auspices 
and, thus, outside its power but, for those areas which were covered by the Act, Table 2.1 
outlines the consultation requirements needed.  
Whereas the 1946 Act was required to put in place a framework to govern an industry 
which did not yet exist, the role of the 1948 Act was to govern an industry which did 
already exist, albeit in a fledgling way. The Radiochemical Centre grew out of a luminous 
paint company that had been founded in 1940, and expanded its work from “from 
luminous paints for compasses, gunsights and aircraft instruments to medical products for 
cancer treatment.”314 Whilst it would be close to five decades until this “nuclear medicine” 
was recognised as an “independent medical speciality,”315 by the time of the 1948 Act, the 
potential for such work was already being recognised. 
In this area, the approach of policymakers was to adapt the existing 1946 legislation 
in such a way that medical work and that involving very low levels of radioactivity could 
be subjected to a separate regulatory regime than work which either used or produced 
high level radioactivity. This is despite the background scientific research on the two being 
inherently linked. From a policy perspective, the separation is advantageous as it means 
the effective separation in the minds of the public and politicians alike of “good” (medical) 
radiation from the fear of “bad” (military) radiation. This difference in perception is 
illustrated by two articles from the Times newspaper. The first article, from March 1948, 
covers the potential invention of a new type of radioactive weapon in the United States, 
saying: 
“The United States has developed a radioactive cloud that ‘kills anyone who 
comes into contact with it…. it is effective over a much greater area than the 
atom bomb.’”316 
The second, from July the same year discusses the medical uses of radiation and 
says: 
“Advances made in radiation treatment were even greater, and for some forms of 
cancer that form of treatment had almost superseded that of operation.”317 
Putting new measures in place to govern this industry also had a practical political and 
trade advantage, in that the UK already had a world-leading company which was creating 
products using radioactive substances, and a regulatory regime which was too restrictive 
might have hampered the chances of Britain becoming the vanguard of the nuclear 
industry. 
If the first and second pieces of legislation to control nuclear material in the UK were 
both spawned from pragmatic concerns, the control of the information needed to develop 
nuclear science was not covered wholly by the “atomic” legislation. A great deal was 
covered by legislation designed to promote secrecy and control access to sensitive 
information, and it is this which must now be considered. 
 
2.6: Secrecy and Access to Information  
As we saw earlier, much of the debate surrounding the introduction of the Atomic 
Energy Bill in October 1946 focused on what was then Clause 11, which placed restrictions 
on the release of information. The rationale behind Clause 11 was given by Attlee, who 
stated that: 
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“the declaration made by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of 
Canada and myself laid down this policy: until we can get the introduction of 
effective and forcible safeguards, and we all hope that international arrangements 
will make strict secrecy unnecessary, while we can meanwhile encourage the 
dissemination of basic scientific information, there must be power to prevent the 
dissemination of information as to what is called the ‘know-how.’”318 
The drafting of Clause 11 came in to some criticism from both sides of the house. 
Conservative MP, Richard Law, said that the clause “seems to be not unduly restrictive but 
to have an entirely negative atmosphere about it”319 although he tempered the criticism 
by adding “it is easier to make a list of the things the Minister must prohibit than to make 
a list of the things he must encourage.”320 
Capt Albert Blackburn, the MP for Birmingham Green’s Norton, argued that the clause 
was far too restrictive and would prevent dissemination of information between academics 
– the very thing for which the government was pressing. Blackburn argued that: 
“Professor Oliphant would be unable to talk to Professor Peierls, the theoretical 
physicist, advising him upon any of the matters on which the Government have 
allocated him £141,000. He would first have to submit to the Minister a request 
for permission to do so…. Atomic energy is defined [in such a way] that would 
cover a cyclotron, a betatron, a Cockcroft-Walton apparatus and other 
instruments for fundamental research.”321 
Despite the criticisms, Clause 11 of the Bill duly became Section 11 of the Act without 
any fundamental relaxation of its terms and atomic energy research became one of the 
most closely regulated industries in peacetime Britain. 
As was shown earlier, the 1946 Act specified that the development of all technology 
relating to atomic energy was to be controlled by the Minister of Supply322 and the Act 
also imposed a duty on the public to surrender any atomic information the Minister 
required.323 Despite these provisions and despite the clearly stricter controls on access to 
information, there had been no extra enactments relating to espionage. Indeed, the most 
recent Official Secrets’ Act at the time dated from 1920 and the area of law was not 
seriously revised until 1989.324 This seems a surprising oversight in terms of government 
control of the area – all the technology was controlled, as was the access to information. 
People could be jailed for not providing information to the appointees of the Minister and, 
in 1958, the security service, MI5, had a team of “thirty people at AWRE [Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment] and for two years AWRE carried the entire cost.”325 As though 
having an MI5 team at the AWRE was not a strong enough deterrent to potential Soviet 
spies, the team was involved in the British part of Operation Venona, which was 
specifically using the AWRE computer power to try and break Soviet spy codes.326  
This reliance on pre-war, anti-espionage measures in a Cold War context meant that it 
was almost inevitable that, during the 1950s, the UK would suffer from a number of 
espionage-related scandals, and suffer it did. An agent, given the CIA codename REST 
(who was actually Klaus Fuchs – otherwise known as Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, or Karl 
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Fuchs), was employed “by the British Atomic Energy Commission [sic]”327 in the mid-
1940s, before transferring to the Manhattan Project and returning at the AEA in Harwell in 
the late 1940s.328 Fuchs was caught by Operation Venona (above), but the CIA did not 
reveal this information until 1995.329 In 1950, convicted of leaking atomic secrets to the 
KGB (and thereby advancing the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb project by “at least a 
year”330) Fuchs was given a fourteen-year prison sentence.331 
Slightly over a year later, in May 1951, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess publicly 
defected to the Soviet Union, having been warned by fellow Cambridge spy, Kim Philby, 
that they were being investigated by MI5.332 Maclean and Burgess were assisted in their 
defection by the fourth of the Cambridge spies, Sir Anthony Blunt.333 Philby himself did 
not defect for another twelve years, disappearing from Beirut in January 1963. Blunt, a 
cousin of the Queen, never defected, although he was stripped of his knighthood in 1979 
after being publicly named by Margaret Thatcher. He was also granted immunity from 
prosecution in 1979 in exchange for a full confession.334 The information leaked to the 
Soviet Union by Burgess and Maclean focused on non-scientific “atomic bomb secrets and 
strategy”335 partly relating to the UK but mainly “assessments of the American atomic 
arsenal, production capabilities, and nuclear resources,” 336 whereas those leaked by 
Philby were more strategy-related. 
Despite its attempts to keep a firm rein on everything that was being carried out 
under the broad umbrella of nuclear research, therefore, and the impact that those 
measures were having on the public, the UK government had singularly failed to ensure 
the security of information from Soviet spies, the one group which had the potential to 
cause the most damage. This failure, coupled with similar lapses in the United States, was 
responsible for the Soviet Union’s dramatic progress in nuclear research, both civil and 
military, despite the point being made at the time that the wording of Clause 11 was: 
“founded upon suspicion of the intentions of other nations and the possibility of 
espionage by other nations.”337 
The desire by governments to keep the science behind nuclear reactions secret was 
never going to be easy and was, actually, rather naïve – as has been shown, the research 
which led to the development of a self-sustaining reactor in 1942 by Enrico Fermi and his 
team was based on decades of existing work, the background to which was in the public 
domain. As the Nobel-Prize winning physicist and MAUD committee member, Professor 
James Chadwick, later wrote “[by December 1940] I realised that a nuclear bomb was not 
only possible, it was inevitable.”338 In addition to this, the Cold War was rife with 
espionage and counter-espionage: keeping technology secret only seems to have 
increased the desire of the “other side” to possess it. Indeed, “espionage played a key role 
in the atomic Soviet project”339 and, without the efforts of men like Fuchs, the Soviet 
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atomic programme would have been delayed by many years. The impact that the drive for 
secrecy had within the UK cannot be underestimated either. By 1940, for example, Dr 
Otto Frisch and Professor Rudolph Peierls were working at the University of Birmingham340 
and their conversations, which had crystallised into the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum,341 
would subsequently have been forbidden by s11 of the 1946 Act. Other notable scientists 
were working at the Cavendish Laboratory, including Dr Egon Bretscher and Dr Norman 
Feather342 and indeed, as Professor JD Bernal, the Irish X-ray crystallographer wrote in 
1939: 
“Science policy in England depends on the fact that a handful of the more 
important scientists in the country know one another, and between them know 
practically everybody else.”343 
In other words, the worries of some politicians that the 1946 Act had a potential to 
stop legitimate collaboration appear to have been wholly justified, whilst at the same time, 
scientists working for the Soviet Union were able to spirit away highly sensitive documents 
seemingly at will. This suggests that the intellectual and geographical separation of those 
working in the nuclear industry, wherever the policy might be attributed, may occasionally 
have been counter-productive. 
 
2.7: Conclusion 
The two main decisions taken during the time period covered by this chapter were, 
essentially, to create a nuclear energy industry from the by-product of the nuclear 
weapons industry, and to create a regulatory framework around the existing radioactive 
material industry.  
As has been shown above, the legislative and policy steps which were taken by the UK 
Government and the international community during this period were all working to a 
greater or lesser extent without knowing what they were trying to do. As such, 
governments were being forced to a greater extent to react to events, rather than make 
any overarching strategic plans. As was shown in the previous chapter, the hallmark of 
political pragmatism as it is being used here is “what works,” but what can be seen to 
work in relation to reactive pragmatism is not necessarily the same as what would be seen 
to work relation to proactive pragmatism. Due to this, the extent to which decisions in this 
period were pragmatic must be measured against what seemed most likely to work at the 
time. 
At the beginning of the chapter, we are faced with a national government which has 
just emerged from an expensive period of conflict, and which sees almost no practical 
future in atomic energy at all. By the time the chapter ends, however, statute required the 
Minister of Supply to promote its development, and further to provide an environment in 
which the relevant research could flourish without security being compromised. 
The outline a fledgling international system of legislation was also beginning to show, 
with the abortive introduction of the Baruch Plan to control the spread of nuclear 
technology, and swingeing US legislation to punish those who assisted with any 
dissemination. Indeed, one of the themes which runs through this period is the desire to 
restrict the flow of nuclear information as much as possible, both on a national and 
international scale. On both scales this was seen as a priority, and on both scales it failed. 
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Partly through espionage, despite the wrangling over Section 11 of the 1946 Act, and 
partly through the beginnings of cold-war posturing by the US and USSR, both of whom 
presented and vetoed alternate control plans. Britain’s role in these plans was as a 
supporter of the US Baruch Plan, as was befitting (not to mention politically pragmatic) for 
a fellow NATO member, and a recipient of Marshall Aid. 
The chapter has also covered the detail of the first two pieces of nuclear-related 
legislation passed in the UK, and drawn parallels between the approach taken in the UK 
and elsewhere. At this point in the development of nuclear power, the policy outlined in 
the 1946 Act can be argued to be at its core a proactively pragmatic attempt to deal with 
a source of energy which no-one really expected to become commercially viable at the 
time. The selection of the Ministry of Supply to control the area illustrates this – if it had 
been truly intended to develop atomic energy as a useful, nationwide energy source, then 
control of the technology would doubtless have come under the remit of the Minister of 
Fuel and Power. 
As we have seen, giving the duty to promote nuclear power given to the Minister of 
Supply, assisted by Sir John Cockcroft and other scientific advisors, gave them 
considerable influence on the way the nuclear industry might develop. We have seen that 
the move placed those in control in a ‘semi-technocratic’ élite, and enabled them to make 
“mixed decisions.” This, it is argued was a pragmatic move of the proactive type, as it was 
only the scientists who understood the potential of nuclear energy and, more importantly, 
the mechanisms through which the weapons technology could develop into “beneficial and 
humanitarian uses.”344 The ideas put forward by Teichman and Jasanoff, that there exists 
a technocratic decision making élite hidden from view do not work in the context of the 
1946 Act. There is, without doubt, a decision making élite, as all the decisions as to the 
direction of nuclear power policy were taken by the Minister of Supply. Equally, there was 
a technocratic élite, as the number of people with knowledge of this area of science was 
small, and many of them became influential members of industry bodies. What was 
lacking, however was any sign of a single élite fulfilling both roles. 
The 1948 Act, on the other hand did not have any overt links to the weapons 
industry, yet as we have seen was still a pragmatic course of action, this time more of the 
reactive type. Unlike the as-yet-nonexistent nuclear power industry, radioactive material 
industry had been in operation for many years. The term “radioactive material industry” is 
something of a misnomer, as it was in fact several industries, linked only by their use of 
various radioactive materials. The immediate focus of the legislation was on creating 
guidelines on what materials should be used, how widely these materials should be 
distributed, and the level of safety requirements that should be in place. The 1948 Act did 
not try to put any of these guidelines in place on a statutory basis, but delegated 
responsibility to an Advisory Committee, predominantly composed of scientists. This 
situation, however, does not give rise to a technocratic élite, since it is not the Advisory 
Committee that would be making the policy decisions, and the Act only required Ministers 
to “consult”345 the committee, not necessarily follow their advice. What the Advisory 
Committee did do, however, was provide a scientific basis which politicians could then 
choose to use to justify their decisions. 
We have also seen that the decisions taken during this period were highly driven by 
scientific discovery, much of which had originated as “blue sky” research; the feasibility of 
a self-sustaining controlled atomic chain reaction, or the luminescence of certain elements 
used in products ranging from paints to cancer treatment, and so on. The language used 
by politicians in the introduction and promotion of the statute echoed this, despite the 
politicians themselves having little scientific background. There was seemingly no real 
attempt made by politicians in this period to simplify the scientific data, or to use only 
those elements of it which supported their intended decisions, and that separates this 
period from the other three. The innocence, or naïveté of the politicians, and indeed 
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scientists, involved in the early days of nuclear energy was partly fuelled by their wish, 
and the wish of many, for a “brighter, cleaner world”346 in contrast to a dark and dirty 
war. 
This chapter ends with the passage of the Radioactive Substances Act 1948, and a 
period in which nuclear power and the science associated with it seemed to be without 
many publicly-acknowledged flaws. Chapter Three, however, begins with an investigation 
of a series of accidents which were to help shape attitudes to nuclear power for several 
decades. 
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Chapter 3: 
1973-78: Mortal Wounding of Nuclear Power? 
3.1: Introduction 
As with the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter will be on a relatively short 
time period. However, there will also be a secondary focus on the inter-period, that is to 
say the time which passed between the four-year focus of the last chapter and the five-
year focus of this. 
As the end of the previous chapter, there had been two Acts of Parliament relating to 
nuclear technology – the Atomic Energy Act 1946 and the Radioactive Substances Act 
1948 – but there was still nothing resembling a coherent industry to regulate. The period 
covered by this chapter has a similar lack of quantity of legislation, but the few Acts which 
were passed were of great significance to the continued development of nuclear energy. 
The first part of the chapter covers the main nuclear-related occurrences in the 1950s 
and 1960s and their impact on the UK’s nuclear industry. This will include accidents at 
nuclear plants, the development of the industry and the creation of national, regional and 
international bodies to regulate the industry. Since the industry in the UK has been 
regulated primarily by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), a significant 
part of this section will deal with the creation and running of that Authority. 
The second part of the chapter assesses the background to and rationale for, the 
Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Act 1973. This Act is important insofar as it 
strips the UKAEA of its responsibility for nuclear weapons and refocuses the regulator on 
the energy aspects of nuclear technology. As was outlined in Chapter One, this section will 
make use of the Hansard parliamentary record and the various rules of statutory 
interpretation to uncover any points of contention relating to the separation of weapons 
and energy.  
The third section stays with a statutory focus and traces the background and 
development of the Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 and the Nuclear Safeguards and 
Electricity (Finance) Act 1978; a pair of small yet significant measures introduced to give 
increased financial support to nuclear plant operation. This section also looks specifically 
at one of the stand-alone companies which emerged from the early years of the UK 
nuclear industry, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL). BNFL was created by statute and 
the reasons and decisions behind its creation will be analysed in order to discover the 
extent to which that decision-making process matches the underlying argument of this 
thesis, that politicians use the language of science to lend weight and credibility to their 
politically pragmatic decisions. 
The final part of the chapter focuses on the 1978 report of the inquiry into the 
Thermal Oxygen Reprocessing Plant (THORP) which was proposed for the Windscale site. 
This, it is argued, was one of the last decisions taken in the UK which led to the 
construction of a nuclear-related facility and thus it is vital to understand how the 
environment was changing by the end of the 1970s. In addition, throughout all of the 
sections, assessment of other non-nuclear international and regional events which might 
have had a direct or indirect impact on policy-making will be included. 
This period of time covered in this chapter therefore begins on the day of the UK’s 
accession to the combined European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel 
Community and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and ends the month that 
Austria, a future EEC (and thus Euratom) Member State, passed an act specifically 
banning the development or use of nuclear energy.347 We have already encountered the 
argument put forward by Professor Nowotny that even if there had once been a single 
scientific community, which she doubted, it had been long-separated into many different 
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sections, each claiming to be the most authoritative.348 
The title of this chapter suggests that nuclear power fell out of favour in this period 
and, while subsequent events have shown that this was not a terminal decline, this was 
not entirely evident at the time. However, any decisions made in this period must be 
assessed in the context of the slow-down (at best) of global nuclear expansion. Also in the 
period, Professor Steve Cohn speaks of a collapse of orders of new nuclear plants in the 
United States. He says that: 
“all forty-one reactors ordered after 1973 were subsequently cancelled. In fact 
more than two-thirds of all nuclear plants ordered after January 1970 were 
subsequently cancelled.”349 
As was discussed earlier, what this chapter does is to examine the decisions behind 
the creation and passage of the three main pieces of legislation, and assess the extent to 
which they were triggered by everyday or political pragmatism, and the extent to which 
that was as a result of a TDM process. It also reveals that, whatever the trigger, 
politicians are willing to hold aloft the “brilliant light of science”350 when the scientific data 
supports their decisions, and equally willing to “extinguish the light of science”351 when it 
does not. 
 
3.2: Developments between 1948 and 1972 
This section will cover the main nuclear-related developments which occurred 
between the passage of the Radioactive Substances Act 1948 and the entry into force of 
the European Communities Act 1973, through which the UK’s membership of the EEC was 
formalised. Some of the developments will have had a direct impact of the way in which 
the nuclear-energy industry was managed and regulated (for example, the creation of 
specific, semi-autonomous regulatory agencies), and other developments will have been 
equally important but a less direct in their impact (for example, the way in which the 
number of companies involved in the consortia to build power stations was steadily 
reduced).  
Attlee’s comments mentioned in the previous chapter were echoed in 1951, both by 
Lord Cherwell who pointed out that if the UK had to “rely on the United States… we shall 
sink to the rank of a second class nation”352 and future French Prime Minister, Félix 
Gaillard, who said: 
“those nations which [do] not follow a clear path of atomic development [will] be, 
25 years hence, as backward relative to the nuclear nations of that time as the 
primitive peoples of Africa [are] to the industrialised nations of today.”353 
However, although it was not until 1956 that a nuclear reactor was connected to a 
national grid, experimental reactors had been operating since the late 1940s and, by the 
late 1950s, there had been a number of accidents at nuclear-power stations at home and 
abroad and most of these would have had an impact on policy making. There existed a 
general idea that it was better to try to control the technology early, rather than to 
develop it first and then try to get it under control. These connotations were echoed in a 
statement in the early 1960s by the Project Plowshare team, who planned to use nuclear 
explosions for engineering purposes (and who will be discussed further in Appendix VIII): 
“In order to tame the nuclear giant and harness him to our national strategies, 
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we must set the guidelines of policy today – before and not after he has realized 
his full potential.”354 
The first part of this section will assess the effect on attitudes to nuclear power that 
was triggered by a series of accidents across the world from the 1950s onwards. Far from 
being the “safe, clean” energy that had been promised by the early proponents of nuclear 
power, these accidents revealed a more dangerous aspect to the technology. The fact that 
those nuclear energy programmes which were up and running by this stage were not 
mothballed or abandoned as soon as questions about their safety and cleanliness were 
raised, suggests both that politicians and scientists alike opted for the more pragmatic 
“wait and see” approach, and that the contribution made by nuclear to the UK’s energy 
production had become too significant to replace.355 This was in fact the very antithesis of 
the “precautionary” approach which would come into force by the end of this period. 
 
3.2.1: Accidents 
In December 1952, there was an explosion in the National Research Experimental 
Reactor at Chalk River in Canada, contaminating the site.356 There was a second fire at 
the Chalk River site in November 1958,357 which was referred to the following month by 
Minister without Portfolio, Lord Mills, in the House of Lords’ debate on the Nuclear 
Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Bill, who reminded the House that “accident do 
happen” but: 
“is clearly our duty to make sure that in legislating for such a disaster, which we 
all hope will not happen, we are fully realistic and do not funk the possible 
consequences of something which we all agree to be inherently desirable—
namely, the successful and fruitful use of atomic energy”358 
Just under three years after the first Chalk River accident, and three years before the 
second, EBR-1, the Experimental Breeder Reactor in Idaho, was partly destroyed by a 
partial core meltdown and released low-level contamination in November 1955.359 As we 
saw in Chapter One, EBR-1 was the first reactor in the world to generate more electricity 
than it consumed, which it did in December 1951.360 The EBR-1 accident was caused by 
operator error, but the sequence of events which led to the partial core meltdown not 
properly explained as the investigation by “MIT scientist TJ Thompson… did not reach firm 
conclusions about what had happened.”361 
In September 1957, there was a chemical explosion362 at the nuclear plant363 at 
Chelyabinsk, in the Urals, in which about two megacuries of radiation were released and 
more than 100,000 hectares (approx. 250,000 acres) of land were contaminated.364 
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Whilst the accident was not publicly acknowledged (either by the USSR or anyone else) 
until 1989,365 exiled Russian biochemist, Zhores Medvedev, wrote about it in the New 
Scientist in 1977,366 and Robin Cook MP brought Medvedev’s article into a Commons’ 
debate on Nuclear Energy in December 1977 saying that: 
“it is perfectly clear that the nuclear community in the West had known about this 
for many years and had concealed it from the public with as much care as the 
Russians, for reasons that we can only speculate upon.”367 
The most influential accident, in terms of its direct impact on UK nuclear policy, 
however, was the accident at Windscale Pile No. 1 in October 1957.368 A fire in the 
graphite reactor core led to a release of radioactive material and to the pile being 
mothballed369 until its decommissioning in the 1990s. The Fleck Report370 into the fire, 
published in 1958, found the cause to be a series of minor errors, combined with poor 
checks and balances, cumulating in the contamination of a large part of Cumbria with 
radioactive fallout. The Fleck Report found that there were improvements and 
modifications which should be made to the design of Windscale Pile No 2 and believed that 
it might be possible to restart Pile No 1 as early as 1959.371 In fact, Pile No 1 was never 
restarted and has now been decommissioned. 
The 1957 accident at Windscale signalled to the government that there were, indeed, 
risks associated with running a nuclear-power station. Although the technology involved in 
a nuclear reactor itself is inherently safe and there cannot possibly be a Nagasaki-style 
explosion, the accident further gave notice that, if these risks were to manifest 
themselves into an incident, it would be expensive to rectify. In addition to being the 
trigger for the Atomic Energy Act 1959, the journalist Tony Hall attributes the 1957 
accident at Windscale as being the incident which led to what he calls the “a long, slow fall 
from grace”372 by the nuclear-power industry in the UK.  
The Windscale fire was retrospectively classified as a Level 5 incident on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), which was developed jointly by the IAEA and 
the NEA (see Figure 3.1) and came into operation in May 1990.373 Only two other events 
have ever been classified this high; the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United 
States (a Level 5 incident) and the 1986 Chernobyl-4 accident (or severe reactivity 
excursion374) in the Soviet Union (a Level 7 incident).375 
Figure 3.1: International Nuclear Event Scale 
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The ‘science’ behind the Windscale accident was not widely published at the time of 
the radioactive leak and, indeed, has still not been much circulated beyond the specialist 
media. There were, however, eighteen stories published in the Times in the two weeks 
after the accident, using phrases like “radio iodine content six times permissible levels”376, 
and “official readings of radioactivity in London… have shown an increase of 20 times.”377 
This was followed by an editorial in the New Scientist at the time, which claimed that: 
“Public confidence has been severely shaken by what appeared to be attempts to 
minimise the gravity of what had taken place at Windscale, and even more by the 
extremely late hour at which any precautions to safeguard public health were put 
into effect.”378 
The possibility that the scale of the accident was down played could be regarded as 
nothing more than an unfortunate oversight. What cannot be and has not been denied, 
however, is that the official report issued in 1957379 was not the unexpurgated version – 
this was released in 1988 under the ‘30-year rule.’380 
In September 1973, a further accident at Windscale released radioactive ruthenium 
gas into the plant, although none of the gas escaped into the surrounding countryside. 
The report into the incident381 concluded that the accident increased the risk of developing 
cancer for the 35 workers who had been exposed to the gas by approximately one per 
cent. 
The accidents discussed here are merely a selection of what is a very large total 
number of nuclear-related accidents in the twenty-four year period between the two 
chapters. According to Dr T.J. Thompson, the scientist who led the investigation of the 
EBR-1 fire in 1955, there had already been dozens of “criticality accidents which have 
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occurred outside of nuclear reactors through 1963, and a further five in 1964.”382 Despite 
these accidents: 
“at the time, nuclear power programmes were thought to be safe and economical 
methods of generating electricity that appealed to countries seeking to promote 
the rapid development of their electric power systems.”383 
This optimism among the non-nuclear countries can partly be explained by the fact 
that the accidents were, at least, underplayed and, at most, flatly denied, by the relevant 
government bodies. The effect of these accidents on attitudes to nuclear power, which 
might have been expected to have been significant, were actually comparatively minor, as 
general awareness of them outside the nuclear sphere was very low. The cover up of 
accidents by the Soviet government was comparatively easy to achieve, given the lack of 
press freedom which existed in the Soviet Union at the time. In the UK, this was not so 
easy, and so the government and the nuclear industry, both of which had a vested 
interest at that time of ensuring the continuation of nuclear power generation, relied on 
official scientists to downplay the dangers. A Times report from October 1957, for 
example, reports that: 
“The Ministry of Agriculture, on the advice of the Medical Research Council, last 
night issued an assurance that milk from cows removed from the Windscale 
area… could be used with no risks to the health of adults or children.”384 
This was only twelve days after the accident had occurred, and reveals the extent to 
which the Ministry was able to claim to be relying on unified scientific opinion about the 
safety of milk. The Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan spoke of the Medical Research 
Council’s report a few days later in the House of Commons, saying that the report was 
“very technical, and not very easy for a layman to follow,”385 but that a simplified 
summary would be released. This was despite his assurance that the advice given to him 
was clear. As we have seen in previous chapters, the desire of politicians for “political 
closure of scientific controversy”386 is an ever-present one in policy making areas such as 
this. 
The two types of organisation which would have been aware of both the risks and 
likelihood of accidents at nuclear reactors however, would be the newly-formed regulators 
and the insurance industry and it is the creation of the former to which we will now turn. 
 
3.2.2: The creation of the Atomic Energy Agencies 
This section focuses primarily on the creation of the regulatory authority for the UK 
but, since nuclear-power generation is a discipline involving multiple regulators, it also will 
outline the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the two European 
Nuclear Agencies. 
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) 
As we have already seen, at the end of the 1940s, the as-yet non-existent nuclear 
industry in the UK was under the nominal control of the Minister of Supply, who had been 
given the duty to promote its development under section 1 of the 1946 Act. 
In 1953, Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, set up a Committee of Atomic Energy 
Organisation under the chairmanship of Lord Waverley, the ex-Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer. The Committee, also known as the Waverley Committee, was given a very 
specific aim: 
“to devise a plan for transferring responsibility for atomic energy from the 
Ministry of Supply to a non-departmental organisation and to work out the most 
suitable form for the new organisation, due regard being paid to any 
constitutional and financial implications.”387 
One harsh critic of the previous policy where the Ministry of Supply ran all nuclear 
technology was Oxford Physics Professor, Frederick Lindemann, who would later sit on the 
initial board of the UKAEA as Lord Cherwell. Lindemann’s biographer, the Earl of 
Birkenhead, felt that he believed that this was “the worst possible choice”388 as it put 
nuclear energy into the same category as “the collection of customs.”389 
Although the Waverley Committee’s Report itself was never published (for reasons 
relating to national security), a summary of the chief recommendations was published as 
Appendix 1.390 These recommendations were that there should be: 
A Statutory Atomic Energy Corporation with an executive Board; 
A designated Minister with no departmental responsibilities encroaching on the 
field, e.g., the Lord President of the Council; 
A Ministerial Committee and 
An Official Committee representative of the Departments concerned.391 
Some of these recommendations were adopted in the government’s White Paper on 
Atomic Energy, also issued in 1953 and, following the standard statutory procedures, the 
Atomic Energy Authority Act came into force on 4 June 1954. 
One recommendation which was not followed, however, was that of creating a 
dedicated ministerial post for Atomic Energy. Given that work had already commenced on 
Calder Hall, this cannot be because there was perceived to be no need for such a post. In 
order to better understand this decision, it is necessary to look briefly at the background 
to the Ministries of Supply and Fuel and Power. 
The Ministry of Supply had been created at the beginning of the Second World War to 
coordinate the equipping of the armed forces. In so doing, it took on parts of the roles of 
the Air Ministry, War Office and Admiralty. On 1 January 1946, a new Ministry of Supply 
had been created, which was an amalgamation of the existing one and the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production. As has been shown above, it was this new Ministry that took on the 
role of coordinating the work of the atomic-energy research. Interestingly, despite this 
control over nuclear power, the rest of the country’s power production was controlled by 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which had been created in 1942.392 This left the country in 
the situation where one Ministry controlled the production of electricity from nuclear power 
and another controlled coal-based production. This split can be traced back to the GEN.75 
and GEN.163 Cabinet committees of eight years earlier. The situation continued with 
separate boards existing for Coal, Gas and Electricity until those industries were 
privatised, and it is only today that there are suppliers offering both electricity and gas to 
consumers. This structure was never really the most efficient way of governing the power 
industry, as it inevitably meant that the different industries were forced to compete with 
each other, rather than spending money on improving technology or services. The 
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decision, therefore, not to create a single Atomic Energy ministerial post could be justified 
on the ‘conflict of interests’ argument. In 1959, Lindemann got his way and the Ministry of 
Supply was abolished completely. 
The main purpose of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 was to create “an 
Authority, to be called the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority”393 (the UKAEA). The 
members of this Authority were to be appointed by the Lord President of the Council,394 
rather than the Minister of Supply.395 However, the UKAEA was not just intended to 
replace the Minister; it also took on a role which had not existed before; namely, that it 
was empowered to “make arrangements with universities and other institutions… for the 
conduct of research into matters connected with atomic energy.”396 This broadened the 
scope for involvement considerably from the AEA 1946, and meant that, as was the 
situation prior to the AEA 1946, independent (or at least quasi-independent, as approval 
needed to come from UKAEA and the Lord President), research into atomic power was 
allowed to flourish. The rationale behind this was that the control elements of the 1946 
Act, which had been intended to keep nuclear research as tightly controlled as possible 
had, to a certain extent backfired. Many of those who would otherwise have been tempted 
into researching this area of experimental physics did not do so, for they had no desire to 
see their work classified and restricted by the government, and this led to a shortage of 
scientists. As the Labour MP for Watford, Maj. John Freeman, put it: 
“Over the whole field, this enterprise is working in very straightened 
circumstances. It is using scientists, and we have not enough scientists. It is 
using Government research establishments, and we have not enough 
Government research establishments.”397  
Against this background, the 1954 Act was a purely pragmatic response, and it 
created a system in which research could once again occur.  
The UKAEA was not given wide operational freedom by the 1954 Act. Instead, it was 
to operate under the direct control of the Lord President of the Council, the approval of 
whom was necessary before most ventures were undertaken. The reason for the split was 
outlined by the Minister of Works, Sir David Eccles MP in the second reading of the Bill as 
being a way of ensuring that: 
“Policy remains firmly in the hands of the Government while the Authority is given 
sufficient freedom to operate that policy with efficiency and in a far-seeing 
manner.”398 
This reveals that deliberate attempts were being made to ensure that the UKAEA did 
not mutate into a technocratic élite in control of policy making – the organisation certainly 
fits all the criteria of a technocratic élite, comprised as the Committee was of high ranking 
scientists and bureaucrats, but the decisions were still made by the politicians.  
The development of weapons was expressly forbidden to the Authority “save in 
accordance with arrangements made with the Minister of Supply”399 but research and 
experimentation in areas which may have led to more efficient and advanced atomic 
weapons was not.400 The “arrangements made with the Minster” led to the creation of four 
groups within the UKAEA: Production, Reactor, Research and Weapons.401 This led to a 
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slightly perverse situation where the UKAEA could not develop weapons itself unless the 
Minister gave specific permission, but could develop, entirely of its own volition, the 
technology to be used in weapons. Despite the presence of the Weapons Group, which 
took advantage of its ability to develop weapons-improvement technology, the main 
thrust of the Authority’s work was focused on atomic energy402 and the Authority was 
separated into four operational groups: 
Production: 
This group, which was born out of the AERE,403 was responsible for uranium 
enrichment and ran the nuclear fuel cycle programme.404 The group’s fuel cycle 
work was transferred by the Atomic Energy Act 1971 (below) to British Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd405 and its enrichment work to Urenco, also in 1971.406 
Reactor: 
This group had the “prime responsibility for the development and introduction of 
nuclear-power reactor systems.”407 
Research: 
Run by Sir John Cockcroft.408 The little information available on the Research 
Group suggests that it was heavily involved in UKAEA’s research computer 
systems, and was jointly based at Harwell and Culham, both in Oxfordshire.409 It 
should not be confused with the UKAEA Research Establishment, which was also 
based at the Harwell site, but dealt with reactor research. 
Weapons: 
This was to remain part of the UKAEA until 1973 (below). It took over the work of 
the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), based at Aldermaston in 
Berkshire and a trials’ range at Foulness in Essex. By this time, the UK had 
successfully tested its first atomic bomb, at one minute past midnight on 3 
October 1952. The bomb, which had been designed by a team led by Sir William 
Penney, was detonated aboard HMS Plym, anchored off the island of Trimouille in 
the Pacific, in Operation Hurricane.410 
The initial UKAEA Committee was to consist of a chairman and between seven and ten 
other members,411 three of which would have capacity in dealing with problems associated 
with atomic energy and two with experience in administration and labour relations.412 
Sitting MPs were specifically disqualified from becoming committee members shortly after 
the Authority came into existence, and vice versa. This was not a restriction which was 
specific to members of the UKAEA, but encompassed: 
“… certain offices [which] are incompatible with membership of the House of 
Commons, some as involving physical impossibilities of simultaneous attendance 
in two places, some because of possible patronage, and others because of a 
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conflict of duties”413 
The 1956 Report of the Spens Committee414 helped lead to the enactment of the 
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1957, section 1 of which stated “a person is 
disqualified for membership of the House of Commons who for the time being … (f) holds 
any office described in Part II or Part III of the said First Schedule”, and then goes on to 
list the UKAEA in Schedule I, Part II. 
Members of the House of Commons, therefore, were barred from sitting on the UKAEA 
Committee on the grounds of the potential for conflicts of interest and yet, as will be 
shown, all of the men who were appointed to the committee had much greater potential 
for a conflict of interest themselves. As was argued earlier in relation to the creation of the 
Advisory Committee under the Radioactive Substances Act 1948, this could be seen as a 
deliberate move to take nuclear oversight away from the political realm and leave it under 
the (unelected, unaccountable) control of a Quango. Now, as then, the rationale can be 
seen to be a pragmatic (if inevitably doomed) attempt to in some way place the nuclear 
industry above and apart from issues of party politics. What it actually achieved was, to all 
intents and purposes, to leave the industry as a self-regulating one. It did not go 
unchallenged, however and in the debate on the Bill, the Labour MP for Watford, John 
Freeman argued that: 
“The danger is that… a new private empire, ruled by the atomic knights, will be 
set up.”415 
A similarity between Freeman’s feared “private empire” and the idea of a technocratic 
decision making élite put forward by Jasanoff and Teichman can clearly be seen here, and 
this point marks the closest to which TDM has come to having an impact on nuclear 
power. 
The requirements under Section 1(3) of the Act, relating to the experience of a 
proportion of the committee members, were abolished by Section 11(3) of the Atomic 
Energy Authority Act 1995 (see below). The maximum membership level of the committee 
was increased to fifteen, by section 1 of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1959, and the 
minimum level from four to seven, by section 11(2) of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 
1995. It is worth bearing in mind that the UKAEA of the 1950s was running an industry 
which was intended to grow for several more decades, whereas the UKAEA of the 1990s 
was in charge of an industry where no new plants had been ordered for many years and 
the existing ones were beginning to be decommissioned. It does, seemingly, take more 
people to orchestrate the dismantling an industry than its creation. 
The first Chairman of the UKAEA was the economist Sir Edwin (later Lord) Plowden, 
formerly Chief Planning Officer for HM Treasury. Plowden was a highly regarded economic 
planner who had previously been a director of British Aluminium. He had also been one of 
the “three wise men” charged with organising the planning and financing of NATO in 
1951.416 He was to remain Chairman until 1959, when he was replaced by Sir Roger 
Makins (later Lord Sherfield), who had previously been Chairman of the Marshall 
Commission in the United States.417 
Both the Committee members and ordinary members of UKAEA were, as was to be 
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expected, to be remunerated by the Authority.418 This could be in the form of fees, 
expenses, or allowances419 and also included pension provisions. The level of 
remuneration was to be agreed by the Lord President of the Council, who would have to 
present a statement of remuneration before Parliament.420 It is worth noting that, by the 
time Calder Hall went on-line in 1956, the UKAEA had grown to a total workforce of 
roughly 24,000421 compared to the 600,000 who worked on the Manhattan Project in the 
US.422 
The 1954 Act specifically convened the UKAEA Committee to be an expert group of 
scientists, industrialists and civil servants. The eight initial UKAEA committee members 
back up this assertion: a senior civil servant with directorial experience (Plowden), four 
physicists (Cockcroft, Penney, Hinton and Cherwell), two industrialists (Perrott and 
Stedeford), and a trade-unionist knight (Fawcett). Of the full-time members, Cockcroft, 
Penney, and Lords Plowden and Hinton had all either been senior civil servants or involved 
with the early development of atomic policy in the UK, and the same can be said of the 
part-time members. That these men were leaders, and often giants, in their specialised 
fields cannot be denied, however,423 and so the scientific elements of their work are 
beyond any real reproach. 
The rather cosy relationship between the industry and its regulator was to continue 
with the creation of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in 1957, as the sole 
customer for atomic power.424 The new Chairman of the CEGB was to be none other than 
Sir Christopher Hinton who had moved across from the UKAEA.425 
Also within the makeup of the UKAEA, was the creation of the UKAEA Constabulary 
(UKAEAC). Section 3 of the Special Constables Act 1923 was used to give the UKAEA 
power to swear in its own constables – “the powers of nomination conferred by those 
provisions shall be exercisable also by the Authority.”426 The amendment of the UKAEAC is 
discussed further in section 3.4, below. 
The UKAEA was not given any specific duties relating to atomic energy; instead its 
authority arose solely from the granting of powers. This marks something of a sea change 
from the 1946 Act. In that Act, as has been illustrated above, the Minister had a duty to 
promote the use of atomic energy427 by whomsoever he felt was able so to do. Under the 
new Act, however, that role was split into two parts. The UKAEA now had the sole power 
to “produce, use or dispose of atomic energy”,428 but no duty of promotion. That was 
given to the Lord President of the Council, along with a further duty to “secure that… the 
proper degrees of importance are attached to the various applications of atomic 
energy.”429 Again, this illustrates the level of low-key influence which politicians were able 
to maintain in the nuclear arena. 
Responsibilities allocated under the 1954 Act were not restricted to the Authority, the 
Lord President and the Minister of Supply, however. Both the Ministers of Housing and 
Local Government and Agriculture and Fisheries were required to authorise the disposal of 
any radioactive waste generated by the work of the UKAEA.430 This was a new provision, 
as no mention of radioactive waste disposal had been made in the 1946 Act. As there had 
only been very low-scale, atomic-energy projects by that time, the omission of radioactive 
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waste in the 1946 Act was not a serious oversight, but it does reveal that neither the risks 
associated with waste storage nor the eventual scale of the waste generated were fully 
appreciated at that time. Since the nuclear industry in the UK did not exist in a vacuum, 
having examined how the UK regulatory body came into existence it is now useful to 
compare this with its international and European counterparts, which would create much 
of the overarching legislation governing all nuclear industries. 
The International Atomic Energy Authority 
In December 1953, US President Eisenhower made his famous “Atoms for Peace” 
address before the UN General Assembly.431 Eisenhower, who had the support of the UK 
and French governments,432 was arguing along much the same lines as had been tried by 
the Baruch Plan, seven years earlier,433 namely that: 
“The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary 
prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their 
stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international Atomic 
Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the 
aegis of the United Nations.”434 
Unfortunately, by the time the Agency was set up in 1957, it was no longer 
practicable for it to become a bank of fissionable material. The growth of military 
stockpiles made this particularly tricky, as the number of warheads, which had stood at 
just over 2,000 in 1954, had grown to over 7,000 by 1957.435 
The statute of the International Atomic Energy Authority, which was signed in 1956, 
set out the functions and objectives of the IAEA. In Article III of the Statute, the Authority 
is given the authorization to: 
“Make provision… for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the 
needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due 
consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world.”436 
This suggests that, under the terms of its creation, the IAEA has the power, if not the 
duty, to assist all under-developed areas of the world with the development of a peaceful 
nuclear-power programme. However, there is a caveat in the statute, which says that the 
Agency has the right and responsibility to: 
“Examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear 
reactors, and to approve it only from the view-point assuring that it will not 
further any military purpose.”437  
As with UKAEA, therefore, developing the military aspects of nuclear technology had 
been removed from the remit of the IAEA, although the latter did still maintain the right 
and responsibility for inspecting IAEA member states to ensure that military developments 
were not surreptitiously being carried out. Within a year of the statute being signed, the 
IAEA was being cited by Francis Noel-Baker MP, in a Commons’ debate on the wider issue 
of disarmament, as having: 
“a very great deal of practical experience, now applied over a limited field, in the 
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technique of inspection and control of fissile material which could be used for 
atomic weapons.”438 
The position of ultimate authority in relation to the UK’s nuclear power industry filled 
by the UKAEA in 1954 had only lasted for two years until elements of it were already 
being overreached by the new IAEA. Further erosion to the power of the UKAEA was to 
come with the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community which only directly 
affected the UK after 1973. 
European Atomic Energy Community439 
In March 1957, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) had been signed in Rome. Historian Alexander Rudhart, writing in the mid 
1970s, suggests that the creation of Euratom had been triggered by “the threat of an Arab 
oil boycott in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis”440 which provides an interesting thematic 
link to the 2005 decision discussed later to reintroduce nuclear power partly because of 
issues around “energy security.”  
Although only six countries signed the treaty at this time,441 the UK would eventually 
join Euratom along with the other European Communities in 1973. This meant that, for 
the first time since the war, there was a wider atomic research community; admittedly, 
one of which the UK was not to become a part for a further 16 years. The historian Martin 
Dedman points out that Britain had initially been a part of the negotiations which would 
later lead to the Treaty of Rome, but had pulled out in 1955.442 Disagreement between the 
President of the Board of Trade, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister 
about the wisdom of Britain joining a European Coal and Steel Community are also cited 
by Dedman as being important factors in the decision to pull out of the talks.443 
The UK’s attempts to become a member state had been blocked on two occasions 
before they were successful in 1972. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, had vetoed 
the UK’s application to join in January 1963, on the basis that “enlarging the Market would 
produce a colossal Atlantic grouping under American dependence and control.”444 Again, in 
May 1967 the UK made a second formal application to join the EEC and, despite the other 
five members supporting the bid, de Gaulle was able to exercise the French veto. This was 
partly to do with the UK’s membership of, and staunch support for, NATO at a time when 
de Gaulle was feuding with it. Historian Peter King argues, however, that “the position of 
sterling and the Common Agricultural Policy… were the main attacking points.”445 This is 
perhaps an example of a decision by the French President which was made for pragmatic 
reasons – resisting the strength of sterling and the power which the UK would bring into 
the CAP – but which was justified on the basis of an ideological standpoint – that Europe 
should remain free of American influence. 
The entry of the UK into the Common Market was important step in relation to nuclear 
power. Many aspects of the UK’s nuclear research had been governed by the IAEA since 
1956, which sought “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, 
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health and prosperity throughout the world.”446 The aims of Euratom, by comparison, 
were focused primarily on the member states within Europe, although there was provision 
for it to “establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as 
will foster progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”447 Although, in practice, there 
has never been a recorded conflict between the aims of the IAEA and Euratom, we can see 
the potential for conflict between them. The IAEA was geared towards enhancing the 
global role played by nuclear power, whereas Euratom was geared towards the stability of 
the Common Market, and only then to enhance global relations. 
Even though it would be a further sixteen years before the UK became a formal 
member of Euratom, in February 1959, a cooperation agreement was signed between the 
UK and Euratom, providing: 
“the framework for development of close co-operation between institutions and 
private industry in the United Kingdom and in the European Atomic Energy 
Community.”448 
Although the UK was not a member of Euratom until the 1970s, as discussed above, it 
did become a member of yet another international nuclear regulator in the late 1950s. 
European Nuclear Energy Agency 
In December 1957, the Council of the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) adopted the creation of the European Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).449 
The UK was one of the signatory states to the NEA, the role of which was: 
“… the development of the production and uses of nuclear energy, including 
applications of ionizing radiations, for peaceful purposes by the participating 
countries, through co-operation between those countries and a harmonization of 
measures taken at the national level.”450 
It is interesting to note that, of all the regulatory and overseeing bodies discussed 
here, the NEA is the only one to use the word “nuclear” in its title as opposed to “atomic.” 
Professor Sir John Cockcroft, writing in 1947 whilst Director of the AERE, had argued that 
“atomic energy should really be called nuclear energy because it comes from a joining 
together or splitting up of nuclei of atoms”451 and yet it took until the passage of the 
Atomic Energy Act 1959 for the term ‘nuclear’ to make it onto the statute book in the UK – 
and until the Nuclear installations (Amendment) Act 1965 for an attempt to be made to 
define the term. For all that politicians have a tendency to use scientific language when it 
suits them, as we have seen, this suggests that there was not a great deal of 
understanding of the scientific information being used. 
The agency, which still exists, is now called the Nuclear Energy Agency, or Agence 
pour l’energie nucléaire, and is run by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which took on the role of the OEEC in 1961.452 The relationship 
between the NEA and Euratom was described in rather loose terms by the then Home 
Secretary, Rab Butler, as: 
“The Agency Statute provides that it shall be established in close collaboration 
with Euratom whose members are also members of the Agency.”453 
This is rather meaningless, since the seventeen-state original membership of the NEA 
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included all six original members of Euratom, but the “close collaboration” of which Butler 
spoke was to come to fruition with the construction of the Dragon High Temperature 
Reactor at Winfrith in 1959, initially under the joint auspices of the NEA and UKAEA, but 
also with the involvement of Euratom from 1973-6.454 
In the space of five years therefore, the UK had shifted from a position whereby all 
nuclear activity was regulated solely by the Minister of Supply, to one where the wishes 
and proposals of the UKAEA, IAEA and NEA all had to be entertained, and those of 
Euratom were already being given due regard in political debates. The role of Ministry of 
Supply was changed in December 1953, and atomic energy was moved into: 
“an independent Department of State under the Lord President. The arguments 
for doing that and no more are variations on the theme that atomic energy is in 
its prodigious infancy, still very dangerous, very costly to the taxpayers, and still 
unready to leave the nursery of the Civil Service.”455 
As we have seen the rationale behind the 1954 Act was a pragmatic response to the 
lack of scientists working in the field, to the growth in possibilities of atomic research, and 
to the very real probability that there would be an atomic industry in need of regulation 
before very long. 
 
3.2.3: The 1955 White Paper “A Programme of Nuclear Energy” 
With the creation of the UKAEA, the government’s confidence in atomic energy 
appeared to be getting stronger and, on 15 February 1955, the Churchill Government 
published a White Paper “A Programme of Nuclear Energy.”456 The White Paper spoke of a 
new dawn for the British public and of cheap, clean power, and the press reacted with a 
lack of interest – the Times only mentioned the White Paper only once, and in the whole of 
the year published only twenty pieces on atomic energy, many of which concerned the 
establishment of the UKAEA. Indeed, the political news story of the early part of 1955 was 
the resignation of Churchill as Prime Minister in April457 and the election of Anthony Eden 
in May.458 
In the White Paper, “the Government was sufficiently confident of progress to 
announce a £300m programme of civil nuclear power based on the [PIPPA] reactor, 
aiming for 1500-2000 MW of electricity by 1965.”459 The provisional, three-stage 
programme foresaw that the power stations “will be built in the normal way by private 
industry for the Electricity Authorities, who will own and operate them.”460 The capital cost 
of building these stations was estimated at £300m in 1955 prices (approximately £6bn in 
April 2009 prices461), which was offset against 
“the investment by the Electricity Association… in the absence of nuclear power… 
of the order of about £1.2bn.”462 
The White Paper hoped to replace “five to six million tons of coal per year”463 through 
the nuclear programme, which would have amounted to between 50 and 60 millions tons 
(mt) over the subsequent decade. In fact, between 1955 and 1965, coal production had 
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fallen fell by only 33.5mt, from 211.3mt to 177.8mt. 464 Of that fall, 1.2mt can be 
attributed to “shifts not actually worked owing to industrial disputes”465 in 1954, so the 
actual figure is closer to 32mt, which means the claims made by the White Paper were 
rather wide of the mark 
An average drop of over three million tons a year still represents a marked fall in coal 
use, however, even if not all of it was due to the few nuclear plants which came on stream 
during that period. These new plants contributed only about a tenth of the electricity 
requirements of the time – this is especially true since “demand for electricity rose during 
the 1950s and 1960s at a rate of around 7 per cent per year.”466 In 1965, the Minister for 
Fuel and Power, Frederick Lee, was asked by Nicholas Ridley MP whether the government 
felt that coal production would be reduced as a result of “atomic energy becoming 
competitive with coal-fired power stations.”467 The minister replied that, on the contrary: 
“it is clear that the use of coal by power stations will increase substantially over 
the next few years.”468 
The £300m cost of providing up to 2000MW of power appeared to be rather sizeable 
at the time of the White Paper,469 but started to look more reasonable when Egyptian 
President Nasser nationalised and closed the Suez Canal in 1956; thus cutting off the 
shorter route for oil into Britain. At the time, the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, was 
advised that closure of the canal would lead Britain dangerously short of oil and, in 
November 1956, introduced petrol rationing.470 Before rationing had been introduced, the 
price of petrol had already risen by 35 per cent.471 Shortage of oil also meant that the 
case for increased use of nuclear fuel for which the country would not be dependent on 
foreign nations was strengthened: the Suez crisis had already revealed how fragile the 
illusion of a secure energy supply was, and the extent to which “keeping the lights on”472 
at home was dependent upon a stable global situation. It also underlined, not that any 
underlining was necessary, the strong link between energy policy and foreign policy. The 
end of the Suez crisis and the re-opening of the canal in April 1957 meant, however, that: 
“all the assumptions that underlay the nuclear programme were in tatters. By 
then it was clear that the Suez crisis had not provided a lasting threat to Britain’s 
oil supplies… In fact, oil prices were falling to such an extent that it actually 
became cheaper for power stations… to burn oil rather than coal.”473 
It is the economic benefits of oil-fired, rather than coal-fired power stations, which 
therefore must shoulder much of the responsibility for the fall in domestic coal production 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the 1955 
White Paper was even more inaccurate in its estimates than first appeared to be the case. 
The scientific basis for the estimates was never revealed in the White Paper, and 
strengthens the argument that the policy makers portrayed their decision as being based 
on unified and accurate science, when hindsight and experience tell us that it was not. 
As we have seen, the cost of the nuclear programme would involve investment of 
around £300m, and this enormous figure would be allocated by the technocrats in the 
UKAEA (although the decisions would still have to be passed through the Lord President), 
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to whichever companies were lucky enough to be involved in the capital building 
programme. No single company felt that it had the experience or expertise to bid for these 
projects along and so the companies created a series of nuclear consortia. 
 
3.2.4: The Nuclear Consortia 
At this point, it is worth looking both at how the 1955 White Paper envisaged the 
future of nuclear power in the UK and how those plans translated into reality. The 
proposed plants were to be built by a number of consortia, which would be formed by the 
leading engineering companies of the time, all of which were in private hands. Originally, 
there were four consortia set up, led by Associated Electrical Industries (as the Nuclear 
Energy Company, NEC), the General Electric Company (as the Atomic Energy Group, 
AEG), English Electric (as the Atomic Power Group, APG) and CA Parsons (as the Nuclear 
Power Plant Company, NPPC).474 A fifth consortium, led by Internal Combustion and Fairey 
Engineering (called Atomic Power Constructions, APC) had been added in 1956.475 
By the end of 1960, there would have been two mergers of the consortia. The NEC 
joined with the NPPC to form The Nuclear Power Group (NPG) and the AEG joined with the 
newcomer, APC, to become the United Power Company (UPC).476 This left three consortia, 
although they were not to remain unchanged for long. GEC pulled out of the UPC 
Consortium in 1965, leaving APC on its own. GEC also merged with English Electric in 
1968, leading to the emergence of a new consortium, British Nuclear Design and 
Construction (BNDC). This new organisation not only took over from the old APG (which 
had been led by English Electric), but also took on the work of the APC, which was running 
into difficulties.477 The two remaining consortia continued until 1973 when a new 
company, the National Nuclear Corporation (NNC) was set up by the government “to build 
all of Britain’s power reactors.”478 
NNC was to be owned partly by the UKAEA (15 per cent), GEC (50 per cent), and the 
remaining consortia companies (35 per cent).479 The post-1970s’ developments of the 
NNC will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis and this complicated series of 
developments is summarised in Figure 3.2, below. Although this makes the development 
of NNC appear complex, there are other nuances which need to be taken into account in 
terms of the ownership of these companies. The companies named in the first five 
consortia are only the major members and, in all cases, there were other companies 
involved. Indeed, in the first five consortia, there were 23 companies involved and, over 
the several iterations of consortia, a total of more than 30 companies were members.480 
Figure 3.2: Development of the Nuclear Power Consortia481 
                                        
474 Patterson, W. C., 1985, Going Critical: An Unofficial History of British Nuclear Power, London: Paladin 
Grafton Books, pp5-6. 
475 Ibid., p7. 
476 Ibid., p8. 
477 Ibid., p21. 
478 NNC, 2004, History, Knutsford: NNC Holdings Limited. In 2005, NNC was bought by AMEC Construction. 
479 Patterson, W. C., 1985, op cit, n476, p25. The shareholding rose by a further 20 per cent to 35 per cent in 
1976. Source: Benn, T., 1976, National Nuclear Corporation, HC Deb 14 July 1976 vol 915 c169W. By this 
stage, there were no issues about conflicts of interest arising from the UKAEA’s part ownership of NNC, as there 
was only a single consortium left. 
480 The details of the companies involved in the various iterations of the consortia can be found in Appendix IV 
481 Figure based on information from Patterson, W. C., 1985, op cit, n476; NNC, 2004, op cit, n480; and MMC, 
1981, Central Electricity Generating Board: A report on the operation by the Board of its system for the 
generation and supply of electricity in bulk, HC315, London: Monopolies and Mergers Commission / HMSO, 
p359-61. 
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Some of the companies themselves merged over the years as well, reducing the 
number of consortia members in the process: 
GEC (Atomic Energy Group) purchased Associated Electrical Industries (Nuclear 
Energy Company) in 1967 and English Electric (Atomic Power Group) in 1968, 
becoming one of the world’s largest electrical manufacturing companies.482 
C A Parsons & Co Ltd and A. Reyrolle & Co Ltd (Nuclear Power Group) merged in 
1968 to form Reyrolle Parsons. Clarke Chapman & Co (Nuclear Power Group) 
acquired International Combustion Ltd (Atomic Power Construction) and then 
merged with John Thompson Ltd (Nuclear Power Group) in 1970 to form Clarke 
Chapman John Thompson Ltd. Reyrolle Parsons merged with Clarke Chapman 
John Thompson Ltd to form Northern Engineering Industries in 1977. NEI is now 
owned by Siemens. 
All of the larger companies were in public ownership at the time of the consortia and 
so the shareholders could, in theory, access company information. In practice, however, 
two things must be borne in mind. Firstly, many chose not to access the detailed company 
data available in annual reports and, secondly, if there was any information which the 
companies felt it would be undesirable to release, there were far fewer mechanisms in 
existence for forcing them to do so than there are today.483 
One area where the consortia wanted protection from the government was in terms of 
nuclear liability, and this was a significant part of the pressure which led to the passage of 
the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959. 
 
3.2.5: Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
The Fleck Report into the Windscale accident, which had been published in 1958, 
found that there were improvements and modifications which should be made to the 
design of Windscale Pile No 2. The Fleck Report also suggested that it might be possible to 
restart Pile No 1 as early as 1959,484 although in practice this was never done. The 
potential costs associated with such an accident in the future were felt likely to deter 
potential investors and, since the 1955 White Paper envisaged the five private nuclear 
                                        
482 MMC, 1979, The General Electric Company Limited and Averys Limited: a report on the proposed merger 
(Cmnd 7653), London: Monopolies and Mergers Committee / HMSO, p9. 
483 The full provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, for example did not come into effect until 2005, 
and even this does not give an absolute right to access information, since it only requires public authorities to 
comply. 
484 Fleck, A., et at., op cit., n370, p17 
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consortia (and at this point there still were five consortia, but only just) playing a major 
role in future plant construction and operation, the creation of some form of state 
indemnity or insurance became a priority. This had been done in the United States the 
year prior to the Fleck Report by the Price Anderson Act (discussed below), which had 
limited the liability of plant operators to $60m, with the State underwriting the first 
$500m of any claim.485 
The 1959 Act dealt in detail with the granting of “nuclear site licences”486 to 
corporations (and, specifically, not individuals487) by the Minister. These licences would 
enable the licensee to construct and operate plant concerned with most aspects of the 
atomic energy process – “the production of atomic energy by a fission process…”488 “any 
process which is preparatory or ancillary…”489 and “the storage, processing or disposal of 
nuclear fuel.”490 Despite these seemingly blanket allowances, there were areas of activity 
in which only the UKAEA was allowed to work and licences could not be granted to third 
parties. This exception to the general rule covered “any treatment of irradiated matter 
which involves the extraction therefrom of plutonium or uranium; or for any treatment of 
uranium such as to increase the proportion of the isotope 235 contained therein.”491 
There are several different isotopes of uranium, some of which are of more use in the 
atomic energy process than others. Naturally occurring uranium is about 99% uranium-
238 and contains about 0.7% uranium-235 by weight.492 The fuel used in nuclear reactors 
must have “a higher concentration of uranium-235, as it is the key ingredient that starts a 
nuclear reactor and keeps it going”493 and the process of increasing this concentration is 
called “enrichment.” This means that, although the Act made it possible for bodies other 
than the Authority to carry out research or other work connected to the atomic-energy 
process, the production of fuel could not be delegated. One reason for this non-delegation 
clause is that the enrichment process used to increase the usefulness of Uranium as a fuel 
source is the same process as is used to create Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which is 
used in atomic weapons. While the Government would be content to allow third parties to 
become involved in some of the research linked to the atomic-energy process, it was 
bound by the terms of the IAEA Statute (dealt with in Chapter 3.2.2) not to allow 
weapons’ technology out of its control. 
The Act imposed a basic restriction on licensees, who were required to ensure that 
there were no escapes of ionising radiation (Section 4). This was not a blanket restriction, 
as it exempted two categories of escape: those which did not “cause any hurt to any 
person or any damage to any property, whether that person or property is on that site or 
elsewhere,”494 or those were attributable to “hostile actions in the course of any armed 
conflict.”495 The logic behind these exemptions is entirely sound – making licensees liable 
for escapes of radioactive material caused by a war (which, by assumption was not the 
fault of the licensee, since the licensees were all companies) would contravene the 
common law maxim that “actus legis nemini facit injuriam” (“the act of the law injures no-
one”).496 Legal maxims, whilst not having the same level of power and authority as 
statute law, still have a level of importance which has been recognised for centuries. They 
have also been rehearsed and revisited by generations of law students old and new. Lord 
Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the seventeenth century, had fairly 
                                        
485 Price Anderson Act 1957 
486 Section 1(1) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
487 Section 1(4) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
488 Section 1(1)(a) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
489 Section 1(1)(b) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
490 Section 1(1)(c) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
491 Sections 1(2)(a) and (b) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
492 BNFL, 2003, Enrichment, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, http://www.bnfl.com/index.aspx?page=160, accessed on 
25/01/04 
493 US NRC, 2003, Uranium Enrichment, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC: US 
DoE / US EPA 
494 Section 4(1) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
495 Section 4(2) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
496 See Volume 5, Coke’s King’s Bench Reports [1572-1616] @ 116 
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strong views on the level of power exerted by statute and whether or not it could be 
bypassed by common sense:  
“It appears in our books that in many cases the common law will control acts of 
parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an act of 
parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be void.”497  
Coke’s words are well known amongst lawyers and politicians alike and indeed, have 
been cited in parliamentary debates.498 Insurance policies, however, have traditionally 
excluded any liability for “losses… proceeding from the act of God, or the King's 
enemies”499 – in other words, losses attributable to natural disasters or acts of war (and, 
more recently, terrorism). This meant that the provision of cover under section 5 was the 
exact opposite of mainstream insurance policies. This approach suggests both that the 
government already considered that its atomic plants were more of a target than other 
industries, and that the consequences of an attack on such a plant would be far graver 
than they would for an attack on a coal mine, for example. 
Licensees were also required to take out insurance against any possible escape of 
radioactive material, up to a value of £5m500 (£90m). Several different claim periods were 
set out in the Act, ranging from ten years with respect to single incidences of pollution 
(Section 4(4) and Section 5(1)), up to thirty years in situations where the “occurrence was 
a continuing one, or was one of a succession of occurrences….”501 
Equally importantly, section 7 of the Act gave the Minister the power to appoint 
Inspectors, who were given powers of entry onto licensed sites in order to assess whether 
the terms of a license were being complied with. The Inspectors, and their parent body 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), were protected from interference and 
obstruction in the course of their duties. The provisions of the Act which prevented 
Inspectors from disclosing any information that was discovered on inspection were much 
stricter, however.502 As with the unusual exemption clauses to insurance discussed earlier, 
these draconian measures for interfering with inspectors suggest that, as the Cold War 
was at its height, concerns about espionage were still at an acute level. 
The general rule on a person’s liability for the escape of something on their land is a 
well-established one, having been set out towards the end of the 19th Century by 
Blackburn J, in the case of Rylands v Fletcher.503 The rule states that: 
“… the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and 
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril 
and if he does not do so, if prima facie liable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape.”504 
The Rule in Rylands and Fletcher was soon refined and now covers only a non-natural 
use of the land.505 This, in turn, was refined further in the early twentieth century to the 
extent that: 
“non-natural use… must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use 
                                        
497 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 114 
498 See for example, Ferrand, W., 1847, Poor Law Administration Bill, HC Deb 17 May 1847 vol 92 c983, and 
Mar and Kelly, Earl, 1999, House of Lords Bill, HL Deb 11 May 1999 vol 600 c1153 
499 Butler v Wildman [1814] 23 All ER 748, per Best J @ 52 
500 Section 5(1) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
501 Section 4(4) Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
502 Section 7(1) gives the power to appoint. Section 7(3) protects the Inspectors from obstruction by the 
imposition of a criminal penalty of up to £50 and three months’ imprisonment. Section 7(4) imposes a criminal 
penalty of up to £100 and two years’ imprisonment on “any person who… discloses any information obtained in 
the exercise of powers under this Act” 
503 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 
504 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, per Blackburn J at 333. this is generally referred to as “the Rule in 
Rylands and Fletcher” 
505 This was added by Cairns LJ when the case was appealed to the House of Lords. 
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as is proper for the general benefit of the community”506 
The use of statutory powers as a basis for construction of a site also has an effect on 
potential liability under Rylands v Fletcher. Although writing about a reservoir rather than 
a nuclear-power station, Professor Simpson states that, for such cases, “in the absence of 
negligence, the occupiers whose lands had been [damaged] would have had no 
remedy.”507 
Similarly, actions for nuisance against installations which have been granted planning 
permission has become more difficult since the case of Gillingham BC v Medway 
(Chatham) Dock Co Ltd.508 In this case, the court held that the character of the residential 
area had been changed by the grant of planning permission for a commercial port and 
that what may have constituted a nuisance prior to the grant of planning permission would 
not necessarily do so afterwards.509 
The law regarding the level of compensation payable is almost as well established, 
having been set out later by the same Judge (who, by now, was a Lord Justice): 
“… where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of 
money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get 
at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has 
suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained 
the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation”510 
The 1959 Act thus appears to envisage situations where damage of more that £5m 
could be caused by an escape of “iodising radiations”511 from a licensed site. If it did not, 
then there would have been no need for a cap on the required insurance. As ever, this 
could be argued to be a sensible, pragmatic, “belt and braces” approach –parliament 
believed nuclear power to be safe, and to demonstrate this they would cover claims for 
any damages resulting from an accident. However, just in case it turned out not to be as 
safe as they had hoped, a cap would prevent too great a level of exposure to the 
government (and thus taxpayers and voters). 
Although the UK opted to introduce a liability regime on the operators of nuclear sites 
with a comparatively low cap, the United States followed a different path via the Price 
Anderson Act of 1957.512 This imposed a total cap on a single claim of $560m ($4.5bn at 
2007 rates513), and set out that the first $500m of any claim would be covered by the 
Federal government, leaving the licensee with a $60m maximum exposure.514 Without this 
limit, it was argued, insurance costs would run at $23.5 m per plant per year515 – meaning 
that no company would be interested in operating a nuclear facility. With a cap on the 
exposure to liability, companies would look upon the development of nuclear-power 
stations more favourably – Westinghouse Electric Corporation had already built reactors516 
and was now joined in the field by Consolidated Edison Company517 and Commonwealth 
Edison Company,518 who started construction work respectively on the Indian Point 
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reactor at Buchanan, New York, and the Dresden plant in Grundy County, Illinois, in 1957. 
The UK and the US had two things in common in the 1950s and 1960s; governments 
which were decidedly pro-nuclear power and privately-owned nuclear construction and 
operation industries. Added to this heady mixture was the increasingly apparent 
suggestion that accidents at nuclear power stations, even though they could not be as 
destructive as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could cause considerable, 
and expensive, damage. The costs of this were presumed to be high enough to deter 
private companies from wanting to become involved in the industry, and so the UK and 
the US therefore had already started imposing limits on liability for nuclear-related 
accidents, as a mechanism for encouraging investment. It was not long before both the 
United Nations and the OEEC joined them.  
 
3.2.6: The Paris, Vienna and Brussels Conventions 1960-3519 
The Paris Convention 1960520 and Brussels Convention 1963,521 both of which were 
introduced under the auspices of the OEEC/OECD, and the Vienna Convention of 1963,522 
which was a United Nations instrument, were all concerned with the imposition of liability 
for nuclear incidents and accidents. They were given effect in the UK by the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1969.523 
The 1960 Paris Convention established the absolute liability of plant operators for 
personal injury and damage to property as a result of a nuclear incident.524 In relation to a 
nuclear installation, the operator was defined as “the person designated or recognised by 
the competent public authority as the operator of that installation.”525 In the UK, 
therefore, this would mean anyone who had been granted an operating licence by the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965. The financial limit of liability was set out in Article 7 as 15 
million “Special Drawing Rights”526 (SDRs), although it could be amended by the signatory 
States depending on various insurance criteria.527  
The Brussels Convention then extended that liability to the signatory States 
themselves for “damage caused by nuclear incidents”528 by their national operators. The 
limit was set at 300 million SDRs,529 much higher than that set by the Paris Convention 
only three years earlier. The 300 million SDRs would consist of a combination of 
insurance, national public finds and funds made available by all the Contracting Parties.530 
The Vienna Convention did much the same as the Paris and Brussels Conventions but, 
as a UN instrument, it was open to a greater number of signatories. Another difference is 
that lack of any specified financial cap on claims. Claimants were specifically barred from 
claiming under both the Vienna Convention and the Paris/Brussels Conventions by Article 
                                        
519 For further discussion of the role that these conventions have in the area of liability for nuclear incidents, 
see: Temple, R., Penney, C, & Sullivan M., Liability for Nuclear Incidents: Should the UK Now Follow the US 
approach? (2006) 18 JEL (443). 
520 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960. 
521 Brussels Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention 1960. 
522 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963. 
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524 Woolley, J., 2000, Report on the Legal Liabilities for Civil Plutonium Incidents, Oxford: Oxford Research 
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525 Article 1 (a)(vi), Paris Convention 1960. 
526 IMF, 2006, Factsheet: Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
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530 Article 3(b) Brussels Convention 1963. 
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XVI. As a result of this provision there are no countries which have ratified both the Paris 
and Vienna Conventions. Spain and the UK are the only countries to have signed both, but 
both have only ratified the Paris Convention.531 
The amendments in the Nuclear Installations Act 1969 covered two specific areas. 
Section 1 inserted a new subsection (3A) into the 1965 Act, which extended the 
restrictions on liability for certain types of damage. Section 2 amended the thresholds and 
maximum amounts that would be made available by Parliament to meet compensation 
claims. In the case of compensation awarded by a foreign court, the threshold amount 
was raised from £1.75m to £2.1m.532 The maximum limit on the compensation fund to be 
made available by Parliament was raised from £43m to £50m.533 This rise of 16.3 per cent 
over four years is more or less in line with inflation over the same period.534 
A considerable amount of the 1965 Amendment Act was devoted to assessing the 
apportionment of risks associated with transportation of nuclear matter and the 
involvement of “relevant foreign operators.”535 The transportation covered was wholly 
within the United Kingdom (Section 3) and, therefore, would not later fall under the 
auspices of the United Nations’ Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.536 Moreover, under section 5 of the 
Act, any damage or injury that occurred outside the UK and which, had it happened within 
the UK, would normally have invoked the compensation regime under section 4, was 
expressly excluded from compensation. 
The rationale behind this exception was quite simple: licences could only be granted 
under the provisions of the linked 1959 and 1965 Acts in relation to sites within the UK 
and, thus, having Crown liability for an accident occurring outside the UK was 
unnecessary. As is often the case in statute, there was a caveat to this rule, meaning that 
compensation would have been payable if it could have been shown that the damage or 
injury occurred on a ship or aircraft registered in the UK.537 The effective extension of the 
UK’s responsibility onto its ships and aircraft is nothing new. In 1901, a government 
report538 decided that there was no effective difference between the general extent of the 
British Empire and British ships. The report concluded: 
“the simplest rule would be that a person born on a British ship in foreign waters 
should be a British subject, but that a person born on board a foreign ship should 
not be deemed to be a British subject merely because the ship was at the time of 
his birth in British waters”539 
Although this report concerned naturalisation laws rather than civil or criminal liability, 
what it did was to extend what was already an accepted idea that British sovereign 
territory extended to its ships (and, by logical extension, aircraft). 
The existing Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 and Nuclear 
                                        
531 Spain signed the Paris Convention on 31 October 1961 and the Vienna Convention on 6 September 1963. 
The UK signed the Paris Convention on 23 February 1966 and the Vienna Convention on 11 November 1964. 
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Installations (Amendment) Act 1965 were repealed in their entirety by section 29(1) of 
the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. This Act was entered onto the statute books on 5 
August 1965, but did not come into force until a further four months later, however.540 
Whilst not a point of great significance, this is a longer time period than for most pieces of 
statute, particularly consolidation Acts which say nothing new or controversial. Although 
those four months were a busy time for the Wilson Government, which had to contend 
with the increasing US involvement in Vietnam, the outbreak of war between India and 
Pakistan541 and the oil embargo against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, the delay appears to have 
been simply an administrative measure designed to smooth the transition between the old 
Acts and the new Act. 
This is a good example of what was mentioned in the introductory chapter; a situation 
where national legislation was initially informed and directed by international law, but 
subsequently developed along a more independent pathway. One advantage of this is that 
international treaties and conventions, such as the Paris Convention, have no direct legal 
effect on real or legal persons – that is to say on people or companies.542 International law 
needs to be put into a national framework before it becomes anything more than a 
statement of intent by the signatory states, so the states which have signed but not 
ratified any of above Conventions are not bound by their provisions. This means that 
although the Nuclear Installations Act 1969 stated that its purpose was to bring the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 into “conformity with international agreements” the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention are still not binding in the UK, only those of the Paris 
and Brussels Conventions. The differences in levels of liability under the Paris/Brussels 
Conventions, the Vienna Convention, the 1959/1965 Acts and the 1957 Price Anderson Act 
(which was the US equivalent) are summarised in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Liability under UK and other Law543 
Statute 
Liability for Escape or Damage 
Time Period 
Operator State 
Price Anderson Act 1957 $60m (£223m) $500m (£1.9bn)  
Nuclear Industry (Licensing and 
Insurance) Act 1959 
£5m (£84m) £43m (£722m) 10-30 yrs 
Paris Convention 1960 15mSDR (£53m) 300mSDR (£1bn)  
Vienna Convention 1963 UNSPECIFIED  
Nuclear Industry (Amendment) Act 
1965 
£5m (£70m) £43m (£600m) 10, 20, 30 yrs 
Nuclear Industry Act 1965 £5m (£70m) £43m (£600m) 10, 20, 30 yrs 
 
Although the figures used in the table are all just rough approximations, it is clear to 
see that liability for both state and licensee under UK law is considerably lower than under 
either US law or International Law. Given the way in which the nuclear consortia (who 
were the licensees) managed to exert influence on the legislative process in the UK, this is 
not a great surprise. 
The inherent internal contradiction between governments which, on the one hand 
                                        
540 Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (Commencement No 1) Order 1965 (SI 1965/1880). 
541 Sked, A., & Cook, C., 1993, Post-War Britain: A Political History 1945-1992, London: Penguin Books, p213. 
542 A corporation has had legal personality, or the right to enter into contracts in its own name, since the 
sixteenth century. The more formalised Doctrine of Separate Legal Personality evolved at the end of the 
nineteenth century (see especially Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22), but that is beyond the focus 
of this work. 
543 Figures in brackets represent rough 2007 Sterling equivalents. Sources: ONS, 2009, op cit, n463; BLS, 
2007, op cit, n515; and IMF, 2010, op cit, n529. Paris Convention figures are calculated as if the Bretton Woods 
system were still in place. 
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were convinced that nuclear energy was the future of commercial energy production and, 
on the other knew that they could not encourage private enterprise to play any significant 
role in this future without sweetening the deal considerably, was first marked in the eight 
year period between the 1956 Price Anderson Act and the 1963 Vienna Convention. Prior 
to Price Anderson, no company had any indemnity from the state. After Vienna, no 
company operated without indemnity from the state.  
Having considered the general developments which occurred in the interim time 
period between the end of chapter two and the beginning of this chapter, it can be seen 
that the Acts which were passed between 1973 and 1977 were forged in a completely 
different environment to those which had been created in the late 1940s. In the early 
Acts, the environment was what Professor Steve Cohn refers to as a “politico-economic 
consensus in favour of nuclear power development.”544  
Nineteen sixty-four saw the election of Harold Wilson and the Labour Party, following 
the increasing unpopularity of the Conservative government, which had been in power 
since 1951. Partly because of the tiny Labour majority (of four), Wilson was unable to 
introduce any significant legislative changes to the previous government’s nuclear policy – 
the 1965 Nuclear Installations Act, for example, built on existing policy decisions. This put 
Wilson somewhat at odds with a significant proportion of the party membership, which 
had by that time established close links with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND). According to the CND, “Labour Party members and trade unionists were 
overwhelmingly sympathetic”545 to their causes, but this should not be taken at face 
value, since the organisation proffers no concrete evidence to back up their assertion. 
Additionally, the Trade Unions with their block votes were generally unsympathetic to the 
nuclear industry, particularly since the passing of a party conference motion in 1960 in 
support of unilateral nuclear disarmament, which had gone against the advice of the 
leadership.546 In the UK, nuclear power related decisions were taken, as has already been 
shown, by the Minister of Power (although this post was incorporated into the Ministry of 
Technology in the late autumn of 1969547) and UKAEA. Clearly, as a political appointee, 
the Minister of Power is bound to a large extent by government policy which in the 1964-
70 period was broadly pro-nuclear and pro-British buying. Indeed, Harold Wilson launched 
the “I’m backing Britain” campaign in 1968548 (shortly after the devaluation of Sterling by 
around 15 per cent in November 1967549) in which the public was urged to purchase only 
home-produced goods rather than imported goods. Clearly it was far from being his 
intention, but by making foreign goods and services more expensive almost overnight, 
Wilson’s actions made the choice of a British reactor slightly more economically viable. 
Professor Cohn, who looked at the development of the nuclear industry primarily from 
the perspective of the United States, makes some points which translate equally well to 
the UK, arguing that there had been several elements which spawned the political-
economic consensus he claimed to have been in place in the 1950s and 1960s, including 
“widespread public trust in business and government leaders” and “popular faith in 
‘Science.’”550 By 1973, as we have seen to some extent above, and will be shown in more 
detail in the following sections, many of these elements had either begun to be eroded or 
had been eroded completely, and thus the use of scientific language and rhetoric by 
politicians could be expected to change. 
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3.3: The Atomic Energy Agency (Weapons Group) Act 1973 
As has been shown in earlier chapters, the early days of nuclear research were 
focused on the weapons-related potential of the technology, with Sir Henry Tizard, Chair 
of the Aeronautical Research Committee “fail[ing] to see much of a future for nuclear 
power at all”551 and Winston Churchill and Sir John Anderson claiming in 1943 that the 
prospects for Britain’s post-war commercial exploitation of nuclear power were “remote 
and hardly worth considering.”552 
However, an industry dedicated to nuclear power did develop, as we have also seen, 
and the separation of this industry from the parallel nuclear-weapons’ industry is marked 
in the UK by the separation of the Weapons Group (one of the four specialist groups within 
the UKAEA) from the rest of the Authority by the Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons 
Group) Act 1973. This Act, while not privatising any aspect of the industry, transferred the 
Weapons Group to the direct control of the Secretary of State for Defence.553 Along with 
the personnel (who were given guarantees of continuation of employment under Section 
2(1) of the Act), any land that had been used by the Weapons Group prior to 1 November 
1972 was also transferred away from UKAEA.554 
Perhaps unnecessarily, given the complete removal of its Weapons Group, the Act 
goes on to specifically forbid the UKAEA from engaging “in any work, whether by way of 
research, experiment, development, production or otherwise, on any explosive nuclear 
device, whether for war-like application or otherwise”555 without the authority of the 
Secretary of State. This inclusion of “war-like application or otherwise” has links back to 
the US Plowshare programme of the 1960s which will be discussed below. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the UKAEA had ever entertained any plans for such a project 
prior to this date, but the Act made sure than no plan was ever subsequently devised. 
Although the Weapons Group was transferred directly to the control of the Secretary 
of State, in practice it remained at the same site at Aldermaston, in Berkshire, where its 
management was taken over by the newly created Ministry of Defence (MOD).556 557 Sir 
Derek Rayner, as part of his role as Chief Executive of the MOD Procurement Executive,558 
had been given the task of looking:  
“at defence procurement as a whole, and will aim to reach lasting conclusions to 
end the constant reorganisation in this field which has plagued us ever since the 
war.”559 
When his review was complete, Rayner had proposed that in order to rationalise 
overall research and development in defence: 
“procurement activities embracing all stages of all defence procurement from 
research through to production should be brought together into a single 
organisation within the Ministry of Defence.”560 
There was very little disagreement with the fundamental issues of the Bill when it was 
debated in Parliament – in fact, the main bones of contention were relating to the pension 
rights and wage levels of those employees who would be transferred from the UKAEA to 
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the MOD. 
Although the separation of weapons- and energy-related work in the UK was 
formalised by the Act, elsewhere the ideas of using nuclear explosions for non-warlike 
reasons was still a matter of potential development. The best known of these examples 
was Project Plowshare, which Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Lord Chalfont 
described as “an important branch of civil nuclear technology and engineering”561 in a 
House of Lords’ debate on Disarmament in 1967. The wider debate around Project 
Plowshare,562 and similar programmes is not directly relevant to this discussion, and will 
be dealt with in Appendix VIII. 
The separation of the UKAEA into separate weapons and energy groups was made, as 
we have seen, on the back of a recommendation that it would be more economical and 
efficient. Nuclear weapons, by the early 1970s were felt by many to be eternally tarnished 
by their role in the Cold War in general, as well as in specific flash points such as the 
Cuban Missile crisis of the previous decade. The UK government’s overarching attitude to 
nuclear weapons was, as the title of Professor (and ex-UKAEA historian and archivist) 
Margaret Gowing’s history of nuclear policymaking in the 1940s suggests, “Independence 
and Deterrence.”563 Nuclear power, on the other hand, although inherently linked in the 
minds of many to nuclear weapons, was being portrayed as the clean power of the future 
and, by separating out the oversight and management of the two types of technology, the 
government was attempting to distance nuclear power in the minds of the public from the 
weapons debate. 
One reason for separating the two sibling technologies is a continuation of the 
separation that had started with the Radioactive Substances Act 1948 between “bad” 
radiation and “good” radiation. In the earlier case, the good radiation was that used for 
medical and commercial purposes, and it was separated from the bomb-related 
technology. By the time of the 1973 Act, however, the “good” side of the nuclear industry 
was probably at best the “not so bad” side, and still needed to be distanced from the 
weapons-related technology. 
A second reason for the separation was that the nuclear energy industry in the UK 
was in need of financial stimulation; not only were the funding and accounts of nuclear 
power a matter of public record, but the technology also had to compete (albeit at this 
time not in a truly competitive marketplace) with other forms of electricity generation. 
Nuclear weaponry, on the other hand, and the UK’s nuclear deterrent in particular, could 
be financed without full public disclosure (under the umbrella of “national security”) and 
without competition. The financial stimulation for nuclear energy came in the form of two 
pieces of legislation, the Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 and the Nuclear Safeguards 
and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978. 
 
3.4: The Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 and the Nuclear 
Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 
These two pieces of statute will be dealt with together, since neither is particularly 
lengthy and yet both had an impact which was larger than might at first seem to be the 
case. The 1977 Act concerned extension of monies available to the National Nuclear 
Corporation, which was discussed above, and British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) and the 
Radiochemical Centre Ltd (TRC), both of which were set up under the Atomic Energy Act 
1971, and will be discussed shortly. 
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The influence of the OPEC region was to become more important once these states 
formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960,564 but was 
offset to a certain extent in the UK by the commencement of commercial North Sea Oil 
production in the early 1970s.565 The OPEC-triggered fuel shortages of the mid-1970s led 
to another rise in the drive for nuclear power; again, the rationale being national energy 
security. 
In October 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armies advanced on Israel, in what is now 
referred to as the Yom Kippur war.566 The details of the conflict are not important for this 
discussion, but the reverberations are. In the same month, OPEC announced that it was 
reducing oil production (and increasing prices), by 17 per cent in retaliation for the 
support of the United States and the West for Israel during the brief war.567 Retail prices 
for fuel also rose sharply, both in the United States568 and in the UK, where “car use fell 
on average 1.81 per cent per annum”569 
In this environment of high fossil-fuel prices, the Energy Secretary, Eric Varley, 
announced UK’s third nuclear-power programme in July 1974.570 The announcement was 
that there would be just six new reactors built, but that they would all be larger than any 
previously constructed (at 660MW each), and of the Steam-Generating Heavy Water 
(SGHWR) type. Other than a small experimental prototype at Winfrith, however, the 
SGHWR was an untested design.571 The CEGB, as eventual customer for the electricity 
these reactors would produce, had preferred the established and much-tested (but 
American-designed and built) Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), and wanted 18 PWR type 
reactors to be built. In this case, however, the wishes of the customer, both in design and 
scale of construction, were overridden by the political desires of the time which, in the 
midst of a recession, were resolutely pro-British industry.572 As with the decisions above 
taken at the height of the Suez crisis, this was a clear example of a piece of decision 
making based on a pragmatic stance in response to the problems of higher fuel prices and 
over-reliance on imported energy sources. This is not the only occasion where “the trouble 
for Britain was that in many ways the least satisfactory runner had won”573 and later, 
similar, outcomes were to arise in relation to the decisions over Nimrod Airborne Early 
Warning System574 and Westland Helicopters575 in the 1980s. In all three of these 
decisions, time (and hindsight) showed that the decision made was not the right one, and 
eventually the bids which had initially lost were adopted (viz. the PWR, Hawkeye and 
Black Hawk). However, as has already been suggested, political pragmatism must be 
judged against the situation as it appeared then, rather than the situation as it appears 
now. Given that proviso, and despite much of the advice given at the time being against 
such a move, the decision to adopt the SGHWR was still at its heart a pragmatic attempt 
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to alleviate some of the impact of the recession. In 1976, the Chairman of the CEGB, 
Arthur Hawkins, again suggested the cancellation of the SGHWR programme which had 
been announced two years earlier (and which the CEGB had never fully supported 
anyway) on the basis that the PWR had by then passed a stringent safety review by the 
Department of Energy and was operating successfully in France and the United States.576 
At the time, there was no reaction from the government of the opposition, but the 
Liberal Party did pass a motion at their Annual Conference in October 1977 to oppose all 
nuclear power in the UK.577 In January 1978, the Energy Secretary, Tony Benn, 
announced that more power stations would be built, but that the SGHWR design (which he 
had initially favoured very strongly) would be abandoned, saying: 
“It is the unanimous advice of all concerned that in the changed circumstances of 
today the SGHWR should not be adopted for the next power station orders. The 
Government have accordingly decided that it would be right to discontinue work 
on the SGHWR.”578 
What Tony Benn is effectively saying is that the moves he felt to be pragmatic at the 
time (but which many disagreed with) were no longer pragmatic since the global situation 
had changed. Ironically, if the government had given sufficient weight to the opinions of 
the CEGB, which was, after all, the sole UK customer for nuclear power, then the 
programme would not have been delayed for so long and a great deal of money 
(estimated at the time as £145m579) could have been saved. However, despite 
abandoning the SGHWR design, Benn still avoided opting wholly for the tried and tested 
PWR design that was being used in the United States and elsewhere. Instead, the new 
plants would be built using a combination of the British AGR and PWR designs and the US 
PWR design. The decision was given a somewhat mixed reception: 
“The government’s decision on the next generation of nuclear power stations sets 
the nuclear industry back 10 years. Or, to put it another way, it represents a 
major milestone in the successful development of nuclear power. Take your 
choice; as Mr Tony Benn, the energy secretary puts it, Britain is in ‘a valid option 
situation.’”580 
The rationale given by the government for what an editorial piece in the Economist 
berated as a lack of a proper decision, was that it was better not to be “dependent upon 
an exclusive commitment to any one reactor system”581 as that could potentially lead to 
problems with competitiveness in the future. In other words, Tony Benn was “hedging his 
bets” in an attempt to avoid the situation that he had created with regard to the SGHWR 
programme. The Secretary of State also argued that, much as it would be unwise to rely 
wholly on the tried and tested AGR, it would not be a pragmatic choice to opt exclusively 
for the unfamiliar PWR system, not least because: 
“In general, it is quicker to build what one knows best. It takes longer to build 
what one has not built before and longest to build what has never been built 
before.”582 
The justification of the SGHWR decision did not involve much reliance of scientific data 
– much of which would have shown the design to be too expensive and uncompetitive – 
and this is another example of politicians being prepared to drop all scientific rhetoric to 
justify a policy if it does not support their decision. 
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3.4.1: British Nuclear Fuels Limited 
Section 1 of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 had gone to great lengths to 
specify which parts of the UKAEA were to be transferred to BNFL (effectively, everything 
which was part of the UKAEA trading fund and was not specifically excluded in sub-section 
2583). Everything in the trading fund which did not go to BNFL went to TRC under section 
1(2). Excepted from transfer to either BNFL or TRC was any interest which the UKAEA 
may have had relating to a “patent, registered design or registered trade mark”;584 
whether existing, applied for, or pending. Intellectual property rights in any product, 
design or idea arising after the transfer from UKAEA, however, were to be owned by 
whichever of BNFL or TRC was responsible for their creation. The trading fund had been 
set up some six years previously and used primarily to cover the production of nuclear 
fuels. Between 1965 and 1970: 
“the “value of sales of nuclear fuel services has grown from £19½ million to £30 
million and the value of sales of radioisotopes from £2.3 million to £4 million.”585  
Much of the Act was concerned with the minutiae of every step involved with the 
transformation of a state-owned company into a quasi-independent body corporate. This 
meant that the company could own its assets and deal with them in much the same way 
as an independent company floated on the Stock Exchange; the difference being that the 
Government maintained ownership of all the shares. The Secretary of State was 
empowered to make loans to the two companies from the National Loans Fund,586 up to a 
maximum of £75m for BNFL and £7m for TRC.587 The whole of this section was repealed 
only six years later, however, by the Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977, which is 
discussed below. 
Whilst BNFL ended up being a wholly government-owned entity, there was support for 
the idea that ownership of BNFL would also be offered to private shareholders. During the 
second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, the Minister for Industry, Sir John 
Eden, said that there were “strong grounds for ensuring that in the foreseeable future 
there shall be a majority public shareholding.”588 The “strong grounds” that were being 
discussed included the fact that, due to the nature of its work, BNFL would inevitably “be 
handling, and in fact generating, information of a particularly sensitive nature”589 and that 
it would be in the interests of security to keep this information secure. 
The financial limits on the two companies which the 1971 Act had set at £50m for 
BNFL590 and £5m for TRC591 were also addressed by the 1977 Act. These limits 
represented the maximum amount of public money that could be injected into the two 
companies. The limits for BNFL were increased to £300m (with a capacity for further 
extending it to £500m).592 For TRC, the limit remained at £5m, but the extension limit 
was raised to £15m.593 This reflects the fact that BNFL had expanded quite significantly 
over the intervening time period, but TRC had done so only marginally. Although the limits 
for TRC remained the same, those for BNFL were increased again to £1bn)594 by the 
Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1981 (which had no other function) and to £2bn, with no 
capacity for extension595 by the Atomic Energy Act 1989 (below). These rises are 
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represented in a Table 3.2 below, and it is clear to see that BNFL’s financial limits were 
increased by roughly ten times the underlying rate of inflation (from £50m to £2bn), 
which can be argued to be a sign that either the company was outperforming the market 
consistently (since a larger company requires larger capital flows to operate) or the 
reverse – that the company was struggling to stay afloat in the unprotected market in 
which it had been launched. The truth lies between the two extremes – the company had 
grown dramatically, but with that growth had come increased exposure to changes in the 
market. 
Table 3.2: Financial Limits on Nuclear Companies  
 1971 1977 1981 1989 OVERALL RISE 
BNFL 
£50m 
(£75m) 
£300m 
(£500m) 
£1bn 
(£1.5bn) 
£2bn 
--  
£1.95bn 
(£1.425bn) 
Rise 
N/A 600% 
(666%) 
333% 
(333%) 
100% 
-- 
3,900% 
(2,000%) 
TRC 
£5m 
(£7m) 
£5m 
(£15m) 
£5m 
(£15m) 
£5m 
(£15m) 
0 
(£8m) 
Rise 
N/A 0% 
(114%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(114%) 
Inflation596 N/A 127.6% 62% 54% 393.3% 
The Act also made provision for the government to buy more shares in the National 
Nuclear Corporation Ltd (NCC). NCC had been formed in 1973, when the consortia which 
had been formed to build the UK’s nuclear power stations amalgamated.597 The 
government maintained their one-third shareholding until 1988, when the company was 
sold to General Electric.598 The creation of, and amendments to, the consortia were 
discussed more fully above. 
The Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 ran to only four sections. Section 1 
concerned the extension of guarantees given by the Secretary of State for the repayments 
of loans made to BNFL or TRC, which had been set up six years previously. The mechanics 
of the guarantee process did not change, however, and will not be discussed in any 
further detail. The idea of setting up two new companies which could potentially be 
privatised also ties in with the creation in January 1975 of the National Enterprise Board 
by the Industry Act 1974, the purpose of which was to extend public ownership of 
industry. 
 
3.4.2: Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 
The 1978 Act has a dual role. The first part of the Act was concerned with giving 
effect to an agreement made in the autumn of 1976599 between “the United Kingdom, The 
European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency.”600 This 
agreement was made to allow inspectors from the IAEA to enter the UK and inspect sites 
under the terms of the 1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), which came into force in 1970. Although this Treaty concerns nuclear weapons, and 
so is not strictly within the areas of discussion here, it does have a bearing on the role of 
the UKAEA. The Treaty (and Safeguards Agreement) gave the IAEA Inspectors the right to 
inspect all nuclear facilities, whether involved in the production of weapons-grade fissile 
material or power production. The UK was not the only country to put in place a 
Safeguards Agreement following the NPT. Although none were required to do so by the 
                                        
596 ONS, 20019 op cit, n463 
597 NNC, 2004, op cit, n480. 
598 ibid. 
599 UK Safeguards Agreement, Cmnd 6730 
600 Section 1(1) Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 78 
Treaty itself, “all five declared nuclear weapon States (France… China, the Soviet Union, 
the UK and the United States) subsequently concluded voluntary safeguards agreements 
with the IAEA.”601 The rationale behind the UK’s decision to sign the Safeguard agreement 
is set out in the 13-part preamble to the Treaty. Some of the sections of the preamble are 
purely procedural, but others are more substantive, particularly the fourth, which states: 
“WHEREAS the United Kingdom, as a nuclear-weapon State within the meaning of 
the Treaty, has throughout desired to encourage widespread adherence to the 
Treaty by demonstrating to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be 
placed at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards 
pursuant to the Treaty.”602 
In other words, if the UK and the other states which had signed their own Safeguard 
Agreements could demonstrate to those countries which had not yet developed this type 
of technology that they would not suffer as a result of abandoning attempts to develop it, 
then the Treaty would stand a greater chance of working. Since the 1968 Treaty and the 
1976 Safeguards Agreement India, Pakistan and South Africa all admit to having 
developed nuclear weapons (though the latter has since relinquished them) and, since the 
revelations of Mordechai Vanunu, Israel is widely regarded to have done so, although it 
has never admitted to it.603 
Inspectors appointed by the IAEA under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement604 
were given the power to enter “any facility of part thereof and there make any inspection 
or do any other thing which may reasonably be required.”605 If the IAEA Inspectors were 
obstructed in their duties or if their reasonable requests for information were refused, the 
penalty on summary conviction could have amounted to a fine of up to £1000.606 
Moreover, the provision of false information to the IAEA Inspectors was punishable on 
indictment by imprisonment of up to two years.607 
These sanctions can be compared with those under section 7(3) of the Nuclear 
Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 which impose a maximum fine of £50 
and maximum imprisonment of three months. Whilst it is true that nearly two decades 
have passed between the Acts, this alone does not explain a rise of 2,000% in the level 
fines available, or 800% in potential prison sentence. 
One possible explanation for this sharp rise in sanctions is, as was mentioned earlier, 
that the timing of this Act coincided with a growth in dissatisfaction with nuclear power 
among the public, both in continental Europe and in the UK. In 1976, the Danish 
government was forced to abandon its plans to build six nuclear-power stations in the face 
of massive public opposition.608 Stocketon and Janke also attribute the fall of the Swedish 
Social-Democrat government in 1976 and the “collapse of the Conservative Coalition in 
October 1978” to similar factors.609 In Austria, as we have already seen, a referendum led 
to atomic energy being banned from the entire country. Although the effective 
abandonment of nuclear energy by the governments of Denmark, Sweden and Austria 
does not, of course have any direct impact on decisions made in the UK, it can be seen to 
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be symptomatic of a growing disillusionment with nuclear energy, which will have been 
picked up on by politicians in the UK610 and, as such, the increased penalties can be seen 
as a pragmatic response to the perceived increase in risk of non-compliance with 
inspectors. 
The “Electricity (Finance)” section of the 1978 Act concerned the making available of 
extra government funds to construct the second-stage of the coal-fired Drax power station 
in Yorkshire,611 and was repealed by the Electricity Act 1989 (below) so will not be 
discussed further here. It does, however, illustrate that the labour government had not 
completely abandoned fossil fuels in pursuance of nuclear power. 
The remaining sections of the Act, further pertaining to the IAEA Inspectors, have 
remained substantially the same since their inception, other than for minor amendments; 
e.g., changing the Section 2 fines discussed above to “level 5 on the standard scale.”612 
The 1978 decision to abandon the SGHRW-type reactor was based, in the words of 
the Energy Secretary, on the “unanimous advice of all concerned”613 as the existing AGR 
technology was more easily accessible and cheaper. By the late 1970s, cost had become 
an important issue in the UK, since inflation was running at over 15 per cent for almost 
the whole of the period focused on in this chapter614 and, as a direct result of the OPEC 
price hikes of 1972-3,615 the “sterling crisis” of 1976 led to the UK being forced to ask the 
International Monetary Fund for a loan of £45.3bn in September 1976.616 
These two Acts refined the framework which had already been put into place in order 
to support the companies involved in the nuclear industry. As policy measures, the 
financial support given under the 1977 Act was entirely pragmatic, as it was realised that 
without extra funding being made available, neither BNFL nor TRC would be able to 
continue operating and the government would be saddled with the entire cost of the 
operation. One area where debates were still continuing was in the drawn-out discussions 
about whether a large plant should be built in rural Cumbria to reprocess spent nuclear 
fuel rods. 
 
3.5: The Parker Inquiry 
In early 1978, the Report of the Windscale Inquiry (the Parker Report) was 
published.617 The report recommended that the construction of the Windscale reprocessing 
plant should continue without delay, even though in practical terms it was unlikely to 
“start for 2-3 years [and] the first ounce of plutonium will not be recycled for 10 years.”618  
On its publication, the Parker Report was given a mixed reaction by politicians. Sir 
Peter Emery, the Conservative MP for East Devon, argued that: 
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“the whole House must be grateful to Mr. Justice Parker for the extensive nature 
of the report. In view of the considerable emotional feelings and fears about 
nuclear energy… over the past 15 years there has been not one fatality or serious 
accident due to radiation in the whole of the nuclear power industry That is surely 
of significance in allaying people's fears.”619 
The East Devon constituency, based around the town of Honiton is, it should be 
noted, approximately 350 miles from the THORP site at Windscale. The reaction appears 
not to have been consistent along party political lines, however, as Emery’s fellow 
Conservative MP, Michael Noble,620 (later Lord Glenkinglas), argued, “the original planning 
inquiry [was] unsatisfactory in view of the nature of the decision”621 and went on to say 
that “we find the proposal for a further debate to be unsatisfactory”622 as it would not take 
into account the apparent objections of the United States to the development of the plan. 
These objections, which were raised in a letter from Joseph Nye, a State Department 
official,623 were based on the “misunderstanding [of US policy] which arose at the at the 
Windscale hearing.”624 The misunderstanding arose when the US granted a licence to a 
Japanese consignment of fuel elements sent for storage at Winsdcale with a view to 
reprocessing.625 The licence was not meant to signal “an endorsement of reprocessing”,626 
and the US “moratorium on the development of nuclear reprocessing”627 was still in force. 
Despite the efforts of the US State Department, the recommendations of the Parker 
Report for the construction of the reprocessing plant at Windscale were approved by MPs 
on 23 March 1978 by a 130 majority.628 
The authors of the Parker Report also sought to dispel many of the common 
misconceptions about plutonium as a substance: 
“It is not highly radioactive; and it is not the most toxic substance known to man. 
You could sit on it wearing nothing stouter than a pair of jeans. The escape of 
plutonium would be less damaging than an accident to a tanker of chlorine.”629 
This compares to the information given by opponents of nuclear power; the Australian 
physicist, Dr. Alan Roberts, in his 1977 book, The Hazards of Nuclear Power,630 gives a 
theoretical scenario based on a predicted 2,000 reactors operating: 
“If the leak is as small as one hundredth of one per cent of the total, this still 
constitutes a maximum permissible dose [of plutonium] for every person in the 
world, ten times over.”631 
With this type of rhetoric entering the public domain, if not necessarily the public 
consciousness, it is unsurprising that the public in the UK was becoming concerned about 
nuclear power. The Times reports in February 1977 on “A coordinated campaign, called 
‘energy 2000’ against the development of nuclear power”632 which was going to be 
launched the following month. the campaign would involve representatives of local 
campaign groups (e.g. South Yorkshire nuclear action group) and national organisations 
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(e.g. Friends of the Earth).633  
Equally, the rhetoric employed by the anti-nuclear scientists helps to explain why the 
experts may have been having trouble in getting their message across to the public. Part 
of the problem was access to information: the sober and reflective Parker Report was 
published by HMSO, ran to three volumes of often complex language, and was nearly 700 
pages long; whereas the Roberts’ book, which was neither sober nor reflective, was 
cheaper, shorter and more accessible. These two texts illustrate the fracturing of scientific 
opinion on nuclear power, and the increasing extent to which the presentation of a unified 
scientific discourse was a fallacy. To revisit Kuhn’s three stages outlined briefly in Chapter 
One, this period of scientific debate around the safety of nuclear power was beginning to 
move beyond the “normal” phase into a more turbulent pre-revolutionary phase. 
If the Parker Report can be criticised somewhat for its inaccessibility to the “man on 
the Clapham omnibus”634 and the inevitable consequence that it did not provoke much of 
a reaction, the British approach to nuclear power was still more measured than that used 
in France. In July 1977, for example, when rioting broke out near the Superphénix fast-
breeder reactor in Creys-Malville, the compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS – elite 
French riot police) were deployed and the resulting conflict left one person dead and over 
100 injured.635 Interestingly, the French approach to nuclear energy was later recalled by 
Dr Jack Cunningham MP (now Lord Cunningham of Felling), who said, in an Environment 
and Industry debate in the House of Commons that: 
“The French Minister of the time [Michel d’Ornano, French Ministre de la Culture 
et de l'Environnement] said to [Tony Benn, then Energy Secretary] and me when 
we queried public reaction to their policy, ‘When you are draining the swamp you 
do not consult the frogs.’ It was hardly environmental concerns that drove the 
French; it was because they recognised that they had no oil or gas and very little 
coal of their own.”636 
This would appear to be an even more pragmatic basis for decision-making in the 
nuclear-energy arena than that which has been adopted in the UK, but suggests that 
outside the UK, the debate about nuclear power was far more volatile. In addressing this 
point in mid-1979, RJS Baker, a Reader at Sheffield City Polytechnic wrote: 
“If the nuclear debate ceases to be a rational debate, the wider political 
consequences could be very serious indeed. Already we have seen the horrific 
confrontations between large crowds and riot police which seem to constitute 
some of our European partners’ chosen methods of decision-making in nuclear 
policy matters.”637 
This is illustrative of the increasing levels of concern which were starting to be felt in 
many circles of society. Baron Taverne, ex-government minister, director of the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, and co-founder of the Sense about Science charity,638 argues that in the 
1950s and 1960s, as the wider public started to appreciate the dangers which could be 
associated with nuclear technologies, that appreciation in turn led to “a widespread public 
feeling that [the dangers] had been deliberately concealed.”639 Taverne goes on to argue 
that there are three reasons why the public has lost faith in nuclear science particularly: 
The politicisation of scientists; 
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Increasing suspicion of a conspiracy between government, scientists and industry 
“to pursue technological progress regardless of social consequences and risks” 
640; and  
The fact that scientists appeared for both the pro- and anti- nuclear sides of the 
argument, suggesting that even they weren’t sure of the impact of their work. 
Taverne’s point about the perceived politicisation of scientists is far from being new. 
In 1969, Professor Michael D Reagan of the University of California, wrote that 
participation in the political decision-making process by scientists had grown to such an 
extent that it could now be regarded as “an integral, routine part of the process.”641 What 
did appear to develop over the course of this chapter was the increasing use of scientific 
language by those opposed to nuclear power,642 and much of this can be attributed to the 
simple fact that more research was being undertaken, and awareness of the nuclear 
industry was increasing. It also links with one of the points made in Chapter One by 
Professor Worcester, that scientists working for NGOs are more likely to be trusted than 
those working for the government or industry,643 especially given that the latter are, 
rightly or wrongly, perceived to be involved in the pursuit of technological progress 
regardless of the risks.644 In terms of public awareness, two early key developments are 
argued to be the publications of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,645 and Ralph Nader’s 
Unsafe at Any Speed646 in the US in 1962 and 1965. Carson, a biologist, argued that the 
use of pesticides, especially DDT, was causing irreparable damage to wildlife, was part of 
the beginnings of widespread public concern over environmental issues. By 1965, this 
book had led to the beginnings of a revision of US pesticide policy, although the use of 
DDT was not to be banned in the US until 1972.647 Nader, an attorney, attacked the safety 
record of General Motors’ Chevrolet Corvair, and his work led to the passage of the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 1966,648 which established the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Both books pointed to a lack of accountability on 
the part of big business (chemical and motoring) and government, and the opaque nature 
of decision-making, and both ultimately led to fundamental changes in US Government’ 
policy. 
Nader went further than Carson in relation to the nuclear industry and, in 1973, 
launched a joint court case (with Friends of the Earth) against the Chair of the US Atomic 
Energy Commission (USAEC), Dixie Lee Ray, in an attempt to force the USAEC to revoke 
twenty nuclear site licenses.649 The case was dismissed by the Civil Division of the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1977, on the basis that “absolute certainty 
[about plant safety] is not required by the [US] Atomic Energy Act, nor does nuclear 
safety technology admit of such a technology.”650 As with the point made above 
concerning the indirect impact of some European countries halting the use of nuclear 
power, the frank admission that no plant is required to be absolutely safe, helped create a 
situation where the Director-General of the IAEA announced a “worldwide concern about 
the safety of nuclear power plants.”651 
This perception of an increasing lack of faith is not helped by the language used by 
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the politicians who are arguing for or against particular policies. As we have seen, the 
majority of MPs are not, and have never been, qualified nuclear scientists, and neither 
could we (or should we) reasonably expect them to be. The rhetoric employed in this 
subject by politicians has consistently leaned towards the scientific, for, as Cohn 
suggested earlier, the public were initially more inclined to trust ‘science’. In a speech to 
the British Institute of Management in December 1977, Kingman Brewster Jr., the US 
Ambassador to Britain, is attributed with saying that “incomprehensible jargon is the 
hallmark of a profession”652 and this can definitely be said of the nuclear industry. 
In addition to an inevitable level of incomprehensibility, Bernard (now Sir Bernard) 
Ingham strongly criticised the levels of secrecy which surrounded the industry as being 
counter-productive. Ingham, a staunch supporter of nuclear power,653 who had spend 
much of the 1970s as Director of Information at the Department of Energy, criticised the 
“nuclear industry, made up of a Civil Service scientific elite brought up in a tradition of 
defence secrecy [as] worse than useless in combating this threat to its existence [from 
Friends of the Earth].”654 Ingham was making the point that the levels of secrecy inherent 
in the nuclear industry were playing into the hands of anyone opposed to it and that, if 
secrecy levels were to be reduced, the public would be less inclined to believe that there 
was a threat which was being concealed from them and, therefore, groups like Friends of 
the Earth would be weakened. The fact that high levels of secrecy continued relates back 
to the discussions of Clause 11 of the 1946 Act covered in the previous chapter – those 
involved in the nuclear industry were governed by some of the most stringent security 
regulations in the country, which dated back to the end of World War 2 and fears relating 
to espionage. 
Brewster is accurate in his summation of professional use (or perhaps misuse) of 
language and, given that the development of the legislative framework surrounding the 
nuclear power industry was effectively a joint process between the three professions – 
scientific (as providers of information), political (as decision makers) and legal (as 
drafters, enforcers and arbiters), it is an argument which has had great resonance. Early 
on in the process of decision-making: 
“Outside scrutiny of the decisions made about nuclear power was inordinately 
weak. In part this was because of the real difficulty Parliament, and for that 
matter Government, had in dealing with scientific issues of greater and greater 
complexity. One MP commented that in a world where even the scientists found it 
difficult work in areas other than their own ‘it is hardly surprising that non-
scientific politicians and MPs struggle helplessly to deal with their responsibilities 
for deciding policy and appropriate funds.’”655 
What this suggests is that senior politicians who, as we have already seen, are not 
reticent about trying to confuse and misdirect opponents with illusions of scientific 
certainty, are equally prepared to do it when it comes to their colleagues on the 
Parliamentary sub-committees. 
Despite this supposed ease of access to materials and information, the seriousness of 
an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear technology is still taken very seriously – perhaps, 
as Franks argues,656 since atomic energy can be considered as a matter of state: 
“[it] is handled by the executive alone, is treated with extreme secrecy, and the 
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argument which justifies it is that of reason of state, a doctrine which in its 
extreme limits subordinates constitutional principles and the rule of law to the 
safety of the state.”657 
Taverne’s final point is that at its heart, the scientific debate on nuclear safety is just 
that, a scientific one. The point at which enriched uranium reaches a self-sustaining chain 
reaction is not one which is affected by any political, social, or moral standpoint. Where 
the debate becomes fractured, however, is partly in what Professor Nowotny referred to 
as the “pluralistic”658 nature of scientific communities, and partly in the manner that 
politicians then use that scientific information, whilst playing down (or ignoring) any 
element of pluralism. The Parker Report on Windscale, which the Secretary of State for 
the Environment called “exceptionally wide-ranging”659 and the most “open and thorough 
examination of a major nuclear proposal”660 received and considered evidence from 
scientists on all sides of the debate, “listing 13 points made by BNFL in support of their 
application, and 17 points put forward by objectors.”661 Having considered the evidence, 
the Parker Inquiry found in favour of the construction of the THORP plant, accepting all of 
BNFL’s points, and rejecting all those of the objectors,662 and prompting the Labour MP for 
Northampton North, Maureen Colquhoun, to assert that: 
“These predictable findings of such people as Mr. Justice Parker are the result of 
allowing the power of science and technology to fall into the hands of over-large 
institutions, Government and industry.”663 
What Colquhoun is suggesting is that THORP was decided by a group of people who 
were insulated from various other pressures and were either making technical decisions, 
or allowing them to be made. This runs contrary to both Teichman’s ideas of TDM664 and 
Jasanoff’s “rule by a technocratic élite”665since, although there is a decision making élite 
and a technocratic élite, there is no technocratic decision making élite 
 
3.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that in the period between 1973 and 1978, the nuclear 
industry in the UK had faced a seismic shift in fortunes. Just before the period began, it 
was still expanding and had the broad, though not unqualified, support of politicians from 
across the political spectrum, industry, scientists and the public. By the end of the period, 
the science was becoming even more fractured, politicians at home and abroad were more 
disillusioned, and the public (in the form of pressure groups) were calling for mass 
protests.666 The nuclear industry, though reduced to a single consortium, was still “on 
side”, however. 
We have seen in previous chapter that decisions made in this area are often reacting 
to external circumstances, rather than creating them, and the same is true in this period. 
The accidents at Chalk River, Chelyabinsk and Windscale in the 1950s caused 
governments and industry to re-evaluate the costs associated with nuclear power. In the 
UK, the government enacted the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959, 
which limited financial exposure to operators of nuclear facilities. As pragmatic as these 
decisions were, given that the government could not have afforded to construct the power 
plants without the involvement of private industry, the Act came too late to prevent the 
five original consortia from merging unhappily into three. 
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Controlling the industry was the UK Atomic Energy Authority, the unelected, all-
powerful group of scientists and industrialists who were appointed initially by the 
government, and then by the UKAEA itself. Although some MPs were concerned that “a 
new private empire, ruled by the atomic knights, will be set up,”667 the Authority was 
deliberately created in such a manner as to prevent it from making policy. This means 
that, although the UKAEA was clearly an élite, given that all eight of the original Board 
members were either knights of the realm or had been ennobled, and it was clearly 
technocratic, again as half the Board were Professors of Physics, it was not making 
decisions. This means that while the criteria set out Teichman668 or Jasanoff669 for the 
creation of a Technocratic Decision Making organisation may work well in other fields, they 
do not fit the structure, power or role of the UKAEA. 
Another theme which runs through this section is that of secrecy. The 1940s saw the 
era of paranoia about espionage from the Soviet Union, as was explored in the previous 
chapter, but in this period there was a shift in the nature of that secrecy. At the beginning 
of the chapter, there was still no functioning nuclear industry, and the technology that was 
going to power it was new, experimental, and subject to strict secrecy rules. By the same 
token, the various accidents of the 1950s were either covered up, or played down by the 
relevant governments, so as to maintain public faith in the new technology. By the end of 
the period, the UK is purchasing technology from the United States, and the PWR 
technology has been exported across the world, and Bernard Ingham, among others is 
calling for all information to be given to the newly-formed environmental groups to 
weaken their case that there had been a cover-up. 
During this period, Politicians were beginning to use the rhetoric of science to justify 
their decisions more in this period than they had in previous periods and, equally to ignore 
the scientific evidence if it disagreed with what they wanted to do. Tony Benn, in pushing 
for the British-built but untested SGHRW ignored all of the scientific data that proved the 
US-built and widely tested PWR would be the best option for the new generation of 
nuclear plants in the UK, and was later forced to overturn his own decision when the 
evidence against the SGHWR became insurmountable. The 1955 White Paper, on the 
other hand, gave the justification for nuclear power that it would be clean, safe and cheap 
– indeed, as the future Chairman of both the UKAEA and CEGB, Dr Walter Marshall, 
announced in 1955, the electricity produced would be “too cheap to meter.”670 The irony 
of these two examples is, of course, that the accurate science was ignored, and the 
inaccurate science was triumphed. 
Further international incidents that required responses from UK policy included the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Yom Kippur war of 1974. Both of these, and particularly the 
latter, caused sharp rises in crude oil prices, and economic hardship; by the end of 
December 1974, the global price for crude oil was £12 per barrel, a rise of 400 per cent on 
December 1972, rising a further ten per cent in January 1975. This should have proven to 
be manna from heaven for the nuclear industry, as it revealed the inherent instability of 
oil supplies and made oil-fired power stations much less competitive. However, as Cohn 
points out, orders for all new nuclear reactors after 1973 were cancelled in the US671 and, 
according to junior minister for Energy, Alexander Eadie MP, the same was true in the UK: 
“In the United Kingdom in the years concerned [1973 – 1977], no new orders 
were placed for civil nuclear power stations and none was cancelled.”672 
As has been shown, what Tony Hall calls the “long, slow fall from grace”673 by the 
nuclear-power industry in the UK was just that. Not an immediate reversal of policy, but a 
series of pragmatic decisions based on immediate problems and short-term gains. 
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Chapter 4: 
1992-95: The Decline of Public Funding 
4.1: Introduction 
At the end of the previous chapter, the Labour Government had less than a year left 
of its five year term in office, MORI polls put ‘nuclear’ as a general topic very low on the 
list of public concerns674 and the UK nuclear-power industry appeared as though it was 
beginning a “long, slow fall from grace” with the May 1978 cancellation of the entire 
Steam-Generating Heavy Water Reactor programme. 
As this chapter will show, that fall from grace was accelerated by the squeeze of 
public finance and subsequent attempts to shift the industry into the private sector. The 
second half of the 1970s saw the beginnings of a global recession, which hit the UK faster 
than most other economies. The whole of 1980 was marked by negative growth, and this 
was combined with a 20 per cent peak in interest rates in June of that year. On the 
brighter side, the UK did achieve self-sufficiency in oil in 1980 as well, partly because the 
recession was lowering demand, but also because of the increasing contribution made by 
North Sea Oil. This can be seen in Figure 4.1, which illustrates the quantity of oil imported 
into the UK between 1920 and 2005 – a sharp drop in oil imports combined with a rise in 
indigenous production can be seen in the 1975-1980 period, and this corresponds with the 
growth in North Sea Oil production. 
Figure 4.1: UK crude oil imports, exports and production, 1920 – 2006675 
 
Well-publicised accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and, seven years later, 
Chernobyl in 1986 did little to warm national or international feeling towards nuclear 
energy, despite the findings of inquiries into both accidents revealing that they were 
caused by human error, rather than any inherent flaw in plant or reactor design. 
                                        
674 The August 1978, February 1979 and April 1979 MORI polls asked people to name the most important thing 
affecting the UK. In all three polls, no one said that ‘nuclear’ (a generic term which included nuclear power and 
nuclear weapons) was the most important thing. the top three issues in each survey were: 
August 1978:  Inflation (63%); Unemployment (55%); and Race Relations (27%) 
February 1979:  Trade Unions (73%); Inflation (66%); and Unemployment (31%) 
April 1979:  Inflation (68%); Trade Unions (56%); and Unemployment (53%) 
Source: Ipsos MORI, 2009, The Most Important Issues Facing Britain Today, 1974-2009, London: Ipsos MORI. 
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The 1980s are remembered chiefly as the decade of what Norwegian sociologist and 
economist, Thorstein Veblen, had 90 years earlier termed conspicuous consumerism,676 
combined with the liberalisation of economic markets across the world and the associated 
economic impact of both. 
Improvements in information technology over the decade led to the shift from 
ENQUIRE (a rudimentary forerunner to the Internet created by Tim Berners-Lee in 1980) 
to the proposals for the World Wide Web as we know it in 1989.677 Berners-Lee’s work on 
the World Wide Web is interesting for the purposes of the current discussion, as it was 
carried out under the funding of CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, 
with the intended goal of: 
“[meeting] the demand for automatic information sharing between scientists 
working in different universities and institutes all over the world.”678 
The logarithmic growth in internet capacity over the period is also interesting as it 
marked the beginning of the ability to access and share information globally in seconds, 
rather than days or weeks and this, in turn, led to the explosion in Internet usage which 
occurred during the 1990s. 
Towards the end of the period between the two chapters, not only were new nuclear-
power stations no longer being planned or built in the UK (with the exception of Sizewell 
B, which was completed in 1992), some of the existing ones were beginning the long 
process of decommissioning and, for the first time since 1956, the amount of nuclear 
energy being produced in the UK was falling. This change in fortune for nuclear power 
meant that the decisions which were made on the basis of what was pragmatic at the 
time, and were explored in previous chapters, would no longer necessarily be pragmatic if 
they had been made in this period. Diego has suggested that the hallmark of a pragmatic 
decision is “what works.”679 In this area of policy making, if not necessarily in all, “what 
works” will rarely be a constant – what worked in 1974 when oil prices were high (over 
$40 a barrel)680 and the economy was beginning to recover from the stock market crash, 
would not necessarily work in 1994, when oil prices were lower (at around $20 a 
barrel),681 and the global economy was well-recovered from the recession of the early 
1990s, for example. 
As intimated above, in addition to the general social, economic and political situation 
in the period, there were some specific incidents which can be assessed to discover their 
impact on nuclear policy in the UK.  
 
 
4.2: Developments between 1978 and 1992 
4.2.1: Three Mile Island. 
The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
had two Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) operating within in, TMI-1 and TMI-2. At 
the end of March 1979: 
“a blast of superheated steam, 500 degrees hot and under pressure of a 
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thousand pounds per square inch, shot from a safety valve at the top of 
Three Mile Island’s Unit 2 reactor building.”682 
The accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI), which was owned and operated by 
the Metropolitan Edison Company (MEC),683 was later classified as a Level 5 incident 
on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) discussed earlier.684 As with the other 
Level 5 incidents, assessment of the number of deaths or injuries directly or indirectly 
attributable to TMI has been difficult and the figures are still contested. Some sources 
argue that “there was no significant off-site radiological consequence from TMI”,685 
whereas others point to a death rate in those living near to TMI of almost 40 per cent 
higher than in neighbouring counties.686 The TMI accident has always been 
surrounded by a perceived lack of transparency687 and this has helped to fuel to 
rumours, and counter-rumours688 and contribute to an overall lack of trust on the part 
of some members of the public. The direct political fall-out of the TMI accident was 
not felt very strongly in the UK, as there were no Pressurised Water Reactors 
operating at the time, although the cancellation of the SGHWR programme ten 
months earlier had led to plans for PWR construction being considered. TMI remains 
one of the defining moments in any debate about nuclear safety: after the accident, 
for example, the US government did not commission a single new reactor and would 
not consider doing so again until 2005. 689 
The months immediately following the TMI accident, had also seen a change in 
government in the UK and the new Energy Secretary, David Howell MP, announced 
that: 
“The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the Nuclear Power Company and the 
UKAEA will be providing considered assessments of the accident at [TMI] as 
soon as they are in a position to do so, and the Central Electricity Generating 
Board is considering the implications for its safety procedures. The lessons to 
be learnt from the incident will need to be studied carefully in the light of 
these reports.”690 
This was a standard, non-committal statement – and could not have been much 
else given that the accident had happened just a matter of weeks earlier and the 
investigations were not yet complete. In a slightly later House of Lords debate on 
energy in June 1979, Lord Sherfield identified that the TMI accident was going to have 
an impact on nuclear programmes outside the United States, although he argued that 
this was not for sound scientific reasons: 
“The emotional repercussions of this serious accident, which caused great 
anxiety and inconvenience to a great number of people, but which, in fact, 
led, so far as I know, to no serious injuries or loss of life, will retard the 
already lagging rate of nuclear building in Europe”691 
Lord Sherfield was well-placed to comment on the nuclear programme for even 
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though he was “not a scientist himself”,692 he had been involved in the nuclear 
industry since the 1950s and, as Sir Roger Makins, had been the Chair of the UKAEA 
from 1960-1964.693 His comments echo the point outlined at the end of the previous 
chapter that orders for new nuclear reactors in the UK had already been non-existent 
for six years by the time of the TMI accident694 and were unlikely to restart in the 
aftermath. It also illustrates the argument that, although there was little direct 
evidence to show that the British public was actually concerned about TMI, the 
politicians were worried that they might become so and were already preparing 
themselves for having to make decisions based, at least in part, on that supposed 
fear. 
TMI was a PWR and the accident threw into sharp relief the safety systems which 
surrounded the US nuclear industry and, by extension, that of the rest of the world. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, PWR-type plants are by far the most 
commonly used across the globe, accounting for more than 85 per cent of all power 
generation.695 Indeed, the UK had only recently decided to use the PWR design as one 
of the options for its future nuclear plans. In the short-term aftermath of TMI, several 
books were published or revised which gave, or purported to give, an assessment of 
“what went wrong.”696 In the US, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) was 
formed by the nuclear electric utility industry in 1979 as a result of TMI and, together 
with the National Academy for Nuclear Training (NAAT), has since been “effective in 
promoting excellence in the operation of nuclear plants and accrediting their training 
programs.”697 Every company in the US which operates a nuclear power plant is a 
member if INPO698 and, some argue: 
“As a result of realizing certain facts about TMI, the principle of transparency 
triumphed decisively over the principle of trade secrecy.”699 
In the UK, there was no equivalent body to either INPO or NAAT set up either at 
the time of the TMI accident, or in the thirty years that followed, despite the 
indication from the Energy Secretary (above) that “the lessons from the incident will 
need to be studied carefully.”700 
The lawsuits surrounding the deaths and personal injuries which may or may not 
have been attributable to the TMI accident carried on for more than two decades. 
Within a very short time after TMI, a class action relating to the alleged heath effects 
caused by the accident was brought against the MEC. The TMI case did the rounds of 
the various courts until 1996, when it was dismissed by Judge Sylvia Rambo of the 
Pennsylvania District Court, who said: 
“The parties… [to this] action have had nearly two decades to muster 
evidence in support of their respective cases.... The paucity of proof alleged 
in support of Plaintiffs’ case is manifest. The court has searched the record 
for any and all evidence which construed in a light most favourable to 
Plaintiffs creates a genuine issue of material fact warranting submission of 
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their claims to a jury. This effort has been in vain.”701 
The class action was dismissed and the plaintiffs appealed to the US Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, where the decision to reject their case was reaffirmed.702 This is not 
to say that no compensation was ever paid out as a result of TMI, however. According 
to the pressure group Three Mile Island Alert, a $20m find had been set up by MEC 
and a further $5m was set aside to set up the TMI Public Health Fund.703 On top of 
these figures, almost $14m had been paid in out-of-court settlements by 1985.704 As 
is common in such settlements, the recipients are forbidden from revealing the terms 
of the agreement. As the lack of public accountability forms part of these discussions, 
it is also worth noting that, as a result of the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act of 
1957, explained in the previous chapter, the Federal government covered the first 
$500m of any claim705 and, indeed, there are unsubstantiated claims that the General 
Public Utility Company (the parent company of MEC) subsequently made a successful 
insurance claim of $560m.706 
The impact of TMI on the general public, identified by Lord Sherfield, might not 
have been great, and it would probably have been even less significant had it not 
followed just days after the release of the Columbia Pictures movie “The China 
Syndrome” which was based on very similar, but fictitious, circumstances. According 
to the Office for National Statistics, there were 112 million cinema tickets sold in 
1979707 and, as such, it is inevitable that the number of people who saw the film was 
many times that which read the case reports.  
The accident at TMI added to a growing body of accident data708 that served to 
provide the world greater scientific understanding of what accidents could happen 
with the use of a nuclear reactor. The report into the aftermath of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki709 had already shown the effects of radioactive fallout caused by atomic 
weapons, but these civil accidents were something of a new phenomenon. They would 
also show that the cost of decontaminating land affected by such accidents could be 
potentially huge, and it was not long before these potentially enormous costs started 
to affect the attitude of industry and government alike. 
 
4.2.2: Atomic Energy (Misc. Provisions) & Nuclear Industry (Finance) 
Acts 1981 
The Atomic Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1981 concerned granting the 
Secretary of State the power to dispose of the government’s shares held in BNFL and the 
Radiochemical Centre Ltd (TRC), the two bodies that had been set up as pseudo-
independent companies after being hived off from the main body of the UKAEA ten years 
earlier by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971. Norman Lamont MP, the Parliamentary 
Undersecretary of State for Energy, introduced the second reading of the Bill in February 
1981, revealing the intention of the government: 
“The present proposal to sell shares in TRC is in accordance with the 
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Government’s policy of introducing private capital into public sector companies… 
and at present the Government have no plans to dispose of shares in BNFL. The 
Bill would allow the Government to do so up to 49 per cent.”710 
The Conservative “Government’s policy of introducing private capital into public sector 
companies”711 was already well underway by this time. The Industry Act 1980 had given 
the National Enterprise Board (NEB, and its regional equivalents) a duty to “to promote 
the private ownership of interests in industrial undertakings”712 by selling off assets that it 
controlled. The NEB had been established just five years earlier by the Industry Act 1975 
with a remit of extending public ownership of industry and, although it would exist in 
some form in the public sector until 1991, the 1980 Act marked the beginning of the end 
for the NEB. The erosion of the NEB’s portfolio can be seen to be as much an expression of 
Margaret Thatcher’s desire to “extend the ownership of property to the largest possible 
majority”713 and “create a bulwark of new shareholders”714 as it was of her desire to hold 
down the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR).715 This combination of a wish for 
privatisation can be interpreted as a political standpoint716 and indeed, it is often cited as 
being one of the underpinning concepts of, and crucial to, the Thatcher Government.717 
However, Marr’s description of the new shareholding class as a “bulwark” (or “defensive 
wall”718) combined with Sked and Cook’s argument that the rationale was to keep the 
PSBR low, suggests that there was a strong pragmatic edge to the Prime Minister’s 
decisions.  
The first part of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act makes some minor amendments to 
the powers of the UKAEA and the Secretary of State. In the case of the former, UKAEA 
could now dispose of shares held in any company,719 giving them the freedom to dispose 
of their holding in TRC, which was a necessary step as it allowed for the sale of TRC. In 
the case of the latter, the Secretary of State could dispose of shares held in “any company 
whose activities include the development of atomic energy or research into matters 
connected therewith.”720 Another important issue was that the Secretary of State’s power 
to dispose of shares in these companies was acceptable “whether or not the disposal is 
consistent with promoting or controlling the development of atomic energy.”721 We have 
already seen that the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 supplemented the Minster’s 
existing duty to promote atomic energy with the UKAEA’s powers and duties. This Act, 
therefore, marks a further explicit diminution of the duty imposed on the Secretary by the 
1946 Act which was, after all, to “promote and control the development of atomic 
energy.”722 As discussed in Chapter One, a statutory duty is not something which is 
imposed lightly, and the decision to effectively remove it was criticised in some quarters 
as being “too wide a clause to include in a Bill of this kind dealing with atomic energy.”723 
Under the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971, the government had been required to 
maintain shares carrying more than half the voting rights in both BNFL and RCL, but the 
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Miscellaneous Provisions Act removes that requirement in relation to TRC.724 This means 
that, for the first time, private interests could control TRC, and it would be able to take full 
advantage of the market. In February 1982, shortly after the July 1981 entry into force of 
the Act, TRC was fully privatised and became Amersham International plc. 725 The 
privatisation was 25-times oversubscribed,726 which is partly a measure of the interest the 
market had for the company but, mainly, because, as Andrew Marr argues, the sale was 
“grossly undervalued.”727  
The sale of TRC was important as it marked the first full-scale privatisation of an 
industry linked to nuclear power, albeit one on the low-risk, low-radiation end of the scale. 
It is also regarded as the first flotation of a state-owned firm728 and raised £71 million; of 
which £64 million went to the Exchequer.729 As will be shown below, subsequent ideas 
about privatising the main part of the nuclear-power industry were not too successful. 
One of the other areas of the nuclear industry for which privatisation remained a 
possibility was BNFL. In the previous chapter, the issue of the level of guarantee which the 
Exchequer provided for BNFL and TRC was discussed and, in 1981, the Nuclear Industry 
(Finance) Act 1981 amended the Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 to raise the level of 
guarantee in relation to BNFL. Since TRC was about to be sold, no changes were made to 
the guarantees available for that company. David Mellor MP who, by October 1981, had 
replaced Norman Lamont MP as Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Energy, 
introduced the second reading of the Bill and said that: 
“The Bill proposes to set a new limit of £1,000 million, with power to raise that by 
statutory instrument to £1,500 million”730 
This was more than a threefold rise in terms of both the immediate and maximum 
loan guarantees from the 1977 Act, over a period when the UK economy had already 
suffered quite badly (and was still suffering) as a result of the recession. The rationale 
behind the enormous increase in funding available to BNFL was explained by Mr Mellor as 
being the company’s £3.5bn investment plan between 1981 and 1991 (at 1981 prices, or 
equivalent to £6bn), which could only be 70 per cent met by the company itself.731 Part of 
the expansion programme related to BNFL’s work within the UK, but some also related to 
the 40 per cent of work which BNFL undertook outside the UK, and for which all the waste 
imported into the UK for reprocessing was returned to its country of origin once the 
process was completed.732 This state guarantee which, as was shown on Table 3.2 in the 
previous chapter, would be raised again to £2bn in 1989, was never called upon and, 
indeed, BNFL was in fact paying the Government (as sole shareholder an annual dividend, 
which amounted to £36m by 1987-8.733  
In the entire nuclear-fuel cycle (enrichment, use as fuel, storage as waste, or 
reprocessing), the point at which nuclear material becomes most vulnerable to loss, theft 
or mishap is, naturally, during transit. Fears about the threat of theft of nuclear material 
“from terrorists, from fanatics and from – may I say it? – nut cases”734 had been 
expressed in Parliament since the late 1960s, when £8,000 worth of nuclear fuel cores had 
been stolen from Bradwell power station in Essex.735 BNFL was in the business of 
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transporting both used and reprocessed fuel rods across the world, and that business 
meant that there was a higher inherent risk associated with BNFL than if it had focused on 
the operation of power stations. As such, BNFL was spending higher sums on logistics than 
similar companies in different industries,736 and so such guarantees of extra funding could 
be justified. 
 
4.2.3: Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 
Although nuclear material was at a higher risk of misappropriation whilst in transit, it 
had been clear to the UN since the early 1970s that nuclear material was becoming more 
sought after by terrorist and rebel groups. In December 1976, the United Nations’ General 
Assembly passed Resolution 31/102, in the preamble to which it declared that it would 
invite the ad hoc Committee on International Terrorism (set up under Resolution 3034 
(XXVII) in 1972) to recommence its work, since it had become: 
“Deeply perturbed over acts of international terrorism which are occurring with 
increasing frequency and which take a toll of innocent human lives”737 
It is important to note that Resolution 31/102 (and the subsequent Resolution 31/103 
on the drafting of the International Hostages Convention) were not specifically related to 
any terrorist threats specifically against nuclear facilities, but to terrorism in its wider 
context. 
The Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 was added to the statute books in order to 
give effect to the UK signing of the UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material in Vienna in 1980.738 The UK had signed jointly as a Euratom Member State, 
rather than individually.739 The Convention was the sixth in a series of UN anti-terrorism 
conventions which had started with the 1963 Tokyo Convention (“on Offences and Certain 
other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft”) and currently numbers thirteen major 
multinational conventions in force.740 It built on the fears expressed in the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 31/102 discussed above. The ad hoc Committee on International 
Terrorism resurrected by the resolution had reported regularly to the UN General 
Assembly and its recommendations had been adopted several times, including in the 
drafting of the Vienna Convention. 
Article 7 of the Convention741 made it a requirement that the signatory states create a 
number of new offences, although as Home Office Minister, David Waddington MP, pointed 
out on the introduction of the Bill: 
“The acts which we are required to make punishable may be divided into two 
groups: first, those which parallel offences that already exist in our domestic law; 
and, secondly, those for which our law has no direct equivalents. Most of the acts 
covered by the convention fall into the first group and correspond broadly with 
existing offences.”742 
Parliamentary discussions during the first reading of the Bill rapidly moved from the 
scope of the legislation to a wider discussion of the desirability of nuclear power in the UK 
                                        
736 Mellor, D., 1981a, op cit, n732, c93 
737 UN Resolution 31/102 – A Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or 
Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of 
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Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations A/RES/31/102. 
738 For a discussion of the role that this Convention might play in countering twenty-first century terrorism, see: 
Joyner, C., Countering Nuclear Terrorism: A Conventional Response EJIL 2007 18 (225) 
739 IAEA, 1995, Information Circular: Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
INFCIRC/274/Rev.1/Add.5, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
740 UNODC, 2009, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Conventions, Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 
741 “The intentional commission of [a list of actions] shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party 
under its national law” Article 7(1) UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
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and, on the part of Tam Dalyell MP, of the Falklands War.743 The committee stage of the 
Bill passed without amendment, and it was only two weeks after the Bill was introduced 
that it had its third reading in the Commons, where it was passed. 
Although the passage of the Bill through Parliament was rather rapid and the Act 
entered on the statute book in May 1983, the date at which it was to come into force was 
left open.744 Despite the fact that the Vienna Convention itself came into force in February 
1987,745 the UK did not ratify it until 6 September 1991746 (again, through Euratom, 
rather than individually)747 and thus the Act did not come into force until October 1991748 
(see table 4.2). On the point of ratification, the Opposition Home Affairs spokeswoman, Dr 
Shirley Summerskill MP, said that: 
“Under successive Governments it has been the commendable practice of this 
country, unlike many other countries, not to ratify United Nations conventions 
until we are able to put into effect and into law the requirements of that 
convention. This has meant that although we are often slow to ratify, and have 
been subjected to criticism because we have not ratified, when we do it means 
something and is a significant step forward.”749 
The ratification by Euratom and the UK was less than a year before the first Review 
Conference was convened by the IAEA and there was still a reservation by Euratom in 
relation to Articles 7-13 (which are all related and concern the punishment of various 
offences by the State Parties to the Convention). This should not be regarded as an 
illustration of any reluctance on the part of Euratom to fully commit to the Convention 
more that, as a non-state party to the Convention, it could not have been bound by those 
Articles even if it had so wanted. The 1983 Act, which implemented the whole of the 
Vienna Convention, meant that the Articles for which Euratom had entered a reservation 
would still have effect in the UK. Table 4.1 illustrates that Euratom took an inordinately 
long time (even for international law) to ratify the Convention. The reason behind this is 
that, as a representative of the Member States, Euratom had to get agreement from each 
one before it was empowered to ratify the Convention. 
Table 4.1: Vienna Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  
Date Progress of Convention  
03-03-1980 Vienna Convention opens for signature. 
13-06-1980 Euratom becomes a signatory to the Convention (and therefore so does the UK). 
Euratom declares itself not to be bound by Articles 7 to 13 of the Convention. 
09-05-1983 Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 passed in UK, and extends the effects of 
Articles 7-13. 
08-02-1987 Vienna Convention comes into force under Article 19, paragraph 1 (on the 30th day 
following the deposit of the 21st instrument of ratification) 
06-09-1991 Euratom ratifies the Convention (as does UK), but maintains its reservation relating 
to Articles 7-13. 
02-10-1991 Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 comes into force750 
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When the Bill was being discussed in the House of Lords, Lord Flowers who, as Sir 
Brian Flowers, had chaired the 1976 RCEP Report into Nuclear Power and the 
Environment,751 argued that it was essential for such a Convention and, thus, the Act to 
have effect, if only to counteract the attitude of the nuclear industry at that time which: 
“when it meets with a problem which lies outside its competence, sometimes 
behaves as if the problem does not exist. For many years it behaved as if the 
dangers from the illicit diversion of fissile materials were negligible, even to the 
extent of relaxing physical controls over their storage and movement.”752  
The primary effect of the Convention (and, therefore, the Act) was to extend liability 
for many offences, from murder to fraud, to any person, regardless of their nationality, to 
areas outside the United Kingdom.753 The liability imposed is the same as would have 
arisen if the offence had taken place within the UK, but there is a prerequisite that the 
offence must be “in relation to or by means of nuclear material.”754 The definition of 
“nuclear material” is taken directly from the Convention and included as the Schedule to 
the Act. 
The Vienna Convention and the Act that implements it in the UK illustrate that, 
although the UK had not knowingly been exposed to crimes involving nuclear material, the 
potential threat was seen by politicians, if not by the industry itself, as real enough to 
warrant international legislative provision. Interestingly, a search of the Westlaw database 
reveals that since the Vienna Convention was ratified into law in the UK, only one case755 
even mentioned the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983, and that was only in passing. 
If the 1983 Act was a pragmatic response to International and European pressure to 
tackle the perceived threat of terrorism (even if it has never actually been used), then the 
intentions of the next piece of legislation to be considered here were far more humble. 
 
4.2.4: Atomic Energy Authority Act 1986 
The main purpose of this Act was to convert UKAEA from an integral part of 
government to a semi-autonomous corporation, with the ability to borrow money from the 
Secretary of State or, with his permission, from anyone else.756 This borrowing capacity 
was not limitless – the aggregate limit for money borrowed by UKAEA, its subsidiaries, 
and any sums for which they were acting as guarantors was set at £150 million, with the 
possibility of extending the limit to £200m.757 The majority of the rest of the Act is 
concerned with specific points on guarantees by the Treasury758 and other supervisory 
powers of the Secretary of State.759 When the Bill was introduced into the House of Lords 
in November 1985, Lord Gray of Contin, the Minister of State for the Scottish Office (but 
former Minister of Energy with responsibility for North Sea Oil760), explained that the 
Authority was to have its finances put onto a trading fund basis, and went on: 
“Your Lordships may find it helpful at this point to be reminded of the key 
features of Government trading funds. These are: 
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• a capital structure including a commencing debt; 
• a profit and loss account and ability to carry surpluses or deficits forward from 
one year to the next; 
• powers to borrow, subject to a limit on total indebtedness; and 
• a duty to achieve, to the extent possible, financial objectives set by the 
responsible Minister, with the agreement of the Treasury.”761 
The Act put into place some of the recommendations of the 1984 Manley Report,762 
which had come out of a working group set up by the Department of Energy.763 The 
primary recommendation of the report was followed was that the funding of nuclear 
research be moved from government to industry.764 The Parliamentary Undersecretary of 
State for Energy, Alisdair Goodlad MP, was very clear to point out, however, “that the 
Government have no intention of privatising the authority.”765  
UKAEA was given the power to draw up new terms of appointment for committee 
members, provided that they were first approved by HM Treasury. For the first time in its 
32-year history, this enabled the inclusion of provisions for payment of compensation for 
UKAEA Committee Members if their contracts were ended in particular circumstances.766 
This is a small, but important, step as it brought UKAEA contracts into line with other 
government contracts. As was discussed in earlier chapters, When the original atomic 
energy industry had been set up in the 1940s and 1950s, very little of it had conformed to 
standard practice – amongst other things, the initial financing was even kept from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and there was little accountability surrounding any of the 
early decisions. This new measure, combined with others in the Act meant that the UKAEA 
was becoming more like an ordinary company than a semi-autonomous organ of 
government. Despite the assurances of Alisdair Goodlad MP (above) and Lord Gray that 
privatisation was not the aim: 
“Lord Stoddart of Swindon, Opposition spokesman on Energy, said despite the 
assurances there was suspicion th; Bill was a paving measure towards eventual 
full-scale privatisation.”767 
If the measures of the 1986 Act were intended to make the UKAEA operate more like 
an ordinary company, the decisions as to which type of reactor would be used were taken 
in a different way to those in other electricity industries. There was heavy influence from 
the opposing, not to say warring, factions within the sole surviving Consortia, the National 
Nuclear Corporation and its operational subsidiary, the Nuclear Power Company (see 
Figure 3.2 above). The NPC “a merged company only in name, [was] split between 
diehard supporters of the PWR (men from GEC), and bitter opponents of it.”768 This is 
partly as a result of the different technologies which were available (not a real issue for 
the construction of coal- or gas-fired power stations), and partly as a result of the 
historical preferences adopted by the original consortia. When the five consortia existed in 
1955, they were all working towards the design and manufacture of Magnox-type reactors 
(although each had a different design),769 but by 1964, when there were only three 
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consortia remaining; one (The Nuclear Power Group) favoured a Boiling Water Reactor, 
one (The Atomic Power Group) favoured a Pressurised Water Reactor designed by 
Westinghouse and the third (The United Power Company) favouring the Advanced Gas-
Cooled Reactor.770 By the time of the NNC/NPC, parts of all of the consortia had been 
amalgamated and the differences of engineering opinion had been covered over. 
Slowly but surely, UKAEA was losing its unique status in the energy market. The two 
models outlined in Figure 4.2 were designed by Dr Wolfgang Rüdig to explain the 
development of a nuclear industry in a free-market economy. The star structure (left) puts 
the nuclear energy agency as the lynch-pin of a functioning nuclear sector – all the 
decisions go through the agency and it assumes the lead role. Political systems, the 
construction industry and the supply industries do not work with each other in this model 
and the public are excluded from any meaningful role. The ‘triangle’ structure (right), on 
the other hand, which he argues is a development of the star, removes the nuclear-energy 
agency from the process completely. This could make the industry more efficient and 
commercially viable, as decisions would not all have to pass through the central agency, 
but it could also mean that there would be less monitoring and oversight than previously. 
Reduced regulation, or even deregulation, is seen by many as one of the hallmarks of 
‘neoliberalism’, a label which has often been applied to the Thatcher government.771 
Martinez and Garcia define neoliberalism as being based around five points: 
The rule of the Market; 
Cutting Public Expenditure for Social Services; 
Deregulation; 
Privatization; and 
Replacing the concept of “public good” with “individual responsibility”772 
Bearing those five points in mind, the links to the policies adopted by the Thatcher 
government are clear to see. It is also possible, therefore, to see a link between Rüdig’s 
Triangle-shaped model and the policies of the Conservative government of the mid-1980s 
towards an increasingly open electricity market. As we will see below, the nuclear element 
of the industry was eventually removed from the privatisation, but that had not yet 
happened.  
The changing status of UKAEA matches the shift towards decentralisation in those 
models. A further power granted to UKAEA, which moved it further along the road to full 
independence was that of commercial exploitation of the intellectual property resulting 
from both its own research and development programmes and, through any mutual 
agreements, for exchange of information.773 This fitted in well with the overriding purpose 
of the Act, which had been to make UKAEA as independent as was practicable at the time. 
Alongside this independence came a reduction in the power which the Authority was able 
to exert on the government since, despite the guarantees discussed above, the Authority 
was meant to succeed on its own. 
By the time the Act was passed, the major public inquiry into the construction of 
Sizewell B power station is Essex had been completed. The inquiry lasted for more than 
two years and cost an estimated £25m to hold, with the report not being released for a 
further 18 months, in December 1986. Between the completion of the report and its 
publication, there had been a catastrophic accident at the Chernobyl-4 reactor in the 
Soviet Union, discussed below, which changed the atmosphere into which the report was 
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released. The accident served to crystallise a great deal of existing opposition to all types 
of nuclear power, despite the fundamental difference in design between the RBMK design 
used at Chernobyl (and the fact that even with these flaws it took human error to cause 
the accident), and the PWR design which was to be used at Sizewell. 
Figure 4.2: Decentralisation of Nuclear Industries774 
 
Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) and Greenpeace International, for example, 
both used the Chernobyl accident to muster support for their pre-existing campaigns 
against all types of nuclear power, with FOEI claiming that the accident “increased the 
number of FoE groups strenuously opposing nuclear energy”775 and Greenpeace even 
being cited in the House of Commons: 
“Shortly after Chernobyl, Greenpeace published a full-page advertisement in 
several national newspapers listing all power stations, those in the first category 
that it thought should be closed immediately, and those in the latter category that 
should be phased out.”776 
The government did not respond officially to the Greenpeace advert however, as 
shown below, it did respond to the Chernobyl accident by admitting that the accident 
would have “a profound impact on public opinion”777 and by reassuring the House that the 
nuclear industry in the UK “is the most regulated industry in the country”778 thus making 
it considerably less likely that such an accident could ever occur here. 1986 also saw the 
adoption of a new organisational strategy for the coal industry; the Wheeler Plan. The 
Plan, which built on the earlier, but classified, Miron Report: 
“anticipated the creation of a downsized ‘core’ workforce engaged in coal getting, 
supported by a ‘peripheral’ workforce comprised of subcontractors.”779 
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The Wheeler Plan, which was released in the aftermath of the contentious and long-
lasting strikes by the NUM from 1984-5, should have been popular with the nuclear 
industry in the UK, since any diminution in reliance on fossil fuels would be likely to 
necessitate more reliance on nuclear as a generating source. However, the Shadow 
Energy spokesman, and well-known opponent of nuclear power, Stanley Orme MP (later 
Baron Orme of Salford), argued during the second reading of what would become the Coal 
Industry Act 1987, that: 
“The Government have no coherent energy policy; they have merely used the 
energy industries as a political tool, motivated only by the ballot sheet and short-
term gain.”780 
For Margaret Thatcher, it has been argued that there was also a strong element of 
“essential revenge” on the miners after the humiliation that had been meted out on Ted 
Heath in the miners’ strike of 1974.781 Norman Lamont MP, when Minister of State for 
Industry, said that the: 
“policy of returning whole or parts of nationalized industries to the private sector 
wherever this is practicable will assist the operation of market forces; it is the 
best spur to efficiency and the optimal allocation of resources.”782 
Table 4.2: Pre-and post-Privatisation profits for three companies 
COMPANY PRE-PRIVATISATION 
PROFIT (LOSS) 
POST-PRIVATISATION 
PROFIT (LOSS) 
PERCENTAGE 
RISE 
Cable and Wireless £62m783 (1980/1) £157m (1982/3)784 155% 
(76% p.a.) 
British Aerospace £52.8m785 (1980) £95m (1982)786 80% 
(40% p.a.) 
National Freight Co £1m (1980/1)787 £37m (1985/6)788 3600% 
(74% p.a.) 
 
As explored above, therefore, the drive for privatisation can be interpreted as a 
pragmatic way of ensuring that governments were able to transfer ownership of low-
profit-making companies (see Table 4.2) to the public, reduce the PSBR and, in theory, 
improve the economic position of the country. The downside of privatisation if, of course, 
that the increased profits remain in the hands of investors and the private sector, instead 
of becoming available to government. In the case of the National Freight Company 
however, the corporate tax paid on the post-privatisation profits exceeded the whole sum 
of the pre-privatisation profits.789 
It should be noted that the rise in profits for the three companies in Table 4.2 cannot 
be wholly attributed to their privatisation – in the case of Cable & Wireless, for example, 
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changes in the telecommunications industry in the late 1980s and 1990s led to a huge 
boom in profits in the sector worldwide. 
 
4.2.5: Atomic Energy Act 1989 and Electricity Act 1989 
The early years of the nuclear industry can be painted as an occasionally haphazard 
series of lurches from potential crisis to potential crisis. The truly international aspect of 
this technology was first properly revealed with the accident at Chernobyl in 1986. 
The Chernobyl Accident, April 1986 
The RBMK-1000 design of the reactor which was at the heart of the accident at 
Chernobyl was unique to the Soviet nuclear programme. The specifics of the design are 
covered in greater detail in Appendix III, but the immediate cause of the accident was the 
unauthorised experimentation of the reactor crew, who began: 
“preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and supply power 
following a loss of main electrical power supply. Similar tests had already been 
carried out at Chernobyl and other plants, despite the fact that these reactors 
were known to be very unstable at low power settings.”790 
The experiment was a resounding failure, and a series of explosions caused a huge 
quantity of radioactive dust to escape into the surrounding atmosphere. The prevailing 
wind currents caused the cloud to drift over much of Western Europe before the 
radioactivity finally dissipated to an undetectable level. 791 The size and nature of the 
escape caused the accident to be classified at Level 7 on the INES scale reproduced in the 
previous chapter. The economic costs of the Chernobyl accident were estimated at roughly 
$100bn,792 and this was in addition to the number of deaths which are directly 
attributable.793 
Taken as a solo incident, the Chernobyl explosion would more than likely have had a 
significant effect on European attitudes to the safety of nuclear power but, coming as it 
did a few years after the Three Mile Island accident, the combined impact would be much 
greater. 
Impact of the TMI and Chernobyl Accidents 
The combination of the accidents and “low energy prices and abundant supplies of oil 
and gas… made nuclear power even less attractive as a policy option”794 and it is 
unsurprising that when this situation was superimposed on the planning enquiry for the 
Sizewell B power station in Essex, it was to be the last nuclear-power station built in the 
UK. It may also have had an impact on the decision not to include nuclear-power stations 
in the privatisation of the electricity industry in the 1990s. However, it is as treacherous to 
try and attribute actions of governments to that single cause as it is to try and attribute 
the number of deaths.  
In terms of the impact that these accidents had on nuclear policy in the UK, one of 
the potentially most important was the passage of the Atomic Energy Act 1989, part of 
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which gives effect to the UK’s ratification of the IAEA Vienna Convention 1986.795 Since no 
similar incident has occurred since Chernobyl, the actual impact of this statute has been 
minimal but, nevertheless, the potential impact was dramatic. Chernobyl did not just have 
an impact on statute; it was also considered in the decision on whether or not to allow the 
construction of Britain’s newest nuclear power station, at Sizewell, in Suffolk. 
Sizewell B 
The construction of the Sizewell B in Pressurised Water Reactor in Suffolk had been 
initially mooted in the early 1980s and was “called in”796 for a planning inquiry in 1983. 
The Sizewell B Inquiry was to be headed by Sir Frank Layfield QC, an experienced 
planning barrister, and would last for more that two years, at an estimated cost of £25m. 
In the report of the Sizewell B Inquiry, which was not released until December 1986, 
a full 18 months after the Inquiry had ended,797 Layfield found in favour of the 
construction of the Sizewell B PWR plant. He did not, however, give unconditional support 
to the idea, arguing that that building the plant was not an ideal solution and that the 
plant would be “a totally inappropriate intrusion into the Suffolk countryside”798 but that it 
was, nevertheless, justified on the basis of national interest. 
The Labour MP and Shadow Environment Spokesman, Dr David Clark, summed up the 
report with a mixture of praise and implied criticism, saying: 
“The report might be long, but it is lucid, as hon. Members on both sides have 
said. Sir Frank Layfield has the facility to translate complicated and technical 
issues into words which the layman can follow. 
The report has about 3,000 pages. I fear that it will have a similar fate to ‘Das 
Kapital’ – many people will quote from it, but few will read it. That is a pity, 
because the report is in depth, thorough and well written.”799 
In March 1987, the Energy Secretary, Peter Walker, announced that he was giving the 
go-ahead for the project, having “in particular, considered the relevance of Chernobyl to 
the safety of the proposed station.”800 Walker also commented that  
“Sizewell B was sufficiently safe to be tolerable, and that the national need for the 
station overrides the local interest in favour of conservation.”801 
Playing the “national interests” card was a way for the government to ensure that its 
policy went ahead. Given the plethora of scientific reports what had been published on the 
safety (or otherwise) of Chernobyl802 and the fact that the scientific opinion contained in 
these reports differed widely, the fact that Walker presented his conclusion as though it 
was backed up by a unified scientific community supports one of the themes of this work, 
that politicians will feign unity of science when it suits their purposes. 
It was to be one of the last major acts that Walker made in the post before he was 
replaced by Cecil Parkinson in the post-election cabinet reshuffle a few weeks later. The 
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796 “Most planning applications are decided locally by the district or other council. But the Secretary of State has 
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Oceanographic studies in the Black Sea. Oceanus. pp23-30; and Joshi, S.R., 1987, Early Canadian results on 
the long-range transport of Chernobyl radioactivity, The Science of the Total Environment, 63:125-137. 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 103 
construction of Sizewell B lasted much longer than the remaining Commons careers of 
either Walker or Parkinson though,803 and it would not be completed until 1995, having 
proved to be: 
“every bit as expensive as its critics suggested, and to run into many of the 
problems its predecessors had done.”804  
Greenpeace cite the initial construction estimate as £1.9bn, and the final estimate as 
£2.6bn, which is a rise in cost of over 40 per cent.805 This increase in costs associated with 
the nuclear industry was a pattern which had been established with the first round of 
stations to be built, in the 1950s and 1960s, and would be continued with the financial 
support offered to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. 
Atomic Energy Act 1989 
This Act was a rather fragmentary one and dealt with four main themes in six 
sections. The first move was to increase the limits of the government’s financial support to 
BNFL yet again, this time to £2bn.806 As was discussed in section 4.2.1, above, this limit 
had originally been set by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 at £50m807 and had been 
increased several times. The rationale for the trebling of funding in 1981 had been the 
ambitious expansion project planned by BNFL between then and 1991, and this was 
repeated by the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Energy, Baroness Hooper, 
when she introduced the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, saying: 
“BNFL is supporting a massive investment programme of more than £5 billion 
until the turn of the century, mainly in support of its waste management and 
reprocessing operations at Sellafield.”808 
Most of the money that BNFL needed for its expansion (75 per cent) would come from 
internal sources or overseas customers, and the guarantees were identified as being 
“copper-bottomed”809 (or, as the OED puts it “thoroughly reliable”)810 and exempted from 
the privatisation programme. Removing the potentially costly guarantees from the offer 
was a pragmatic and ingenious way of making the company that was being sold to the 
public far more attractive, and thus likely to command a higher price. 
The second purpose of the Act was to allow the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 
which had gained licensing powers in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 under the Health 
and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974) to recover costs for the work carried out by its 
enforcement body, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC). The Act made it clear that 
the ability to recoup costs only applies to actions started after the Act had been passed 
(25 May 1989) and was not in any way retrospective.811 The HSE was not just given the 
responsibility for inspecting nuclear installations, but was:  
“charged with ensuring that adequate safety research programmes continue to be 
carried out, that the contribution research can make to higher standards of 
nuclear safety is fully exploited and that the results are disseminated.”812 
This would mean that the HSE would take a leading role in the safety-related research 
on specific reactor types as well as the industry as a whole. Putting the work, which had 
                                        
803 Both men were elevated to the peerage in 1992 - Peter Walker as Baron Walker of Worcester, and Cecil 
Parkinson as Baron Parkinson. 
804 Helm, D., 2004, op cit, n220, p104. 
805 Greenpeace UK, 2002, Sizewell B: the facts, Greenpeace UK. Available at 
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806 Section 1 Atomic Energy Act 1989 
807 Section 13(2)(a) Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 
808 Hooper, Baroness, 1988, Atomic Energy Bill, HL Deb 13 December 1988 vol 502 c829 
809 Williams of Elvel, Lord, 1989, Atomic Energy Bill, HL Deb 26 January 1989 vol 503 c835. The phrase 
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previously been carried out by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), under the 
overall umbrella of the HSE was a logical step in streamlining the number of safety-related 
inspectorates which existed. 
Part three of the Act made changes to the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. Section 19 
of the 1965 Act, which had provided a £5m insurance fund by the government for 
licensees of nuclear sites, had been amended previously by the Energy Act 1983, which 
had also increased the limits for single claims under section 16 of the 1965 Act to £280m 
per incident.813 That 1983 amendment had meant that the cover period would end 
whenever the government amended the maximum limit for single claims.814 The 
amendment by the 1989 Act made what looks, at first glance, like a minor change, insofar 
as the grant of a new nuclear site licence to the licensee did not mark the end of the 
period of cover, as it had previously.815 This had a potentially dramatic effect, however. 
Before the amendment, the period of cover would finish every time the site licence 
was renewed. All of the periods of liability that had initially been set out in the Nuclear 
Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 (above) and then amended variously, 
were set up so that they would continue to run with residual liability for a limited time 
after the end of the cover periods. That is so say, if the cover period ended on 1 January 
1969, the liability would be extinguished either ten or thirty years from that date 
(depending on the subject matter to which the claim related),816 regardless of whether or 
not the license had been renewed to the same person. Under the amended version of the 
system, if the license was renewed continuously from 1969 onwards, the cover period 
would not have come to an end and so the clock would not have started to run. The effect 
that this has is only felt on sites where ownership changed hands. Under the new regime, 
the current owner and occupier of the site (or rather their insurance provider) takes on 
the liability for the site, since it is the same insurance cover which rolls over.817  
The final part of the Act gave effect to the UK’s ratification of the IAEA Vienna 
Convention 1986, which set out a framework for international co-operation on the 
occurrence of a Chernobyl-type accident. The Convention entered into force on 26 
February 1987,818 but did not do so in the UK until 12 March 1990 under the Atomic 
Energy (Mutual Assistance Convention) Order 1990.819 This delay between signature and 
ratification of an international convention is fairly standard in international law, and is 
considerably shorter than the equivalent time lag in relation to the 1980 Vienna 
Convention discussed above. 
The Electricity Act 1989 
Returning to the privatisation of the industry, “nuclear power was removed from the 
government’s privatisation plans.”820 This was for several reasons. Firstly, in 1988, the 
Department of Energy revised (upwards) its estimate of the costs associated with 
decommissioning of some of the older Magnox reactors which had, until then “been 
consistently underestimated, or perhaps even concealed”821 by the operators. Later in the 
                                        
813 DTI, 2000, The Government’s Expenditure Plans: Trade and Industry 2000 (Cmnd 4611), London: 
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814 Section 27 Energy Act 1983 
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year, the costs associated with the remaining nuclear-power stations, particularly the 
planned construction of more Pressurised-Water Reactors similar to the Sizewell B reactor 
(which was under construction at the time), led to all nuclear-power stations being 
retained under state control. It was only the cost that was an issue: “it was never a 
matter of safety, which could perfectly well have been ensured in the private sector”822 
The Prime Minister’s words were in some ways echoed by those of Conservative MP for 
Rochford (and future NRPB member), Dr Michael Clarke, who said during the debate on 
the Electricity Bill:  
“The Secretary of State [has] said that all costs will be borne by the private 
sector unless there is exceptional or retrospective legislation, in which case the 
Government will consider whether to help with the cost of decommissioning.”823 
The Opposition argued that the escalating cost of nuclear power was, indeed, the 
rationale behind keeping the nuclear side of the electricity industry out of private hands. 
Stanley Orme MP, who had spent seven years as the Opposition Spokesman on Industry 
and Energy, pointed out during the debate that: 
“The prices of oil and coal, nuclear’s fossil fuel competitors, have fallen to their 
lowest level in real terms for many years, and are likely to languish there for 
some time. 
In these conditions, even the PWR, the American-designed pressurised water 
reactor on which so many of the British industry's hopes now rest, cannot expect 
to compete with coal. 
No private sector utility would dream of building one in the present climate.”824 
The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) which, particularly under the 
chairmanship of Arthur Hawkins, had disagreed with the government on questions relating 
to nuclear power, was split into fourteen smaller pieces. The twelve regional electricity 
companies were floated in December 1990 with the generating companies, PowerGen and 
National Power, being floated825 later in two tranches in March 1991 and March 1995.826 
The National Grid Group was not floated until December 1995, five and a half years after 
it was vested.827 An industry which had effectively been controlled by a single unit since 
the creation of the CEGB in 1958 was thus broken up into 15 different pieces, all of which 
were disposed of separately. The interesting similarity between the structure of the 
electricity industry at the beginning and end of the life of the CEGB was that the nuclear-
power sector was not included at either point. The privatisation of the electricity supply 
companies was over subscribed several times over, the “bulwark” of share-owning public 
was extended and approximately £11.1bn was raised from the sale of the shares.828 This 
is equivalent to forty seven per cent of the government’s £23bn spending on defence in 
the same year. As a pragmatic measure for raising short term financial gain, a phrase 
used as a criticism by Stanley Orme in 1986,829 the sale of the non-nuclear elements of 
the electricity industry can be judged to have “worked”830 and thus fulfil the criteria of 
political pragmatism. 
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For all of the successes of privatisation, however, it should not be thought that either 
the government or the nuclear industry were getting things all their own way. In 1985, for 
example, a Mr & Mrs Merlin, who lived close to the Sellafield site in Cumbria, issued a writ 
against British Nuclear Fuels Limited for damages caused by the loss of value of their 
house. This case was to become critical to the continued future of the nuclear industry in 
the UK. 
The “Merlin Case”831 
This case concerns the Merlin family, who claimed for damages pursuant to s12 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965, which gives a right to compensation if “injury or damage 
has been caused in breach of a duty.”832 Their allegation was that BNFL had breached a 
statutory duty imposed by s7(1) Nuclear Installations Act 1965 by disposing of radioactive 
waste from the Sellafield site through a pipe into the Irish Sea between 1973 and 1984, 
and further that the action of the current had caused this waste to emit non-iodising 
nuclear radiation. 
The Merlins also issued a parallel claim, in case the first one was unsuccessful, which 
alleged that there was a duty under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.833 The non-iodising 
radiation would constitute a “non-natural use” of the land and following the rule the onus 
was on BNFL not to let a the “thing” escape from their land and to be prima facie liable for 
any damage caused by that escape. 
BNFL did not deny that the radio nuclides found in the property would have come 
from Sellafield but, instead, argued that the claim was invalid as, even if there was a link 
to sections 7 or 12 of the 1965 Act, or a link to the rule in Rylands and Fletcher, the crux 
of the case was on the nature of the loss. Rather than being a foreseeable and quantifiable 
loss, as the Merlins had argued, BNFL argued that the claim was: 
“a claim for financial loss arising out of a fear of the risk of sustaining personal 
injury; such loss not generally being recoverable.”834 
In summing up the case, Gatehouse J went to some length to point out that plaintiffs 
did not believe there was any negligence involved, but that this was an “absolute liability” 
case, where fault is not an issue. There was some consideration of the wording of the 
Vienna Convention 1963 (which, it will be recalled was the trigger for the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965), and the case hinged on whether there had actually been any loss. 
The court found in favour of BNFL and dismissed the case, because: 
“For there to be a breach of statutory duty, carrying with it a right to 
compensation, the plaintiff must establish that he has suffered injury or damage 
to his property caused by nuclear matter, section 7(1)(a) , or an emission of 
ionising radiations on or from the site: section 7(1)(b)…. in either case there must 
be cause and effect. The mere presence of ionising radiations within the plaintiffs’ 
property emitted from waste discharged from the site, is not enough to constitute 
a breach of statutory duty. There must be consequential damage. The 
radionuclides with which this case is concerned… are alpha emitters. These cannot 
do any significant damage to persons or property externally, but when inhaled, 
ingested or otherwise enabled to enter the body they may induce cancers, but, of 
course, will not necessarily do so.”835 
What this case meant for the nuclear industry is that unless there could be actual 
evidence of damage suffered by a plaintiff, as opposed to damage avoided, there would be 
no case to answer. Indeed: 
“it was a well-established principle in law that where there was no physical injury, 
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damages were awarded only where there was an identifiable psychiatric or 
psychological illness or condition caused by the wrongful act.”836 
The Merlin case then marked something of a temporary watershed for the liability of 
nuclear companies and the government which indemnified them. Before the case, there 
was always the possibility that a claim would be successful and that a large compensation 
order would be made but, after the case, the likelihood of this dropped dramatically. The 
case was to remain the precedent in this area for over a decade, and it was not until the 
Magnohard case,837 in 2004, that the area of law was relaxed slightly. 
A second case which might have weakened the position of the nuclear industry came 
before the courts a few years later. Unlike the Merlin case, this was not a claim for 
damages, but a claim for judicial review of a decision by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Pollution and the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food. 
The 1994 Greenpeace Case838 
In 1992, the decade or so of construction work of the Thermal Oxygen Reprocessing 
Plant or THORP plant at the renamed Sellafield had been completed.839 In 1994, two years 
after completion of the plant, the pressure group Greenpeace was able to seek a judicial 
review of the decisions behind the agreement for the development of the THORP site, 
which was being run by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. In 1994 Greenpeace Case the court 
recognised that, although Greenpeace would not be directly affected by the decision,840 it 
“was a responsible and respected body with a genuine concern in the environment”841 and 
also was the only organisation with the sufficient resources and expertise necessary to 
fund such an action.842 
The implications of this decision had the potential to be dramatic and far-reaching. On 
the plus side, the courts had at last recognised that nationwide environmental pressure 
groups now had the locus standi or legal standing, to bring judicial review actions. This 
meant that the untouchable nature of decision-making in relation to nuclear power had 
been, at least theoretically, reversed. 
The downside of the court’s decision in the case was that part of their rationale for 
allowing Greenpeace leave to apply for judicial review was that they had sufficient funds 
to launch such an action. This narrow scope of who could bring an action brought with it 
an attendant difficulty – the small, local, directly affected groups would find it 
extraordinarily difficult to raise sufficient finances to launch such a challenge, since there 
was no form of legal aid for any type of judicial review. On a point of practicality, this is 
wholly logical – judicial reviews are immensely expensive, and can be drawn out affairs. 
However, this effectively rules out all smaller protest groups, such as those which 
appeared at Tony Benn’s ‘great debate’ in 1976.  
The 1994 Greenpeace case, therefore, marked a theoretical widening of 
accountability, but any fears that the floodgates would open was limited by the fact that 
the court had only granted locus standi because Greenpeace was such a large group. The 
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small groups therefore still missed out on judicial review on financial grounds, and the 
medium-sized groups who could potentially afford it, missed out on the grounds of 
insufficient locus standi. In truth, it was a precedent with far less impact than many had 
hoped or predicted. 
Where the Merlin case marked a genuine strengthening of the position of the nuclear 
industry (and the government) in relation to pollution incidents, the 1994 Greenpeace 
case was a weakening of the decision-making process. This difference in impact was 
shadowed by a difference in applicability – for 14 years, everyone had to follow the 
precedent set by the decision in the Merlin case but, in practical terms, no-one was able to 
follow the precedent of the 1994 Greenpeace case. 
 
4.3: The Radioactive Materials (Road Transport) Act 1991 and the 
Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
4.3.1: The Radioactive Materials (Road Transport) Act 1991 
This Act made new provisions for the transportation of radioactive material by road. 
Prior to the enactment of the Act, the only restrictions on such transportation had been 
put in place under the auspices of s5(2) Radioactive Substances Act 1948 (above) which 
simply said that: 
“The appropriate Minister may, as respects the transport of any radioactive 
substances, make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary to prevent 
injury being caused by such transport to the health of persons engaged therein 
and other persons.” 
The power granted to the Minister had been used several times to make regulations, 
but all of the Orders made were revoked with the passage of the 1991 Act. The power to 
grant new Regulations was maintained by Section 2 of the Act and extended the remit of 
the Secretary of State from just the protection of human health to the prevention of: 
“any injury to health, or any damage to property or to the environment, being 
caused by, or any incident arising out of, the transport of radioactive material”843 
Radioactive material was defined in s1(1)(b) of the Act as “any material having a 
specific activity in excess of 70 kilobecquerels per kilogram”, which would include the 
obvious targets of spent fuel and other Intermediate- and High-Level Waste.844 Whilst this 
limit is quite high (granite, for example is rated at around 70Bq/kg, or 1,000 times less-
radioactive)845 and the new Act was partly triggered by the International Atomic Energy 
Authority’s revision of their Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in 
1990.846 
The necessity for a new Act was purely pragmatic – the existing Act had been in place 
for almost half a century and the scale of the operation had grown dramatically. By the 
time the Bill was being debated, in June 1991, the number of road shipments of 
radioactive waste was roughly “half a million a year”847 whereas: 
“the last time the House considered these matters, which was in 1947—a time 
when the nuclear industry was in its infancy and when there were probably no 
more than 100 shipments a year by road.”848 
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The Radioactive Substances Act 1948 was further amended with respect to the 
powers of Inspectors to investigate possible offences relating to carriage of radioactive 
materials by road. Under the 1948 Act, the powers extended to any “premises, vehicle, 
vessel or aircraft”849 but this was then amended just to premises.850 This did not mean, 
however, that vehicles were exempt from inspection, as Section 3 of the 1991 Act created 
a new type of Inspector who could work in conjunction with examiners appointed under 
section 68(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.851 These officers had powers limited to the 
inspection of vehicles852 and the imposition of prohibition or enforcement notices853 on 
operators. 
Failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Act, whether those provisions were 
imposed by Regulations created by the Secretary of State, or enforcement notices served 
by the Inspectors, was made an offence. The maximum punishment for such an offence 
was, on indictment, an unspecified fine and two-years’ imprisonment.854 As the vast 
majority of those transporting radioactive material were companies, rather than 
individuals, the Act makes specific provision for liability to attach both to the company and 
to: 
“any director, manager, secretary or similar officer… or any person who was 
purporting to act in such a capacity.”855  
In order to trigger this section, it was first necessary to prove that the offence had 
been committed with the “consent or connivance”856 of such people, or through their 
neglect. This is an interesting provision as it was not technically necessary. As early as 
1957, Lord Justice Denning had developed the “controlling officer test”, where he said: 
“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools 
and act in accordance with directions from the centre… (the) directors and 
managers represent the directing mind and will of the company and control what 
it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company 
and is treated by the law as such.”857 
This meant that under this test, the “director, manager, secretary or similar officer” 
outlined in Section 6(1) would already be liable. However, the Act was passed in June 
1991, which is not long after the collapse of the prosecution of P&O Ferries858 in 
connection with the sinking of the passenger ferry Herald of Free Enterprise outside 
Zeebrugge harbour in March 1987. The prosecution failed because there was no Director 
within P&O (which had purchased Townsend Thorensen and thus taken on all its 
liabilities), who had responsibility for safety and, thus, no liability could attach to the 
company. 
Evidently, the sinking of a passenger ferry does not have any direct link to nuclear-
power policy, but the principle involved in the case is of potential interest. We have 
already seen that radioactive material in the form of spent fuel has an incredibly long half-
life, during which period it poses a considerable risk to the public. If a train carrying such 
material had become derailed or otherwise involved in an accident and the material had 
entered the surrounding environment, it would have had the potential for serious 
embarrassment, not to mention cost, for the government should a prosecution have 
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collapsed in the same was as the Herald of Free Enterprise case. This potential, however 
unlikely in practice, would help to explain the “belt and braces” approach adopted by the 
Act. At this stage, of course, the government was still pressing on with its nuclear-power 
programme. 
Less than two years after road transport of high and intermediate level radioactive 
material had been tidied up, the untidy regulations surrounding the use of lower level 
radioactive substances came under scrutiny. 
 
4.3.2: The Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
The Radioactive Substances Act 1993 was a consolidation Act, the theory and rules of 
which were discussed in earlier chapters but which, to recap, cannot introduce any major 
new provisions. Section 50 and Schedule 3 of the 1993 Act859 repealed the remnants of 
the Radioactive Substances Act 1948860 and the entirety of the Radioactive Substances Act 
1960. There were also smaller repeals to eleven other Acts and five pieces of secondary 
legislation, but these tended to amount to one paragraph in each.861 
The small changes that were made by the 1993 Act were partly to do with the 
structure of the Act: in the 1960 Act, the definitions of the key terms “radioactive 
substance”, “radioactive waste” and “mobile radioactive apparatus” had been put towards 
the end of the Act862 but now, in accordance with modern drafting standards, they had 
been moved to sections 1, 2, and 3 respectively. This is the type of change that a 
consolidation Act is intended to make. 
Although it had no effect on the substance of the previous Acts, the 1993 Act did 
change the unit of measurement for radioactive substances. As we saw above, the lower 
limit at which something was classified as radioactive material under the 1991 Act was 
70kBq/kg. Under the 1948 and 1960 Acts, the classification of “radioactive substance” 863 
had been expressed as “Microcuries per gramme (μc/g)”864 but this was changed by the 
1993 Act to “Becquerels per gram (Bq/g).”865 even though the measurement in which 
radioactivity was expressed was changed, the level of radioactivity was not. Bequerels per 
kilogram as a measurement has two advantages, both of which are pragmatic. Firstly, it 
brings the Radioactive Substances Acts into line with other statute, which was already 
expressing radiation in these units. Secondly, it allowed for more precise measurement of 
radiation levels, since 1μc/g is the same as 37,000Bq/g. 
The 1993 Act also changed some of the provisions around inspectors, in order to bring 
the regulations in line with other, non-nuclear statute. Two types of inspectors could be 
appointed under the Act. With respect to “premises in England which are situated on a 
nuclear site”866, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was given the power to 
appoint inspectors. These inspectors did not have the power to inspect mobile radioactive 
apparatus. That power, along with a wider geographical jurisdiction, was limited to those 
inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State, who could also: 
“be appointed both as an inspector or as chief inspector under this section and as 
an inspector or as chief inspector under section 16 of the Environmental 
                                        
859 Section 50 and Schedule 6 Part 1 Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
860 The Radioactive Substances Act 1948 had a fragmented life, as do many statutes: the first part of it to be 
changed was Section 1, which was repealed by s2 Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954; Section 14 was repealed 
by s30 Northern Ireland Act 1962; Sections 3, 4 and 12 were repealed by s135 Medicines Act 1968; Sections 5 
and 6 by s7 Radiological Protection Act 1970; and the remainder by the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. 
861 Schedule 6 Part 1 of the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 lists all thirteen Acts and all of the secondary 
legislation repealed or revoked by the 1993 Act. 
862 Section 18, Radioactive Substances Act 1960 
863 Actinium, lead, polonium, protoactinium, radium, radon, thorium, and uranium (Schedule 3 Radioactive 
Substances Act 1960, and Schedule 1 Radioactive Substances Act 1993). 
864 Schedule 1 Radioactive Substances Act 1960. 
865 Schedule 3 Radioactive Substances Act 1993. 
866 Section 5(1) Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
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Protection Act 1990.”867 
The inspectors appointed under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA) had 
been given wide-ranging powers of entry, inspection and confiscation868 and this 
inequality left the situation where one industry, albeit a very disparate one, could be 
controlled by different sets of inspectors, appointed under different Acts, with different 
powers. This far from ideal situation was not rectified until five years later with the 
passage of the Environment Act, which will be discussed below. 
The penalties for committing offences under the Act were also amended slightly to 
bring them up to date. The most serious offences under the Act were still those relating to 
registration or authorisation. Under the 1960 Act, the maximum penalty was a fine of 
£100 and/or imprisonment of up to three months on summary conviction, or an 
unspecified fine and/or up to five years imprisonment for conviction on indictment.869 
Under the 1993 Act, the penalties for conviction on indictment remained the same, but the 
maximum fine for a summary conviction was increased to a £20,000.870 This was a higher 
rate of increase than was warranted simply by inflation. The inflation rate between 
January 1960 and January 1993 was 1,029%871 which, if it were applied to the maximum 
penalty, would have only led to an increase to £1129. There is no evidence to suggest that 
this increase is due to the offence being taken more seriously, however, the increase in 
fine was to have that effect. 
Obstruction of Inspectors (of either type), which was punishable by a £50 fine and up 
to three-months’ imprisonment in 1960,872 was changed to a purely financial penalty in 
1993.873 There are no provisions under the Act regarding sanctions for giving false 
information to the inspectors874. The logic behind this is that providing false information to 
an inspector could be classed as obstruction, and so the separate provision would not be 
needed. 
However, since inspections were, and are, the best way to discover if the operator of 
a nuclear site is breaching the terms of their licence, or the absolute liability discussed in 
the Merlin case, giving more powers to inspectors and increasing the penalties for 
interfering with them was a logical and pragmatic step. 
The final piece of legislation to be passed in this period was the Atomic Energy 
Authority Act 1995, which entered the statute books in the November of that year. 
 
4.4: The Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995 
In the spring of 1995, at around the same time as the final checks were being carried 
out on the new Sizewell B power station, the government published a report which 
reviewed the future for nuclear power.875 The review found that there was no case, at that 
time, for the construction of new nuclear plant by the private sector and that: 
“because of the high cost of capital… only with government support would new 
reactors be built.”876 
This marks rather a change in direction from the 1988 position which, as we have 
                                        
867 Section 4(3) Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
868 Section 17 Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
869 Section 13(2) Radioactive Substances Act 1960 
870 Section 32(2) Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
871 Figure calculated by the author, based on: ONS, 2019, op cit, n463 
872 Section 13(5) Radioactive Substances Act 1960 
873 Section 35(2) Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
874 This is at odds with provisions under Section 2(5) of the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 
1978 which imposes a prison term of up to two years for giving false information to IAEA Inspectors. 
875 DTI, 2005, op cit, n127 
876 Thomas, S., 2005, The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent studies, Greenwich: Public Services 
International Research Unit p22 
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seen, was that “all costs will be borne by the private sector”877 and shows the extent to 
which private sector involvement was only a pragmatic response to a particular set of 
circumstances, rather than a firm political belief. Later in 2005, the Atomic Energy 
Authority Act 1995 was passed, in order make provision for the transfer ownership of 
parts of the UKAEA into the private sector. The Act did not privatise the whole UKAEA, but 
simply put into place the necessary provisions for later privatisation “if so directed by the 
Secretary of State”878 and with the approval of the Treasury.879 Any nuclear-site licences 
held by the Authority (i.e., those granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965) were 
excluded from any possible transfer by virtue of Section 1(3) of the Act, as were any 
areas of land to which such a site license applied. This was a commonsense exclusion for, 
without it, any new body would have been able to take on the site license without having 
to go through the stringent vetting process set out in sections 2 and 3 of the 1965 Act. 
The Act itself was short, running only to six pages and fourteen sections, but the 
Schedules to the Act were much larger. These dealt with the provisions for the full details 
of, inter alia, the taxation and pension provisions of such a transfer into private 
ownership.880 The intention was that the Act would allow for the transfer of: 
“the activities of what now constitutes AEA Technology to a single successor 
company owned by the Secretary of State”881 so that 
“AEA Technology may well be able to offer a wider range of competitively priced 
services once it is freed from the shackles of public-sector control.”882 
This successor company could then carry on as a separate entity from the remainder 
of the UKAEA until such time as it was floated on the Stock Exchange. As has been 
discussed in earlier sections, privatising the industries which had been nationalised by 
Attlee fifty years earlier (coal, gas, railways, electricity), was a major step and was 
popular with the Treasury, as it raised large amounts of money. It was also, at least 
initially, popular with those sections of the voting public who were able to buy shares in 
the new industries (and, more often than not, sell them shortly afterwards at an increased 
price). This can be shown by the levels of oversubscription for the share offers in the 
regional electric companies in 1990 and the electricity generating companies in 1991; 
which between them were oversubscribed to the value of £5.4bn.883 As was shown in 
table 4.2, above, the benefits of privatisation for the government are short-term income 
and reduced cost. For the consumer, the benefits are argued to be more competition and, 
thus, lower prices. In a US study, economist Dr Clifford Winston and a team from the 
Brookings Institution884 calculated that deregulation of the US airline industry had saved 
the public over $8bn, and that the equivalent figure for the railway freight industry was 
$18bn.885 
Of course, there was a perceived downside to the mass privatisation. The Opposition 
                                        
877 Clarke, M., 1988, op cit, n825 
878 Section 1(1) Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995. 
879 Section 2(1) Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995. 
880 The body of the Act runs to 124 sections and six pages, whereas the four appendices to the Act run to a 
total of 26 pages and 57 sections. Although, clearly, not all sections of an Act are the same length, this gives a 
rough idea of the difference in length between the main body of the Act and its appendices. 
881 Carmyllie, Lord, 1995, Atomic Energy Authority Bill, HL Deb 23 October 1995 vol 566 c896 
882 Carmyllie, Lord, 1995, op cit, n883, c899 
883 The Scottish Electricity Board share offer was oversubscribed by £1.2bn, and that for the 12 regional 
electricity boards in England and Wales was oversubscribed by £4.2bn.  Source: BoE, 2006, Diary of Events 
Relevant to the Interpretation of the Monetary Statistics: 1960 – August 2006, London: Bank of England. 
884 The Brookings Institution is A Washington, DC-based “think tank” that describes itself as “non-artisan” but 
has also been described as “conservative” and “centrist” by some newspapers. Source: WP, 2009, Mr Obama’s 
Job Plan: How much bang would he get for borrowed bucks? The Washington Post, Wednesday, December 9, 
2009 
885 Winston, C., Corsi, T.C., Grimm, C.M., & Evans, C., 1990, The Economic Effects of Surface Freight 
Deregulation, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
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repeatedly accused the government of “selling off the family silver”886 and, although the 
later sales raised £42bn between 1990 and 2000,887 disillusionment with the policy was 
growing by the turn of the decade. Although the revenue generated by a sale was 
potentially colossal, the long-term revenue stream that nationalised industries provided 
would then be destroyed. 
As well as witnessing the creation of an environment in which the UKAEA could leave 
the public sector, 1995 saw the enactment of the Environment Act. This was a huge piece 
of legislation, mainly geared around creating a single Agency888 to which the powers of the 
National Rivers’ Authority, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution and various other 
organisations would be transferred.889 It is relevant here insofar as the new agency takes 
on the functions “conferred or imposed” on the “Chief Inspector for England and Wales 
appointed [by] the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.”890 Once again, the regulatory 
regime surrounding the use of radioactive material had been changed – the second time in 
two years, and a different system was put into place. 
The EA 1995 also further amended the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, and inserted 
the requirement that the Health and Safety Executive (which had been given licensing 
powers relating to nuclear sites in 1974) consult with the “appropriate Agency” (i.e., the 
Environment Agency in England and Wales or SEPA in Scotland) before granting or varying 
the terms of any site licence. 
Just over a month after the Atomic Energy Authority was passed, and less than a year 
after the Review paper was published, Dr Robert Hawley, the Chief Executive of British 
Energy, announced that the company was abandoning its plans for building the Sizewell C 
and Hinkley C PWR stations.891 The travails of British Energy, which had been set up 
earlier in the year to run the UK’s eight newest nuclear power stations,892 will be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
The 1995 Act can be regarded as a ‘fixer’ – it did little dramatic itself, but it did put 
into place provisions which would allow for the privatisation of AEA Technology the 
following year. As has been argued above, the push towards privatisation is best classed 
as a pragmatic move, as it was intended to raise short-term finance and removed long-
term costs and, as far as things appeared at the end of 1995, this is exactly what it did. 
 
4.5: Conclusion 
This chapter considered the impact of the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and 
Chernobyl in 1986, both of which were identified in parliamentary debates as having a 
“profound effect on public opinion”893 and thus policy, outside their immediate region. 
Despite this assertion, the TMI accident was not reacted to by policy makers in any 
significant way, and it was left to the CEGB to “consider the implications”894 of the report 
by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. For nuclear power policy in the UK to be 
                                        
886 The Phrase was first used by the Labour Minister Lord Diamond in January 1985 when he asked in 
Parliament “When will the government cease… selling off the family silver to pay for the groceries?” Source: 
Childs, D., 2001, Britain Since 1945: A Political History, London: Routledge, p243. 
887 Obinger, H., & Zohlnhöfer, R., 2004, Selling off the “Family Silver”: The Politics of Privatization in the OECD 
1990-2000, Working Paper No 121, The Minda de Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, University of Harvard, 
MA. 
888 The desire for a “single agency” was tempered somewhat by the creation of the Environment Agency in 
England (known as Asiantaeth yr Amgylchedd in Wales although it was the same organisation), and the 
separate Scottish Environmental Protection Agency in Scotland. 
889 Sections 1-10, Environment Act 1995 
890 Section 2(e) Environment Act 1995 
891 Highfield, R., 1995, Nuclear future in doubt as £5bn plants are scrapped, The Daily Telegraph, 12 December 
1995, p3. 
892 The AGR at Dungeness, Hartlepool, Heysham 1, Heysham 2, Hinkley Point B, Hunterston B and Torness B, 
along with the PWR at Sizewell B. 
893 Baker, K., 1986, op cit, n779. 
894 Howell, D., 1979, op cit, n692. 
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influenced even slightly by overseas accidents was a sign that the use of the technology 
had become widespread and, equally, that public concern over that technology was 
increasing. This is evidenced in the Merlin case, the transcript of which makes repeated 
reference to television documentary programmes and suggests that it was these, rather 
than the scientific evidence, which induced the Merlin family to move. The 1994 
Greenpeace case too, illustrated the increasing access to scientific information by non-
scientists, and what Baron Taverne called the increasing lack of trust in government 
scientists.895 In addition to the lack of trust in government scientists, we have seen an 
increasingly uncritical acceptance of the evidence produced by NGO scientists, which 
matches the suggestions made by Professor Mehta896. 
The chapter also included an assessment of nine Acts of Parliament, ranging in scope 
from the specific methods of transporting radioactive waste by road, to more general 
(though no less important) attempts to redesign the Atomic Energy Authority. Some of the 
statute was lengthy, some was far shorter but, as we have seen, all relied to an extent on 
the political debate being couched in scientific language. We have seen examples in the 
Hansard records of parliamentary debates of politicians struggling (and, for the main part, 
admitting their struggle) with the scientific background to some of the policies. If we are 
to adopt the classification put forward by Kantrowitz thirty-five years ago,897 these policies 
would all fall into the “mixed decisions” category, as they contained both technical 
elements, informed by the underlying science, and value elements. This weakens any 
argument that TDM is operating during this period even though, as with both of the 
previous periods considered, the criterion of having a technocratic élite898 is partly, if not 
wholly satisfied. The UKAEA, which always had the ability to inform and influence policy, 
but which never had policy-making powers, was being moved away from the public sector 
during this period and towards the private sector.  
The UKAEA was not the only body to be moved to a greater or lesser extent towards 
the private sector. We have also considered here the successful sales of the Radiochemical 
Centre Ltd and the non-nuclear portion of the electricity industry, and the increased 
financial support given to British Nuclear fuels Ltd as part of the overarching policy of 
privatisation adopted by the Thatcher government in the 1980s. On the basis of an 
assessment of the pre- and post-privatisation profits of three of the first companies to be 
sold; Cable & Wireless, British Aerospace and National Freight, that this move could 
correctly be classified as a reactive pragmatic response to the financial situation with 
which the UK was faced in 1980. In other words, the intention was to raise short-term 
capital, and this it achieved very well indeed. As we have seen in previous chapters, 
reactive pragmatism by its nature often focuses on “what works” in the shorter-term, and 
is shaped by external events. 
Equally pragmatic, but more proactive, was the approach taken to reduce the 
perceived risk from international terrorism by the passage of the Nuclear Material 
(Offences) Act in 1983 and the ratification of the Vienna Convention on Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material in 1991. Terrorism had not yet occurred in relation to nuclear sites, 
and the Act and Convention put in place measures to prevent it. The pragmatism 
displayed here was partly that the UK was bound by its membership of Euratom to ratify 
the Convention, and really had no choice but to do so, but also partly that the threat of 
terrorism in relation to nuclear facilities and materials was being assessed by various 
expert bodies as increasing. 
Part of the rationale given by Tony Blair for the consideration of a nuclear rebirth in 
2005 was that of energy security, and the access to North Sea Oil that began in this 
period marked, as Figure 4.1 clearly showed, the beginning of a ten-year drop in the UK’s 
reliance on imported oil. Just as the hike in oil prices following the Suez Crisis and Yom 
                                        
895 Taverne, D., 2005, op cit, n640. 
896 Mehta, M., 1998, op cit, n145. 
897 Kantrowitz, A., 1975, op cit, n91. 
898 Teichman, J., 1997, op cit, n93; Jasanoff, S., 1994, op cit, n94. 
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Kippur was ought to have been a boon time for the nuclear industry, this period should 
have marked a period of decline, and indeed it did. Linked to this was a shift in 
government approach to the construction of nuclear plants, from a position that “all costs 
would be borne by the private sector”899 to one where “only with government support 
would new reactors be built”900, prompting accusations that the government had “no 
coherent energy policy.”901 This was meant as a criticism of a particular government, 
however it is clear that no post-war government has truly had a coherent energy policy, 
and all have had their moves shaped to a greater or lesser extent by external events and 
internal aims with a resulting piecemeal, reactively politically pragmatic, approach. 
As was the case in previous sections, there is a combination here of planned political 
pragmatism – the development of measures to prevent an as-yet-unrealised terrorist 
threat – and more reactive political pragmatism – responses to international crises, the 
need to ratify international legislation, or things as prosaic as the increased level of traffic. 
Just as the scientists carrying out unauthorised experiments at Chernobyl in 1986 would 
not have done so with the benefit of hindsight (and, with a 10 year sentence in a labour 
camp, they would have had plenty of time for reflection) the “what works” criteria have to 
be judged upon the situation at the time. 
The final section which will be focused on by this thesis begins with the announcement 
by the Prime Minister that nuclear power is no longer anathema, but is back on the 
agenda. 
  
                                        
899 Clarke, M., 1988, op cit, n825. 
900 Thomas, S., 2000, op cit, n878. 
901 Orme, S., 1986, op cit, n782. 
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Chapter 5: 
November 2005 – May 2008: The Rebirth of Nuclear Power? 
5.1: Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the period from the end of November 2005 until the late 
spring of 2008. At less than thirty months, it is the shortest period on which this work has 
focused, and it begins starting just over a decade after the previous chapter finished. 
Nevertheless, despite being only a brief period, it was a time of great importance to the 
nuclear industry and to nuclear policy-makers alike. 
The chapter begins by looking at the developments in the wider area of energy policy 
between 1995 and the end of 2005. During this period, increased global focus on the 
dangers of the enhanced greenhouse effect and the anthropogenic contribution to carbon 
emissions led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol902 in 1997 which came into force in 
February 2005.903 The period also saw major terrorist attacks in the United States, Bali, 
Madrid and London, and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing with them 
heightened global tensions and a raft of publications concerning the security of nuclear 
installations against terrorism.904 In 1997, eighteen years of Conservative governments in 
the UK were brought to an end with the election of Tony Blair and New Labour. The impact 
that this change of government had on the nuclear industry is assessed in this part of the 
chapter. 
The second section of this chapter covers the Prime Minister’s speech to the 
Confederation of British Industries in November 2005 (“the CBI Speech”), the resulting 
publication of the Energy Review in 2006905 and the subsequent enactment of the Climate 
Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006. This is the final period to be discussed in this 
research and, had the work been completed even as late as October 2005, there would 
have been little forewarning that the occurrences covered here would have happened. As 
covered in Chapter One, the situation of the apparent “long slow fall from grace” of 
nuclear power was dramatically slowed, if not reversed, after the CBI speech, which 
covered six “key areas”: public service reform, increasing age of the population, transport, 
skills, energy and bank deregulation.906 It was not until towards the end that the 
announcement was made that energy policy was “the issue back on the agenda with a 
vengeance”907 and further that the UK would look in the summer of 2006 at: 
“the issue of whether we facilitate the development of a new generation of 
nuclear power stations.”908 
The impact of this statement cannot be underestimated and will be discussed in more 
depth later in the chapter, but it is important to note that there had been some 
anticipation of the announcement both in the press and in Parliament. Less than a month 
earlier, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Alan Johnson, had said, during a 
parliamentary debate, that the reintroduction of nuclear was: 
“A very big if, because factors such as waste and cost have to be taken into 
account…. A very healthy public debate is going on, but it is very different from 
                                        
902 Technically the “Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change”, but generally referred 
to in its abbreviated form. 
903 Per Article 25(1) of the Protocol “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on 
which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in 
total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, 
have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” 
904 See, for example POST, 2004, Postnote 222: Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, 
London: Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology/ HMSO; and Badey, T.J., 2001, Nuclear Terrorism: 
Actor-Based threat Assessment, Intelligence and National Security, Vol 16 No 2 p39-54. 
905 DTI, 2006b, The Energy Challenge. Energy Review (Cmnd 6887), London: Department of Trade and 
Industry / HMSO 
906 Blair, T., 2005, op cit, n1 
907 Ibid. 
908 Ibid. 
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that which took place even as recently as 2003 in terms of climate change and 
the need for security of supply. I hope that we can ensure a proper, 
comprehensive debate that examines the issues, instead of people taking stances 
based on, perhaps, an ideological viewpoint. Taking such stances will not help 
us.”909 
What the Secretary of State is suggesting is that the facts underpinning the 
announcement in the 2003 White Paper, considered later in this chapter, that a renewed 
development of nuclear power was considered “an unattractive option”910 had changed to 
such an extent that “what worked”911 in 2003 might not be suitable for the end of 2005. 
His use of the “ideological viewpoint” as a term of disapproval suggests that he is using it 
as a contrast to a rational debate. What the Secretary of State’s comments seem to be 
leading to is the fact that he considers the reappraisal of nuclear power as an option to be 
pragmatic (inasmuch as it might be the most practicable choice) and that there is no room 
in the discussion for any other viewpoints. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the high court challenge to the energy 
consultation and the two similarly named White Papers which were published in 2007 and 
2008.912 
Throughout the chapter, the decisions which were made in relation to nuclear power 
policy will be assessed in order to ascertain, as far as is practicable, the reasons for 
making them. As with previous chapters, the ideas of political pragmatism and 
Technocratic Decision Making will be used as the models against which the decisions will 
be measured. In addition to this, and of particular importance in a chapter where global 
climate change plays such a major role, the extent to which politicians have made use of 
‘science’ as a tool to justify their decision will be assessed. 
 
5.2: Developments between 1995 and 2005 
This section will consider the impact of several key events that happened in the 
decade between the end of the previous chapter and the beginning of this one. Some, but 
not all, of the events are directly linked to nuclear power, and some are linked to much 
wider issues such as climate change and energy security. 
 
5.2.1: Home Energy Conservation Act and Environment Act 1995 
The first element to consider is statutory and is the passage into law of two Acts: the 
Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 (HECA) and the Environment Act 1995 (EA). The 
scale of the two Acts could not be more different – the HECA 1995 is only nine sections 
long, whereas the EA 1995 runs to 125 sections and 24 Schedules. Their relevance is also 
different. HECA is mentioned as it speaks to the wider issue of energy conservation, which 
would affect demand for electricity and thus impact on the potential requirement for 
nuclear power. The Act made every local housing authority in England and Wales913 into 
an “Energy Conservation Authority” and then gave them a duty to prepare a report setting 
out: 
“energy conservation measures that the authority considers practicable, cost-
effective and likely to result in significant improvement in the energy efficiency of 
                                        
909 Johnson, A., 2005, Energy Policy, HC Deb 3 Nov 2005 vol 438 c954 
910 DTI, 2003, op cit, n822, p12 para 1.24 
911 Diego, R., 2004, op cit, n31 
912 DTI, 2007a, Meeting the Energy Challenge (Cmnd 7124), Department of Trade and Industry, London: 
HMSO; and DBERR, 2008a, Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power, London: DBERR 
913 (or Scottish local authorities or the Northern Ireland Housing Executive) Source: Section 1(1) Housing 
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residential accommodation914 in its area.”915 
The measures put into place under HECA were modest, in terms of the total use of 
energy across the country, and included local authority schemes such as grants for 
improved insulation, subsidised (or free) low-energy light bulbs and draught proofing. The 
target was to improve energy efficiency levels (from a 1996 baseline) by 30 per cent by 
the end of 2010.916 The performance of the Energy Conservation Authorities was revealed 
in July 2005 when, in a House of Lords debate, Baroness Maddock inquired as to the 
cumulative amount of energy saved as a result of the Act. In response, Lord Bach stated 
that, up to the end of March 2004, 93.4 TWh had been saved;917 which equates to about 
12 TWh a year, on average. Since the total UK energy production for 2005 was estimated 
by the investment analysts Bloomberg as 398 TWh,918 this suggests that HECA managed 
to reduce the UK’s energy demand by about 3 per cent a year. Since each of the fourteen 
nuclear-power stations still operating in 2005 contributed about 1.8 per cent of the total 
UK energy demand, the energy efficiency requirements of HECA have obviated the need 
for one and a half nuclear-power stations. In the light of this apparent success, the need 
for politicians to make concrete decisions about the reintroduction of nuclear power, as 
opposed to vague policy ideas, has been greatly reduced.  
Whereas HECA was concerned with the wider issue of energy conservation, the EA 
1995, spoke to the linked but separate key strand of this period, that of environmental 
concerns. It was an almost all-encompassing piece of legislation which covered areas as 
diverse as:  
The establishment of an Environment Agency (EA) and Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) (ss1-56); 
Dealing with abandoned mines (ss57-60); 
Restating the purpose and organisation of National Parks (ss61-79); 
Setting up a National Air Quality Strategy (ss80-91); and 
Sundry areas (waste, mineral rights, hedgerows, drainage and fisheries). 
In such a large piece of legislation, one might have thought that the impact of the 
nuclear-power industry would have come under more attention. However, the 
amendments to existing legislation are limited to a small procedural change to the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965919 and another to the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.920 What is 
important about the EA 1995 is that it illustrates the growing importance of “the 
environment” as a political influence. According to the ex-Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, writing several years after the event, the “environmental lobby… used the 
concern about global warming to attack capitalism, growth and industry.”921 However, as 
Robert Garner of the University of Leicester points out: 
“Documenting the objective reality of environmental problems is much more 
straightforward… than explaining why the environment has emerged as a political 
                                        
914 The definition of residential accommodation was set out in section 191) of the Home Energy Conservation 
Act 1995, and was amended by section 1(2) of the Energy Conservation Act 1996 which added houses in 
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915 Section 2(2) Housing Energy Conservation Act 1995. 
916 Gore, D., 2000, The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Bill (Revised edition), house of Commons 
Research Paper 00/26, London: HMSO, p12 
917 Bach, Lord, 2005, Home Energy Conservation Act 1995, HL Deb 21 Jul 2005 vol 673 cWA282 
918 Paulsson L., & Dobson, P., 2006, British Energy Ousts Its Nuclear Chief; Output Cut, Bloomberg. Available 
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919 Section 7 of Schedule 22 (Minor and Consequential Amendments) to the Environment Act 1995 adds the 
requirement for the Health and Safety Executive to consult with the new EA and SEPA before nuclear site 
licences are granted. 
920 Section 205 (5) of Schedule 22 (Minor and Consequential Amendments) to the Environment Act 1995 adds a 
requirement for the EA or SEPA to consult with the “relevant Minister and Health and Safety Executive” when 
deciding whether or not to issue a consent for the disposal of radioactive waste. 
921 Thatcher, M., 1993, op cit, n576 
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issue. In particular we cannot just assume that the former accounts for the 
latter.”922 
Although it is true that some in the environmental lobby welcomed the move towards 
total decommissioning,923 other leading figures have clamed that it is a short-sighted step. 
The announcement late in 1995 by Dr Robert Hawley, the Chief Executive of British 
Energy, that the company was abandoning its plans for building the Sizewell C and Hinkley 
C PWR stations924 had a mixed reaction – The Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical 
Union was angry that abandoning the plans meant that roughly 10,000 jobs would no 
longer be created, but Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth both welcomed the decision925 
as it was aligned with their long-standing campaigns to phase out nuclear power 
altogether. 
Even though Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups take a 
position on the safety, economics and desirability of, not to mention the need for, nuclear 
power that is fundamentally contrary to the nuclear industry itself, both sides in the 
debate are ready and willing to use scientific data to back up their arguments. There is a 
fracturing over the acceptance or otherwise of science, however. In some circles there 
appears to be an assumption that “the involvement of experts in policy-making is 
obviously desirable.”926 Others, for example Hannigan, argue that involving experts in 
areas where there is a lack of either information or consensus “opens the door to 
manipulation by vested interests.”927 Professor Jasanoff928 appears to support this second 
view suggesting that, in addition to the ‘scientific community’ and science itself fracturing, 
there is an erosion of public consensus to the extent that the public too are splintered into 
smaller and smaller groups. She also identifies a second set of issues which started to 
have an impact on policy-making; viz: 
“two larger sets of fin de siècle concerns: the reinvention of the Labour Party in 
the post-Thatcher years, and Britain’s ongoing struggle to modernize and 
democratize institutions seen to be out of touch with the economic and social 
realities of the twenty-first century.”929 
She goes on to say that questions over:  
“How to regain a technological edge, what social compromises to make or not to 
make in that process, figured as sub-texts in virtually every major structural 
reform initiative.”930 
Whatever standpoint one adopts, it must be conceded that there is no absolutely 
accurate model for the role played by science in the legislative process.931 Some areas of 
policy are clearly going to be highly reliant on detailed scientific data, whereas others may 
be more closely linked to sociological or economic data. Science and scientific research, 
which were the raison d’être of many academic institutions across the globe are now, as 
Professor Worcester suggested in the previous chapter, often regarded as tools to be used 
by politicians and in the furtherance of their own political goals. This is not a sudden shift 
                                        
922 Garner, R., 2000, Environmental Politics: Britain, Europe and the Global Environment, Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Press Ltd, p14. 
923 For example, “Nuclear power should have no role in Scotland’s sustainable energy future beyond the life of 
the current stations” FOES, 2001, Friends of the Earth Scotland Briefing: Nuclear Power, Edinburgh: Friends of 
the Earth Scotland, p1. 
924 Highfield, R., 1995, op cit, n893, p3 
925 Ibid. 
926 Jordan, G., & Davidson, S., 2000, op cit., n82, p75. 
927 Hannigan, J. A, 1999, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective, London: Routledge, 
p82. 
928 Jasanoff, S., 2000, The Science wars and American Politics, in Dierkes, M., & von Grote C., eds., Between 
understanding and trust: The Public Science and Technology, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press. 
929 Jasanoff, S., 2003,Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, p7 
930 Ibid. 
931 For more discussion of the role played by science in American lawmaking, see, Carden, K., 2006, Bridging 
the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 165. 
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– as we saw in earlier chapters, Clement Attlee was prepared to use the argument that his 
decision to adopt nuclear technology was driven by scientific inevitability. Due to the 
inherently scientific underpinnings of discussions about the environment, climate change 
and nuclear power, the use of scientific language by policy makers is brought into stark 
relief. Worcester further reports that: 
“There is considerable scepticism among the public about scientists’ competence 
as experts. In the field of the environment, this perception has been fairly steady 
for a number of years, with the public generally fairly evenly divided on the 
proposition that ‘even the scientists don’t really know what they’re talking about 
when it comes to the environment’.”932 
The “considerable scepticism” that Worcester talks about will not have been helped by 
occurrences such as the salmonella in eggs debacle of the 1980s and the outbreak of 
bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE), with its links to new variant Creuzfeld-Jacob 
Disease in the 1990s.933 As was discussed in Chapter Three, Taverne takes the argument 
a stage further, suggesting that: 
“Suspicion has increased [following TMI and Chernobyl] that there was a 
conspiracy between government, scientists and industry to pursue technological 
progress regardless of social consequences and risks.”934 
However pragmatic the decisions made by politicians prove to be in this final chapter, 
the direct and indirect influence of environmentalists was at a greater level than it had 
been in any of the previous chapters, as will be demonstrated below. The extent to which 
it was more influential than other factors will be investigated with respect to each piece of 
relevant legislation passed during the period. 
 
5.2.2: Labour’s Election Victory, May 1997 
On 2 May 1997, eighteen years of Conservative government ended when the Labour 
Party, under the leadership of Tony Blair, swept to victory in the General Election with 419 
parliamentary seats – a majority over the Conservative Party of 254. The rhetoric of “old” 
Labour had consistently been opposed to nuclear weapons935 although its viewpoint on 
nuclear power fluctuated somewhat over the years.936 “New” Labour, as the Labour Party 
started to refer to itself in 1996,937 had also made a break with the old party’s 
commitment to nationalisation.938 
Nuclear power remained a low priority for the government in the first years of its term 
in office, as it had during the election. In the wider manifesto, nuclear energy warrants 
only a single sentence: 
“We see no economic case for building any new nuclear power stations.”939 
                                        
932 Worcester, R., 1999, op cit, n65. Worcester is also founder of the MORI Polling Organisation. 
933 The growing disillusionment with science has continued in the twenty-first century with the handling of 
GMOs, foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue and avian influenza (H5N1), and Swine Flu (H1N1) in the twenty-
first century. 
934 Taverne, D., 2005, op cit, n640, p27. 
935 The Labour party adopted a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament at the party conference in 1960, 
reversed its decision at the following party conference, and then adopted it again between 1982 and 1989. 
Source: Hinton, J., 1989, Protests and Visions. Peace Politics in Twentieth Century Britain, Santa Fe, CA: Radius 
Books  
936 As we have seen in earlier chapters, in was Clement Attlee’s government which introduced nuclear power in 
the first instance, and Tony Benn  
937 Labour, 1996, New Labour, New Life For Britain, Labour Party draft Manifesto, London: Labour Party. 
938 Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution had been amended at a Special Party Conference in the spring of 
1995. For a more detailed discussion on the impacts of the reforms of Clause IV see: Kenny, M., & Smith, M. J., 
Discourses of modernization: Gaitskell, Blair and the reform of Clause iv, pp110-168 in Denver, D., Fisher, J., 
Ludlam, S., & Pattie, C., (Eds.), 1997, British Elections and Parties Review: v. 7, London: Routledge, and 
Dolowitz, D. P., New Labour: the phoenix has risen, Contemporary politics 2007 (6)13 (2). 139-146 
939 Labour, 1997, New Labour, New Life for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto, London: Labour Party 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 122 
Instead, the priorities of the new government were set out on a card as part of the 
1997 manifesto. 940 They were “centred on five pledges: education; crime; health; jobs 
and economic stability.”941 Indeed, in parliamentary debates between 1997 and the end of 
2004, Tony Blair never used the words “nuclear energy” and used “nuclear power” only 
nine times, and on several of these occasions he was referring to the former Soviet Union 
or Iran.942 It is suggested that, in the first few years of his premiership, therefore, Tony 
Blair did not express a strong opinion on nuclear energy and the subject remained a low 
priority. The quote (above) from the manifesto suggests that it was a reactive, pragmatic, 
economics-based decision which led the Labour government to shift its attention away 
from nuclear power. 
What the new government did achieve in its first full year of office was to pass two 
pieces of statute which could have had a dramatic impact on the different aspects of the 
nuclear industry; the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibitions and Inspections) Act and the Human 
Rights Act. As we will see, in practice, one of them has had considerably more effect than 
the other. 
 
  
 
5.2.3: Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 
The relevant background to the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 is quite complex. The 
1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 
March 1970, and was given effect in the UK by the UK Safeguards Agreement 1976 and 
the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978. The 2000 Act relates to a 
Protocol to the 1976 Safeguards Agreement which had been signed in Vienna in 
September 1998. The Protocol bolstered the inspection regime of the NPT as it was felt 
that the existing regime was insufficient to meet new demands, following the 1991 Gulf 
War, and the: 
“discovery… of the full extent of the secret Iraqi nuclear programme, combined 
with revelations about the North Korean programme”943 
On the face of it, this Act would seem to impact the civil nuclear industry to the same 
extent as the previous two which have been discussed; i.e., not greatly. However, 
because the technology involved in enriching uranium to weapons-grade is essentially the 
same as that used to enrich uranium sufficiently for use in a reactor, there is a much 
larger impact on the nuclear industry as a whole, and also in the UK. Despite some initial 
concern by the industry that these extra disclosure requirements944 would result in 
excessive costs, the Government announced that: 
“that the estimated total cost for businesses likely to be affected by the new 
safeguards measures would be of the order of £150,000 in the first year.”945 
As it transpires, the Act did not come into force until the middle of 2004, so any 
business which could be affected by it had plenty of lead time in which to make necessary 
changes to their disclosure and secure record-keeping procedures. 
The Act also served to add another tier of inspection onto the nuclear industry, which 
was already covered under several different inspection regimes. Unauthorised disclosure 
                                        
940 Ibid. 
941 Labour, 2010, History of the Labour Party: New Labour, available at 
http://www.labour.org.uk/historyofthelabourparty3, accessed on 21/01/10 
942 Blair, T., 1999a, Chernobyl, HC Deb 15 March 1999 vol 327 c440W and Blair, T., 1999b, Former Soviet 
Union (Nuclear Reactors), HC Deb 10 February 1999 vol 325 c284W 
943 Youngs, T., & Danby, G., 2000, op cot, n602, p9 
944 This included keeping enhanced records so that any information required by the Secretary of State can be 
supplied. (Section 2, Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000) 
945 McIntosh, Lord, 1999, Nuclear Safeguards Bill, HL Deb 30 November 1999 vol 607 c777 
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of information obtained by the Inspectors can be punished by an unspecified fine and a 
prison term of up to two years.946 The same is true for “knowingly or recklessly mak[ing] 
a statement that is false or misleading.”947 
Unlike the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibitions and Inspections) Act 1998, where 
inspections are limited to sites that are suspected of conducting nuclear testing, inspectors 
under the 2000 Act can carry out inspections on any site, provided the Secretary of State 
issues the correct notice.948 Although the Act is not specific on the issue, during the 
debate stage in the House of Lords, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, the Government’s 
Spokesman, said that: 
“the obligations in the Additional Protocol [and thus the Act] do not extend to 
defence-related activities. As is the case with our existing safeguards agreement, 
this will remain outside the scope of [International Atomic Energy Authority] 
oversight. This is, of course essential for reasons of national security.”949 
It is ironic that the rationale for increasing the powers of the IAEA Inspectors was, as 
was discussed briefly above, the secret development of nuclear technology by Iraq and 
North Korea; exactly the type of programme which would be covered by the phrase 
“reasons of national security.” The UK had, therefore, albeit with the full knowledge and 
co-operation of the IAEA, exempted itself from having its military sites inspected, when 
these were exactly the sites that it argued ought to be subjected to inspection abroad. 
This makes the Protocol less universal than it was intended to be and although this was 
not an ideal situation for the IAEA, it was better, perhaps, than the UK deciding to invoke 
its rights under Article X of the NPT to withdraw from the treaty: 
“if it decides that extraordinary events… have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country.”950 
As has been shown at the beginning of the discussions of the 2000 Act, its raison 
d’être was to give force to the 1998 Protocol to the 1976 Safeguards Agreement, one of 
the requirements of which was that: 
“all of the then 15 member states and the European Commission… notify the IAEA 
that their statutory and/or constitutional requirements for implementation were in 
place.”951 
As with several of the Acts considered here, the purpose of the Act was to ratify an 
instrument of international law which had already been signed and, with the caveat from 
section 5.2.3 above, it can be framed as a pragmatic piece of policy-making, rather than 
something triggered by any political ideology. 
The final notification from the member states went to the IAEA in April 2004, which is 
why there was such a delay between the Act being passed and coming into force.952 This 
Act then was in place but was dependent upon the subsequent occurrence of external 
events to give it effect. By sharp contrast, the Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001, however, was an immediate ex post facto reaction to external events.  
 
5.2.4: Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
The Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) entered the statute books 
on 14 December 2001, slightly more than three months after the terrorist attacks on the 
                                        
946 Section 9(2) Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 
947 Section 7 Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000sets out the offence, and section 9(2) NSA 2000 sets out the 
maximum punishment for those convicted on indictment. 
948 Section 2 Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 
949 McIntosh, Lord, 1999, op cit, n971. 
950 Article X, 1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
951 Sainsbury of Turville, Lord, 2004, Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, HL Deb 07 June 2004 vol 662 c23WA 
952 “…the Act shall come into force on 1st May 2004” Reg 2, The Nuclear Safeguards Act Commencement (No. 1) 
Order 2004 (SI 2004/1252) 
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United States on 11 September 2001. This Act has attracted criticism from several groups 
who question whether many of the measures it put into place comply with the provisions 
of the Human Rights Act above953 and has sweeping powers in many areas. Only one 
small part of the Act relates to the nuclear industry, however, Part 8 (“Security of Nuclear 
Industry”) of the Act amounts to only half a dozen sections (ss76-81), and Part 5 of 
Schedule 8 relates to Civil Nuclear Security. Nevertheless, there are some important 
changes made to the nuclear-security regime. 
Section 76 of the Act repealed section 3 and parts of section 4 of the Atomic Energy 
Authority (Special Constables) Act 1976 and also restated the limits of the powers of the 
UKAEA constables from their previous limits to the situation where: 
“An AEA constable shall have the powers and privileges (and be liable to the 
duties and responsibilities) of a constable at any place at which he reasonably 
believes a particular consignment of nuclear material will be trans-shipped or 
stored incidentally to its carriage, in order to ensure the security of the nuclear 
material on its arrival at that place.”954 
The UKAEA Constabulary was reviewed in 2002 by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary 
which, in its report, made several recommendations relating to training and some aspects 
of restructuring.955 Many of these recommendations were incorporated in a new body, the 
Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA), created by the Energy Act 2004 which will be dealt 
with in due course. 
Section 79 imposed criminal liability onto anyone who deliberately or recklessly 
“discloses any information or thing the disclosure of which might prejudice the security of 
any nuclear site or any nuclear material.”956 This liability attracts a maximum prison 
sentence of seven years and an unlimited fine,957 which is higher than any other sentence 
relating to disclosure of information. The Act specified that the person making the 
disclosure must either do so with the intention of prejudicing security, or recklessly as to 
whether or not security will be prejudiced.958 The old definition of recklessness stemmed 
from the case of Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell,959 which gave it: 
“a so-called objective interpretation in relation to offences of criminal damage so 
as to include those who had failed to consider an obvious risk.”960 
This “objective recklessness” test was used as the yardstick in criminal cases for over 
two decades, before it was been overruled by the case of R v G961 which: 
“re-asserted a subjective test requiring actual awareness of risks in cases of 
criminal damage.”962 
For the purposes of this part of ATCSA, a subjective test would be applied, which 
means that, in order for an offence to have been carried out, the person carrying out the 
disclosure must have been aware themselves that such a disclosure “might prejudice the 
security of any nuclear site or any nuclear material.”963 
Section 80 concerned the possible future introduction (through delegated legislation) 
                                        
953 See, for example, JCHR, 2004, Eighteenth Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
London: HMSO; Crossman, G., 2005, Liberty’s Response to the Constitutional Affairs Committee call for 
evidence on the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, London: Liberty 
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of an offence of disclosing information about, or relating to, the enrichment of uranium.964 
The Act provided that the regulations would impose the same level of punishment as was 
created under section 79. No Regulations were passed for almost three years, until the 
passage of the Uranium Enrichment Technology (Prohibition on Disclosure) Regulations 
2004.965 These Regulations gave power to the offence created under Section 80(3) of the 
Act which, as with the offence under Section 79, carried a maximum prison term of seven 
years. 
The rationale behind the introduction of the 2004 Regulations was that the enrichment 
of uranium is essential for both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Naturally occurring 
uranium contains only about 0.7% by mass of U235, the fissile isotope needed to generate 
a reaction and so needs to be enriched before it is of use.966 Uranium used in power 
stations is generally enriched to between three and five per cent U-235967 but, as the 
same processes can be used to enrich uranium sufficiently for use in weapons,968 it is 
important to keep the technology under control. This is the same rationale that used 
above, in relation to the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000. 
Maintaining security of “sensitive nuclear information”969 was not simply a question of 
preventing its disclosure by Inspectors or others who came across the knowledge, 
however. Anyone with sensitive nuclear information were required to:  
“maintain such security standards, procedures and arrangements as are 
necessary for the purpose of minimising the risk of loss, theft or unauthorised 
disclosure”970 
There was no criminal sanction imposed for failure to comply with these regulations, 
however, which potentially weakens their impact. This means that the security regime 
surrounding this highly sensitive information is in two layers. 
In terms of external security threats, the UK Government revisited the issue of 
possible terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities shortly after ATCSA had been passed. In July 
2002, in conjunction with its report into UK security,971 the House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee invited the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (POST) to 
investigate: 
“the physical robustness of nuclear installations against such [terrorist] attacks as 
well as the potential consequences in terms of the amounts of radioactive 
material liable to be released and its effects.”972 
In the early 1970s, Professor Hunt, Dean of the Faculty of Science at Aston University, 
had written, somewhat prophetically: 
“the crashing of an aircraft on a reactor building, simultaneously with two other 
only slightly less unlikely fault conditions, were combined to constitute a 
“maximum credible accident” against which a reactor had to be safe.”973  
He carried on to say that the entire range of reactor buildings tested passed 
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satisfactorily and that there was no major risk. The 148-page POST report, published in 
July 2004, was a comprehensive analysis of both the actual and perceived safety of all 
nuclear activities (power stations, research reactors, military sites and waste 
transportation) in the UK. There are several key points that the report makes, including: 
Ways terrorists might bring about a release of radioactive material from a nuclear 
facility are known, but not the likelihood of success attack, or the size and nature 
of any release. 
9/11 led to increased security and strengthened emergency planning at and 
around nuclear facilities. 
Nuclear power plants were not designed to withstand some forms of terrorist 
attack, such as large aircraft impact, but existing safety and security regimes 
provide some defence. A worst-case scenario would release radioactive material 
(i.e., not cause meltdown). 
Large numbers of instant fatalities are unlikely, but long-term deaths along with 
social and economic repercussions are likely.974 
This is rather inconclusive and repeats, mantra-like, the caveat that more research 
still needed to be undertaken. What the POST report does do, however, is contradict the 
earlier report by Professor Hunt, even though the reactors being used in 2004 were little 
changed from those being used in the mid-1970s.975 
At time the Act was introduced, the regular poll into “the most important issue facing 
Britain today” by IPSOS MORI showed that the proportion of people who believed that the 
answer was the broad category of “nuclear” rose tenfold from less than 0.5 per cent in 
August 2001 to four per cent in September 2001.976 Whilst these levels were still very low, 
compared to the numbers ranking “defence” as the most important issue,977 non-
committal reports such as the POST Report would do little to allay any concerns. In a 
House of Lords debate on International Terrorism which followed two days after the 9/11 
attacks, Lord Brennan spoke of the possibility of “an aircraft hitting a nuclear reactor”,978 
and continued that “This form of terrorism will happen again unless we fight to stop it.”979 
As important as a Lords’ debate might be, the readership of Hansard is quite limited. Of 
more dramatic impact was the fact that the media too had picked up on the “appalling”980 
possibility of an attack against a nuclear facility.981 This illustrates that the scientific data, 
some of which suggested there was a slightly increased risk, and others of which 
suggested there was not, was inconclusive. Despite this, politicians and the media alike 
presented the negative data as if it were incontrovertible proof. 
The ATCSA was rushed through Parliament in a matter of weeks after the 9/11 
attacks in the United States, although it is safe to say that many of the provisions of the 
Act had already been contemplated by the government.982 Liberal Democrat peer Lord 
Phillips of Sudbury, said, during the debate on the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill 
that: 
                                        
974 Ibid, pi. 
975 Ibid. 
976 IPSOS MORI. Nuclear rose to a peak of 11 per cent in February 2003 due to the escalation of the military 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
977 IPSOS MORI. The most important issue in both months was “Defence” which rated 60 per cent and 57 per 
cent. 
978 Brennan, Lord, 2001, International Terrorism, HL Deb 14 September 2001 vol 627 c42 
979 Ibid. 
980 Ibid. 
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“one of the many bones of contention across the House is that a Bill which is 
rushed through this House in order to deal with an emergency terrorist situation 
is being used for much wider purposes.”983 
As a comparison, the Human Rights Bill was introduced to Parliament in November 
1997, and received Royal Assent a year later in November 1998, having been debated 
extensively by both Houses. The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill, on the other 
hand, which many have argued is a much more far-reaching piece of statute, was 
introduced to Parliament on 19 November 2001 and received Royal Assent on 13 
December 2001, a mere twenty-four days later. The accusation that has been levelled 
against ATCSA since its passage is that it was ill-thought out,984 hastily rushed985 and, 
therefore, flawed.986 
The criticism of the government in relation to the ATCSA (and its replacements) was 
in start contrast to the support that the government got in February 2003, however, when 
an energy White Paper was published which, to many, seemed to suggest that nuclear 
was off the agenda. Less than three months later, more statute was enacted to extend 
state support for the privatised nuclear companies. This gave more credence to both 
British Energy’s argument in 1995, and the Labour Party manifesto argument from 1997 
(both discussed above) that there was no sound economic basis on which a revival of 
nuclear power would make sense. 
 
5.2.5: Our Energy Future: A White Paper on Energy 2003:  
On 24 February 2003, the Department of Trade and Industry, in association with the 
Department for Transport and the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
published the 2003 Energy White Paper, ‘Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy’. This White Paper, according to the Foreword by the Prime Minister, gave a new 
direction for, and was a milestone in, energy policy, as it: 
“sets out a strategy for the long term, to give industry the confidence to invest to 
help us deliver our goals - a truly sustainable energy policy.”987 
Other than its task in setting out the direction in which the government wished to 
travel to attain a low-carbon economy as a way of meeting the targets for carbon dioxide 
reduction set by the Kyoto Protocol – and thus the environment in which existing nuclear-
power industry would have to operate – the 2003 White Paper is chiefly remembered for 
its reference to the potential for new nuclear-power stations: 
“Its current economics make it an unattractive option for new, carbon-free 
generating capacity.”988 
“we conclude it is right to concentrate our efforts on energy efficiency and 
renewables. We do not, therefore, propose to support new nuclear build now.”989  
“Before any decision to proceed with the building of nuclear power stations, there 
would need to be the fullest public consultation and the publication of a White 
Paper setting out the Government's proposals.”990 
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This attitude was taken by many observers at the time991 to signal that the “new 
nuclear” option was off the agenda for the foreseeable future and would preferably never 
form part of the energy mix in a low-carbon economy. As was suggested at the beginning 
of this chapter, however, the environmental lobby was far from united on the issue of 
whether or not it felt that “new nuclear” should, in fact, be utilised. Professor Lovelock, for 
example, the eminent environmentalist and author of the Gaia hypothesis, believes 
nuclear power to be the only viable source of power if we are to ameliorate the enhanced 
greenhouse effect partly caused by human reliance on fossil fuels. Whilst not necessarily 
an ardent supporter of nuclear power, Lovelock sees it as the “least worst” option. In a 
combination of an interview with The Independent newspaper and a book preface, both of 
which were in 2004, Lovelock argues not only that nuclear power is safe but, further, that 
it is the only sensible option available: 
“Opposition to nuclear energy is based on irrational fear fed by Hollywood-style 
fiction, the Green lobbies and the media. These fears are unjustified, and nuclear 
energy from its start in 1952 has proved to be the safest of all energy 
sources.”992 
“I hope that it is not too late for the world to emulate France and make nuclear 
power our principal source of energy. There is at present no other safe, practical 
and economic substitute for the dangerous practice of burning carbon fuels.”993 
This is not the first time Lovelock has used this argument. In 2001, he wrote that “our 
fear of all things nuclear has that same quality as our forefathers’ fear of hell” and argued 
for the reintroduction of a nuclear programme. Lovelock is not typical of the 
environmental movement, however, and some have rather mischievously suggested that 
he is a publicity hound – with respect to the Independent interview, May says “one result… 
was that Lovelock gained a great deal of publicity in the run-up to the publication of his 
new book.”994 Whatever his rationale, Lovelock’s views were echoed by figures from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, which stated that: 
“In the absence of nuclear generation, emissions of carbon dioxide in 1999 would 
have been 12-24 million tonnes higher, depending on the mix of generation used 
to replace it.”995 
This disagreement is nothing new, of course. In 1980, the pro-nuclear astronomer 
and scientist Fred (later Sir Fred) Hoyle and his son, Geoffrey Hoyle, published their 
Commonsense in Nuclear Energy,996 in which they similarly argue for heavy reliance on 
nuclear energy. Writing not long after the energy crisis of the late 1970s, nuclear power 
was, they said, the only practicable way to avoid a further energy shortage which itself 
“seems a sure prescription for nuclear war.”997 
As these three examples show, proponents of the nuclear option (new and old) had 
well-rehearsed arguments about the problems of the enhanced greenhouse effect and 
global warming and pointed to nuclear as the only viable carbon-friendly power source. 
This claim was refuted by many on the basis that, although the actual production of 
electricity from nuclear power does not produce any carbon dioxide: 
“The nuclear fuel cycle does release carbon dioxide during mining, fuel 
enrichment and plant construction. Uranium mining is one of the most carbon-
intensive industrial operations and as demand for uranium grows carbon dioxide 
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emissions are expected to rise as ore grades decline.”998 
Despite this statement, and the scientific evidence which was put forward to support 
it, the total carbon production for a nuclear-power station has been calculated at “an 
average value of 4.4tC/GWh999, compared to 243tC/GWh for coal and 97tC/GWh for 
gas”1000 which means that, over its lifetime, a nuclear-power station produces over twenty 
times less carbon than the equivalent gas-fired power station, and fifty times less than the 
coal-fired equivalent. Since the climate change, and by extension, carbon emission 
argument is one part of the rationale for the reintroduction of nuclear power, this helps to 
strengthen the government’s case. It does, however, base itself on the presupposition of a 
unified scientific understanding which, as we have seen, has been symptomatic of 
decisions in this area since the 1940s. 
The cost justification for not going down the nuclear route is an interesting one. The 
Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE) produced a report a few months after the 2003 
White Paper in which it found that a nuclear-fission plant produced electricity at a cost of 
2.3p per kWh, making it the second-cheapest method of electricity generation behind 
CCGT (Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine) plants which were assessed as 2.2p per kWh.1001 
This seems to give the lie to the official justification for ruling out nuclear power given in 
the White Paper. However, initial costing estimates are just that, estimates, and so they 
rarely prove to be entirely accurate – as will be show below, the Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology’s initial estimate in 2003 for the cost of decommissioning had to 
be increased by 45 per cent within two years.1002 The RAE report also takes into account 
just the cost of electricity production, rather then the lifecycle cost of the power plant, and 
makes no distinction between the different types of reactor which are in operation. 
The reports by Lovelock, Hoyle père et fils, Greenpeace and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering are all accessible online with relative ease. This ready access to information 
can be combined with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, section 1 of which gives a 
general right of access to information held by public authorities. Whilst none of the 
examples cited above are public authorities, the two approaches mean that the public’s 
access to previously unavailable data and ability to question decisions has increased 
greatly. As with all statute, this general provision is tempered by various exceptions under 
Part II of the Act. There are several categories of exception, but the main ones concern 
information on security matters,1003 issues of national importance,1004 those which would 
compromise ongoing legal cases1005 and those which were readily accessibly already.1006 
In environmental terms, which broadly categorises many of the issues relating to the 
nuclear debate, the Environmental Information Regulations 19921007 predated the 
Freedom of Information Act, but gave access to a similar range of bodies, but in respect of 
a far smaller range of information.1008 The bodies, set out in Clause 2(3) included: 
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“all such Ministers of the Crown, Government departments, local authorities and 
other persons carrying out functions of public administration at a national, 
regional or local level as, for the purposes of or in connection with their functions, 
have responsibilities in relation to the environment” 
It is the limitation in the final sentence which restricts these regulations to 
environment-related information. These were supplemented by the Environmental 
Information Regulations 2004,1009 which gave effect both to the 2000 Act and the 
Århus/Aarhus Convention.1010 The Convention, which came into force in 2001, will be 
discussed later. 
The 2003 White Paper, with its apparent abandonment of nuclear power as a future 
option, was not following the figures produced by the DTI or the SDC and thus, helps to 
illustrate the point that while politicians will sometimes be very keep to use scientific 
language to justify a decision, they are equally prepared to ignore it. However, as was 
revealed in 2005, what many thought the White Paper said and what it actually said were 
not the same thing at all. This will be dealt with in section 5.3. 
It is important to point out that the White Paper is not legally binding in any way and 
is more of a statement of principles that sets out firm decisions prior to the publication of 
a Bill.1011 However, whilst the 2003 White Paper may (or may not) have signalled a level 
of governmental disapproval of the new nuclear option, the Electricity (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 2003, which received Royal Assent on 8 May 2003, certainly supported the 
existing nuclear industry. 
 
5.2.6: Electricity (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003 
In July 1996, British Energy (BE) had been floated on the London Stock Exchange as 
a public company and, at the time, the President of the Board of Trade, Ian Lang MP, had 
assured the House that “British Energy will be responsible for meeting all its liabilities.”1012 
Despite this assurance, BE had always been heavily reliant on government funding in 
order to be competitive: 
“BE approached the Government in early September 2002 seeking immediate 
financial support and discussions about longer term restructuring. Government 
provided BE with a short-term credit facility of up to £650m rescue aid.”1013  
The Electricity (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003 increased the ability of the Crown 
to cover nuclear liabilities incurred by BE, by removing the reference in paragraph 1 of 
Schedule 12 of the Electricity Act 1989 to paragraph 4 of the same schedule. This 
seemingly minor change had quite a large effect. Prior to the 2003 Act, any monies raised 
by loans or grants to BE would have been paid out of the Consolidated Fund. Equally, any 
repayments by BE would have been paid into the Consolidated Fund. After the passage of 
the 2003 Act, the first part of the equation remained unchanged: loans and grants would 
still be made out of the Consolidated Fund. The requirement that “any sums received… by 
the Secretary of State shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund”1014 was removed, 
however, meaning that there appeared to be no requirement for BE to repay any of the 
money. By not having to repay money loaned or granted to it into the Consolidated Fund, 
it meant that British Energy’s financial position could only get stronger. In the FY2002/3, 
British Energy made a £4.2bn loss before tax, whereas the following year after the 
company made a profit of £232m.1015  
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The 2003 Act also removed the limits for nuclear-liability payments, which had been 
set up by earlier statute. Once the cap in respect of BE had been removed, the 
Government was recognised as having ultimate liability for costs relating to nuclear safety. 
The Minister of State for Energy, Brian Wilson MP, agreed, when he introduced the Bill to 
Parliament, that this was the case and justified it, saying: 
“If the company could not afford its liabilities and were to fail, the Government 
therefore would have to step in to ensure that they were dealt with properly.”1016 
The company was restructured (again) in early 20051017 and again in 2009, when a 
controlling stake was purchased by the French-owned EDF Energy.1018 In addition to this 
removal of the requirement to repay Consolidated Fund money, British Energy Group has 
had access to the Nuclear Decommissioning Fund (NDF) which: 
“was set up specifically as a means of funding the decommissioning of BE’s 
nuclear stations once they have ceased generating electricity.”1019 
The NDF has since been replaced by a Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF), which is 
administered by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (below). The effect of this was to 
create an uneven playing field: BE is a privatised company, operating in a sector driven by 
competitive market forces, yet it does not have to take into account the full costs of the 
electricity it produces. Non-nuclear competitors, on the other hand, must compete on the 
open market without any government subsidy. This situation was by no means unique, 
however, as the privatisation and break-up of British Rail and British Coal into a ream of 
smaller companies in the mid-1990s, and their subsequent support, followed much the 
same pattern. What it does do, however is skew the financial position of energy 
generation in favour of nuclear. 
 
5.2.7: Energy Act 20041020 
The Energy Act was primarily intended to give effect to the policies outlined in the 
2003 White Paper, discussed earlier. As it was a wide-ranging White Paper, it is of little 
surprise that the Energy Act is a vast piece of legislation, which runs to 198 sections and 
23 schedules. In fact, the Act incorporated two draft Bills which were presented before 
Parliament in 2003; the Electricity (Trading & Transmission) Bill, which aimed to create a 
single electricity market,1021 and the Nuclear Sites & Radioactive Substances Bill, in which 
the idea of a Nuclear Decommissioning Agency had originally been floated.1022 
The Act created two new statutory bodies: the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
(NDA) which, inter alia, administers the Nuclear Liability fund discussed above; and the 
Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA), the prime function of which was to oversee a new 
subsidiary body, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC).1023  
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
The business of decommissioning the UK’s ageing nuclear reactors is a long-term and 
potentially highly lucrative one; “expected to be worth at least £50 billion in this 
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century”1024 and the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency (NDA) was set up by Section 4 of 
the Energy Act 2004 as a non-departmental public body (on much the same basis as the 
UKAEA had originally been set up in the 1950s).1025 The purpose of the NDA was to 
oversee the long-term decommissioning of the UK’s ageing nuclear-power stations, and 
the associated waste disposal issues which this entails. The NDA was created in July 
20041026 but, for practical purposes, was not set up until April 2005.1027 The NDA took 
over the responsibility for decommissioning nuclear sites from BNFL and the UKAEA and 
will work with both of these organisations to achieve its aims. This means that another 
level of organisation has been added to the already complex structure dealing with the 
UK’s nuclear legacy. 
Within a year of being set up, the £50 billion figure had been revised upwards by the 
NDA, which announced in March 2006 that it wanted to “put out to tender £72bn worth of 
clean-up and decommissioning contracts over the next 75 years.”1028 The companies 
tendering for the contracts are all expected to come from the private sector, which 
provides a nice synchronicity, as it was private companies that benefitted from the 
creation of the stations in the first place. To put this enormous figure into some sort of 
perspective, the 1955 White Paper A Programme of Nuclear Power1029 estimated that 
would cost around £300m to provide 1500-2000MW of nuclear-generating capacity, a 
figure which equates to approaching £6bn at 2009 prices.1030 This means that the costs 
associated with decommissioning the UK’s nuclear power stations are going to amount to 
more than fourteen times the costs of constructing them. Ironically, as has been shown in 
previous chapters, the 1955 White Paper made no mention of decommissioning costs 
whatsoever, and there is no suggestion that even the scientists advising the government 
had reason to suspect that such costs might one day become contentious. 
The Civil Nuclear Police Authority and Civil Nuclear Constabulary 
The idea of creating a “standalone force independent of the nuclear industry” to police 
nuclear-power stations had been raised in July 2002 in the DTI’s Report ‘Managing the 
Nuclear Legacy: A strategy for action’.1031 The Report outlined the creation of such a force 
as being the logical next step in a process which had started with the transfer of the Office 
for Civil Nuclear Security from the UKAEA to the DTI in 2000.1032 Following a period of 
consultation, the idea was eventually carried forward into the Energy Bill and then the 
Energy Act 2004. 
The parts of the 2004 Act which dealt with the CNC, came into force on 1 March 
20051033 and the CNC itself started operating on 1 April 2005. As with the “traditional” 
Police Authorities (of which there are 43 in England and Wales, as well as the British 
Transport Police Authority and Northern Ireland Policing Board1034), the CNPA is 
represented by the lobbying group, the Association of Police Authorities. However, this is 
where the similarities end. Normal Police Authorities represent the Constabulary for a 
particular region – the Northamptonshire Police Authority, for example, is responsible for 
the Northamptonshire Constabulary. The Police Authority also decides the budget, 
appoints the Chief Constable and generally “sets the strategic direction for the force.”1035 
However, the CNC, despite being a subsidiary body to the CNPA, is under the “strategic 
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direction of the Department of Trade and Industry.”1036 This is despite the view being 
aired quite strongly in the House of Lords debate on the Bill that: 
“it would be more appropriate for the Secretary of State concerned to be the 
Home Secretary who is accountable to Parliament for the vast majority of police 
forces in the UK.”1037 
The effect that this has is to place the CNC under the guidance of non-elected (and 
therefore, the Civil Service would argue, above politics)1038 civil servants and, ultimately, 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, whereas other police forces are guided by 
an independent, local and accountable body, comprising local councillors, magistrates and 
independent members1039 and under the ultimate authority of the Home Secretary. 
Another important difference about the CNC, which reiterates the seriousness with which 
security is being taken in the post-9/11 environment, is that it does not recruit officers 
directly from the public. All CNC Officers are recruited from among the Authorised 
Firearms Officers of the Police Force,1040 which makes the entire force an elite one. The 
CNC, which operates across seventeen fixed sites in the UK, has a remit to: 
“defend and protect those sites to which it is deployed, with a view to denying 
unauthorised access to nuclear material and, if necessary, recover control of any 
nuclear material which may have been lost to any unauthorised persons.”1041 
It is also independent of the UKAEA, which helps to ensure that the potential for a 
conflict of interests cannot arise. The remit of the UKAEA Constabulary, on the other hand, 
was narrower, both in terms of what it was required to do and the number of sites on 
which it had to do it. The 2004/5 Annual Report, which was the final report before the 
metamorphosis into the CNC, listed eight sites where it operated. Their role was set out as 
being to: 
“deliver an effective and efficient Police Service complying with National Security 
requirements for the protection of special nuclear materials on designated UK 
nuclear licensed sites and in transit, and to provide a secure and safe 
environment in which the nuclear industry can carry out its business.”1042 
The 2004 Act, therefore, created two new bodies which had responsibility for different 
aspects of a nuclear industry which at the time was widely believed to be in decline, yet 
which was at the same time under a higher level of threat from terrorism than at any time 
in the past. Both of these bodies were more about managing the existing structure and 
were tailored to fit what had already been created. The rationale for both was similar, and 
unavoidable; a reactive pragmatic way of updating the infrastructure to take into account 
new threats and opportunities. In the case of the CNC, it was to create a new body to 
replace the UKAEA Constabulary, which had operated with a far narrower remit; and in 
the case of the NDA it was to create a new market, and then create a new organisation to 
take advantage of it.1043 
Having considered the key relevant moments between 1995 and 2005, we must now 
turn to consider the announcement which lies at the core of this whole chapter. 
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5.3: The CBI Speech, November 2005 
In May 2005, an ICM Poll carried out for the BBC Newsnight programme showed that 
only 21 per cent of respondents believed that nuclear-power stations were the “most 
feasible way of meeting the UK’s energy needs while reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions.”1044 The poll also showed that 52 per cent of respondents did not think it was 
right “for the government to consider nuclear power as an energy source for the 
future,”1045 compared to 39 per cent who thought it was.1046  
A MORI poll for the Nuclear Industry Association1047 in early November 2005 showed 
that 33 per cent of the public had a “very/mainly favourable” opinion of the nuclear 
energy industry, whereas only 27 per cent had a “very/mainly unfavourable” opinion. This 
was the largest margin in that poll for “favourable” for at least seven years.1048 Equally, 
59 per cent believed that nuclear energy would be a major contributor to energy supplies 
in the future – despite the fact that only a small percentage of Britain’s current energy 
demand is currently met through nuclear power and this figure is going to fall as the 
decommissioning process continues.1049 A second MORI poll later in the same month, 
carried out for the University of East Anglia’s Centre for Environmental Risk1050 revealed 
that “62 per cent said it doesn’t matter what the public think of nuclear power as nuclear 
power stations will be built anyway.”1051 It is interesting to note that it is not just the UK 
where public opinion regarding nuclear power is rather fickle (or possibly pragmatic): 
“In Finland and Sweden and Switzerland, as soon as electricity prices started 
rising like a rocket, people started supporting nuclear power because it is by far 
the cheapest. The same will happen here before long.”1052 
However, when using date from IPSOS MORI and other polling organisations, McNeill 
and Chapman’s criticisms of surveys must be borne in mind. They argue that conclusions 
from surveys should not be embraced too enthusiastically, as: 
“the survey method finds out what people will say when they are being 
interviewed or filling out a questionnaire. This may not be the same thing as what 
they actually think or do”1053  
Against a background of a nuclear-power programme which had not seen a new 
power station commissioned for nearly twenty years, a White Paper which called nuclear 
power “an unattractive option” 1054 and a general public which was 52 per cent opposed to 
the building of new nuclear-power stations, (but 62 per cent resigned to the fact they 
would be built anyway), the Prime Minister gave the CBI speech in which he announced a 
new review of how well the 2003 White Paper goals had been achieved and said that the 
review would: 
“include specifically the issue of whether we facilitate the development of a new 
generation of nuclear power stations.”1055 
Despite the fact that the speech did not say categorically that nuclear-power stations 
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would be built (any more than the 2003 White Paper had said that they would not), there 
was a delay when two Greenpeace protestors climbed into the roof of the conference 
centre to protest at nuclear even being considered as a future option.1056 Since the MORI 
poll (above) suggested that most people did not think it right for government to consider 
new nuclear power, the announcement cannot be regarded as a populist move and it does 
not even seem to fit with the government’s own rhetoric of just eighteen months earlier. 
Instead, it was more of a reaction to perceived changes in the stability of global energy 
supplies and prices.1057 From February 2003, when the earlier White Paper was published, 
to the time of the CBI speech, crude oil prices had risen by almost two thirds from around 
$30 a barrel to around $50 a barrel1058 so the underlying economic premise was no longer 
accurate. 
In the United States, a few weeks after the Prime Minister’s announcement, President 
George W Bush introduced the idea, if not the phrase, of nuclear new build in his State of 
the Union address of January 2006, saying that “America is addicted to oil, which is often 
imported from unstable parts of the world”,1059 and that the new Advanced Energy 
Initiative would be looking at new nuclear as one way “to replace more than 75 percent 
of… oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.”1060 In other words, support for nuclear may 
be seen as a way of supporting a reduced reliance on oil from the Middle East. The 
background to this announcement was a public which appeared to be much more strongly 
in favour of new nuclear power, with 62 per cent of respondents in a series of polls by 
Washington-based Bisconti Research1061 agreeing with the idea of “definitely building more 
nuclear power plants” and only 32 per cent disagreeing.1062 In December 2007, the figures 
for favouring the use of nuclear power as part of the energy mix in the United States were 
64 per cent, with 30 per cent opposing the idea.1063 
The CBI speech, therefore, marks the tentative beginnings of the revival of nuclear 
power in the UK and, perhaps, the first inkling that the previous two decades of decline 
were coming to an end. The 2003 White Paper had promised that no new nuclear build 
would take place without “the fullest public consultation”1064 and this duly took place in 
the early part of 2006. 
 
5.3.1: The First Consultation and the Results 
The current policy of reviving nuclear power was brought in after the government 
decided that the nuclear option was the only sensible way to reduce the UK’s carbon 
emissions in line with the Kyoto Protocol targets. Unlike the original post-war policy, this 
change was supposed to have been carried out “[a]fter a period of public consultation and 
analysis”1065 had led to the conclusion that: 
                                        
1056 BBC, 2005, Nuclear protest hits Blair Speech, London: BBC News. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4478946.stm, accessed on 30/07/09. 
1057 Blair, T., 2005, op cit, n1 
1058 WTRG, 2009, op cit, n682 
1059 Bush, G. W., 2006, State of the Union 2006 Speech given by President George W Bush at the United States 
Capitol, Washington DC, 31 January 2006. Transcript available from the White House at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/, accessed on 14/02/06. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Bisconti’s client list includes several companies active in the nuclear energy arena, including the Institute of 
Nuclear Power Operations, Institute of Nuclear Safety System (Japan), International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Japan Atomic Power Company, Nuclear Energy Institute, and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Source: BRI, 
2010, Clients, Washington, DC: Bisconti Research Inc.  
1062 In 1998, 45 per cent were in favour, and 50 per cent opposed, and there has been a gradual rise in support 
over the last decade. Source: BRI, 2007, Perspective on Public Option: December 2007 – Nuclear Energy as a 
Global Climate Change Solution, Washington, DC: Bisconti Research Inc.  
1063 This series of polls goes back to 1983, when support for nuclear was at around 50 per cent. After a minor 
dip in support from a peak of 67 per cent in 2005 to 62 per cent in April 2007, the figure has started to rise 
again. Source: Ibid. 
1064 DTI, 2003, op cit, n822, p61 at para 4.68 
1065 DTI, 2006, op cit, n822, p161. 
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“nuclear has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside other low 
carbon generating options. Evidence gathered during the Energy Review 
consultation supports this view.”1066 
The consultation process began on 20 January 2006 and ended twelve weeks later on 
14 April. That the process was subsequently regarded as flawed (and certainly not the 
“fullest” consultation possible) is clear, and will be explored in more depth in section 5.4 
below but, whilst it would be relatively easy to dismiss the government’s talk of 
consultation as mere window-dressing, it is fair to say that, during the three-month 
consultation period, over 1,000 individuals and over 400 organisations responded to the 
invitation of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).1067 The responses were all 
published on the website; however, the extent to which the Energy Review gave any 
weight to these suggestions (or equally the extent to which any of the suggestions were 
balanced or useful) is debatable. What it does show, however is that the government was, 
at least, going through the motions of consultation, as a way of laying the groundwork for 
the announcement of policy that would follow. The advantage this has is that it allows the 
policy to be ostensibly based on a unified view from consultees (who were drawn from the 
wider public, industry and science), when in fact it was a pragmatic response to the 
growing problems of climate change and energy security. In other words, the consultation 
is being portrayed as underpinning the decisions, but is actually being used as the 
justification for a decision making process that had already been concluded. 
There have been some arguments supporting1068 and criticising1069 the use of online 
consultations in general, but criticism of this particular example will be discussed below. 
Once the consultation had been finished, the results were collated and assessed and the 
resulting publication (“of a White Paper setting out the Government’s proposals”1070) 
emerged. 
 
5.3.2: 2006 Report: Energy Review: The Energy Challenge 
The announcement made by the Prime Minister in 2005 that energy policy was “back 
with a vengeance”1071 had a dual explanation behind it. On the one hand, the idea of 
“energy security” was mooted as a rationale – keeping supply out of the hands of 
overseas governments. On the other, carbon emissions, and the will o’ the wisp that is 
“climate change,”1072 are being used as the driving force, as they are in the United States. 
Neither of these roles has avoided criticism. The Chairman of the Sustainable 
Development Commission, for example, claimed in 2006 that: 
“a new nuclear-power programme would make no difference at all to achieving 
our 20 per cent carbon dioxide reduction target for 2010 and will make only a 
limited impact by 2020.”1073 
Equally, in April 2006, the Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS), set 
                                        
1066 Ibid. 
1067 DTI, 2006, op cit, n822, p214. This information was verified by the DTI Consultations Submissions website 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/review/consultation-submissions/page27883.html) which listed all the 
suggestions and responses made to the Energy Review consultation. In July 2007 the DTI became the 
Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR), and it was DBERR which completed the 
consultation. 
1068 See, for example, McCullagh, K., 2003, E-democracy: potential for political revolution? I.J.L. & I.T. 2003, 
11(2), 149-161 in which the author argues that online engagement with political decision making “has the 
potential to reinvigorate the democratic process and re-engage citizens positively in political life.” 
1069 See, for example, Saxby, S., 2006, A critical analysis of the synergy between eGovernment and related 
policies in the United Kingdom, C.T.L.R. 2006, 12(6), 179-215 
1070 DTI, 2003, op cit, n822, p61 at para 4.68 
1071 Blair, T., 2005, op cit, n1 
1072 The issue of the anthropogenic or otherwise nature of climate change is far too large to be tackled seriously 
here. For more information, see: Scott, K., Tilting at offshore windmills: Regulating wind farm development 
within the renewable energy zone (2006) 18 JEL (89); Brunnée, J., The United States and International 
Environmental Law: Living with an Elephant, EJIL 2004 15 (617). 
1073 Porritt, J., 2006, Is Nuclear the answer? London: Sustainable Development Commission, p5. 
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up by the Department of Trade and Industry1074 and OFGEM, predicted that, by 2020, the 
total UK energy demand would be roughly the same as it was for 2005, although the 
contribution from nuclear “is expected to drop from its peak of 90 TWh in 1998 to 34 TWh 
in 2015 and 26 TWh in 2020.”1075 Bearing in mind the timescales involved in heavy 
construction of this type, it is highly unlikely that any nuclear build approved under the 
new plans could contribute greatly to that gap. This means that there will have to be an 
increase in energy from other sources. JESS further reports that there are many new 
projects being planned, but these will also take time to develop fully. RWE npower, for 
example, was granted permission to construct a 1,630 MW CCGT station at the site of the 
Staythorpe Power Station in Nottinghamshire in November 2000 but construction did not 
start until April 2009, after various disputes.1076 In total, if all of the “planned major new 
electricity projects” are approved and constructed, they will contribute slightly less than 
25,000 MW,1077 which is larger than the shortfall that will have been created by planned 
closures of existing nuclear plants. It is almost inevitable that some of these proposed 
developments will be rejected at the planning proposal stage, however, and thus the final 
total will be some way short of 25,000 MW. For all large proposed developments an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) must also be carried out under the terms of the 
Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) 
Regulations 1999. As far as electricity generation is concerned, only an EIA is mandatory 
for nuclear-power stations and “thermal power stations and other combustion installations 
with a heat output of 300MW or more.”1078 For smaller plants, Schedule II of the 
Regulations apply, meaning that an EIA will only be required if the development is in a 
sensitive area or likely to give rise to significant effects on the environment. 
On 16 May 2006, before the publication of the Energy Review, but after the comments 
by the SDC and JESS, the Prime Minister again chose to deliver a speech to the 
Confederation of British Industries, this time at its annual dinner. In the speech, he 
announced that carbon dioxide targets and reliance on foreign sources of gas: 
“put the replacement of nuclear power stations, a big push on renewables and a 
step-change on energy efficiency, engaging both business and consumers, back 
on the agenda with a vengeance.” 
The pre-emption of the Energy Review by the Prime Minister was criticised at the time 
and has since been criticised even more vociferously, especially in the 2007 Greenpeace 
case. Whilst it may have represented an unfortunate example of poor timing, there are 
two elements which perhaps make the situation less problematic than it might appear. 
Firstly, the Prime Minister was basing his comments on the draft Energy Review, which 
had already been circulated through Whitehall and, secondly, the speech did not say that 
new nuclear-power stations were going to be built; it simply put the discussion back on 
the agenda. 
The Energy Review was eventually published in July 2006.1079 The preface by the 
Prime Minister no longer concentrated solely on the threat of climate change, as his pre-
publication comments all appeared to have done, but added that: 
“without action to ensure reliable supplies and replace power plants, there will be 
                                        
1074 In October 2008, Just over a year after the creation of DBERR, it’s Energy section was moved to the new 
Department for Energy and Climate Change, and the rest of DBERR’s work stayed in a new Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. 
1075 JESS, 2006, Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group: Sixth Report, London: Department of Trade 
and Industry and OFGEM, p35. 1 TWh is equivalent to 1,000 GWh, or 1,000,000 MWh.  
1076 Pitcher, G., 2009, Protest at Staythorpe Power Station over foreign subcontractors, Construction News, 19 
January 2009. 
1077 JESS, 2006, op cit, n1099. There are nine CCGT plants being processed which will have a total output of 
11,990 MW, several CHP (Combined Heat and Power) plants totalling 1,211 MW, two ICGCC (Integrated Coal 
Gasification Combined Cycle) plants totalling 910 MW, and 79 plants classified as “renewables, and energy from 
waste” which will total 10,680 MW. The total for these is 24,791 MW. 
1078 Schedule 1, Para 2(a), Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and 
Wales) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/293). 
1079 DTI, 2006b, op cit, n907 
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a dramatic shortfall in our energy capacity and risks to our energy security.”1080 
Table 5.1: 2006 Government Nuclear Proposals.1081 
Proposals 
1 Nuclear has a role to play alongside other low carbon generation options. 
2 New stations will be financed by the private sector, taking into account decommissioning and 
long-term waste management plans. 
3 HMG will help identify potential sites, but it is up to the developer to discuss access etc. 
4 The HSE and EA have both been asked [i.e., told] to introduce systems of pre-licensing 
authorisation. 
5 HMG will publish a further White Paper later in 2006/7 outlining possible changes to planning 
inquiries  
6 An alternative to a public inquiry is desired, to focus on the “relationship between the 
proposal, the local plans and local environmental impacts” 
7 A new high-powered inspector is proposed to ensure “planning inquiries are run to clearly 
defined timescales” 
8 Arrangements for meeting decommissioning and long-term waste storage costs will be made 
with industry 
9 A new post will be created for a senior manager to “lead the development of arrangements for 
the costs of new-build decommissioning and waste management”, supported by the DTI. 
 
The review ran to over 200 pages and devoted only thirteen to a discussion about 
nuclear power (paragraphs 5.93-5.143). The section finished with a list of nine proposals 
which the Government were putting forward. The key points of these initial proposals are 
reproduced as Table 5.1 but, in short, every one of the proposals was geared towards 
making the process of approving new nuclear plant faster and more straightforward (and 
thus cheaper). This in itself was a pragmatic move, since the costs of any new build would 
be shared between the private and public purses, and the spectre of a repeat of the Parker 
Inquiry into Sizewell B would not have looked attractive to any of the participants. 
 
5.3.3: Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 20061082 
In the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s speeches saying that energy policy, and 
specifically nuclear power, were back on the agenda in order to tackle climate change and 
make energy use more sustainable, one might have assumed that the Climate Change and 
Sustainable Energy Act 2006 would contain a reference to nuclear power, and shown the 
signs of a coherent energy policy. The Act instead: 
“is in many ways typical of the hybrid measures taken to link energy and 
environmental issues.”1083 
What it does is group together a number of provisions which can all be linked to either 
climate change or sustainable energy, or both, but which do not represent a 
comprehensive framework for dealing with either. In the DTI’s Final Regulatory Impact 
Assessment of the Act, which was also published in 2006, they outline the main objective 
as being: 
                                        
1080 Foreword by the Rt Hon. Tony Blair MP. 
1081 DTI, 2006b, op cit, n907, pp124-5. 
1082 For in-depth assessment of this Act see: Dow, S., Legislative Comment: Climate Change and Sustainable 
Energy Act 2006, Env L Rev 2007, 9(4), 279-284 
1083 Dow, S., op cit, n1106, p279 
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“to enhance the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change. It is also aimed at 
alleviating fuel poverty, promoting microgeneration and the use of heat produced 
from renewable sources.”1084 
These are all undoubtedly laudable aims, but Dow goes on to argue that: 
“Until very recently, the government’s approach to energy policy was somewhat 
limited.”1085 
This is a slightly unfair accusation, since Dow does not go on to quantify why he felt it 
was limited, but it echoes criticisms made of the Thatcher government which, it was 
claimed, had “no coherent energy policy.”1086 As we have seen throughout this work, 
rather than being labelled as ‘somewhat limited’ the approach of the government (and, 
indeed, all governments), should be regarded as a series of reactive pragmatic decisions 
based on external events. A comprehensive energy strategy might, for example, have 
foreseen the near-vertical price rises for crude oil following the Yom Kippur War and the 
Iranian Revolution in the 1970s, but it could not have foreseen the events themselves. 
Even if Dow and Orme’s desires for a coherent, not limited approach to energy policy had 
been met, therefore, external events would still have derailed them. 
Where the 2006 Act does differ, is that it marks a continuation of a relatively new 
approach to energy legislation, in that it takes a very long-term view. The Parliamentary 
debates show that the earlier statute discussed here did not consider for a moment the 
impact that its provisions would have in forty or fifty years. Neither was there a great deal 
of concern expressed about the finite nature of oil supplies – indeed, in 1961, when 
Shadow Cabinet member, Ray Gunter MP, suggested that: 
“It is sometimes thought, perhaps, that those who mention the nonrenewability of 
our carbon deposits are, somehow, melodramatic and a bit feverish; but, 
nevertheless, we must bear in mind, in 1961, the fact that the carbon resources 
of the world are finite.”1087 
The Minister of Power, Richard Wood MP replied that: 
“In fact, the proportion of proved reserves of oil, leaving aside coal for the 
moment, to world consumption over the last few years has continually been 
rising, although world consumption, as is evident to us all, has been rising very 
rapidly itself and behind these proved reserves lie vast quantities of oil still to be 
discovered.”1088 
If the 2006 Act is a good example of long-term planning and thinking, the 2006 
Energy Review turned out not to be when Greenpeace challenged the legality of the 
consultation process, shortly after the results were published. 
 
5.4: The 2007 Greenpeace Case 
Some of the main environmental groups which arose in the twentieth century started 
off as single-cause groups and evolved into multi-cause international organisations, 
although most of those causes can be put under the wider “environmental” umbrella.1089 
The best example of this type of group is Greenpeace, which started out in 1971 as the 
“Don’t Make a Wave Committee”, protesting about US nuclear-weapons testing in 
                                        
1084 DTI, 2006c, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006: Final Regulatory Impact Assessment, Report 
No URN 06/1464, London: Department of Trade and Industry, p4 at para 4 
1085 Dow, S., op cit, p279, n1106 
1086 Orme, S., 1986, op cit, n782. 
1087 Gunter, R., 1961, Fuel and Power, HC Deb 20 February 1961 vol 635 c36 
1088 Wood, R., 1961, Fuel and Power, HC Deb 20 February 1961 vol 635, c50 
1089 Friends of the Earth, for example campaigns on “economic justice; resisting neoliberalism; forests and 
biodiversity; food sovereignty; and climate justice and energy.” At a stretch, most of these can be classed as 
loosely “environmental” causes. Source FOEI, nd, What we do, Friends of the Earth International. Available at 
http://www.foei.org/en/what-we-do, accessed on 15/01/10. 
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Amchitka, off the Alaskan coast.1090 The group has expanded hugely since then and now 
has an official standpoint on many environmental and social issues. In cases like this, the 
focus will be on the nuclear-power-related work carried out by an organisation, rather 
than any of its other work. This is important to bear in mind as many pressure groups 
were formed for a specific one-off purpose, more often than not of local importance, and 
remain at that scale. This means that their funding, influence and longevity were (and 
are) lower than those for an international group such as Greenpeace, with a total gross 
income in 2004 of €158.5m, and membership of close to 3 million.1091 The campaign 
against the Newbury Bypass, for example, lasted for only two years, despite at one time 
holding the largest ever anti-road demonstration in Britain.1092 That campaign did not 
involve groups on the scale of Greenpeace, however. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1994 Greenpeace Case, the courts 
recognised this importance, granting Greenpeace and, by extension, other large multi-
issue pressure groups the locus standi (or right to appear) to give evidence in cases from 
which they would traditionally have been barred. The implications of this decision are far-
reaching, and the decision that nationwide environmental pressure groups could bring 
judicial review actions meant that the untouchable nature of decision-making in relation to 
nuclear power had been, at least theoretically, reversed.  
Nuclear energy is not the sole concern of Greenpeace, naturally, nor is it for many of 
the other pressure groups, and this needs to be borne in mind when addressing their 
particular standpoints on the topic, as small, single-issue groups are often less willing, or 
less able, to take a broad view of the topic area than large, multi-issue groups. As 
unfortunate as it may be, despite the measures put in place by case law, financial 
constraints mean that small protest groups rarely have a significant impact on large single 
companies, let alone entire industries. As the Public Law Project points out: 
“The cost of bringing a judicial review claim is considerable: in the region of 
£10,000 to £20,000 for a straightforward case, higher for a more complex 
matter. If the claimant is unsuccessful, they are likely to be liable for the 
defendant’s costs as well as their own. They are therefore looking at a legal bill of 
upwards of £30,000 if they lose.”1093 
Against this background of an anti-nuclear power organisation having the right to 
appear and challenge government decisions, and considering the reaction of Greenpeace 
to the vaguest hint in November 2005 that the nuclear option might be reconsidered, it 
was unsurprising when, shortly after the publication of the Energy Review, Greenpeace 
launched a legal challenge to the 12-week consultation process. The basis of the challenge 
was that under the terms of the Aarhus Convention,1094 environmental consultation was 
no longer “a privilege to be granted or withheld at will by the executive”1095 and, since 
consultation was, therefore, necessary, it followed that the promise by the government to 
carry out the “fullest” public consultation ought to have been just that, rather than a 
shortened process the results of which appeared to have been pre-empted (and, in the 
argument of Greenpeace, influenced) by the Prime Minister. In any event: 
“Consultation serves a potentially very useful function for those seeking to avoid 
public law challenges - it flushes out the objections and problems at a stage when 
(in most cases) it is possible to take these into account and address them. It is 
far better to know what the best objections are, and what might have been left 
                                        
1090 Greenpeace, 2007, The History of Greenpeace, Amsterdam: Greenpeace International BV. 
1091 Greenpeace, 2005, Annual Report 2005, Amsterdam: Greenpeace International BV. 
1092 FOE, 1997, Anniversary of Newbury Protest, Friends of the Earth Press Release, 8 January 1997, London: 
Friends of the Earth.  
1093 PLP, 2007, Information Leaflets for Practitioners 2, Public Law Project 
1094 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters 1998 
1095 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parté Greenpeace [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin), at para 48 
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out of account, miscalculated or misunderstood, before the decision is made.”1096 
Instead, the government argued that the consultation was adequate, if one were to 
keep in mind the fact that the twelve-week period was the minimum set out by the 
Cabinet Office,1097 and also that the 2006 consultation had been:  
“carried out against the background of the substantial amount of information 
which had been gathered in preparing the 2003 White Paper.”1098 
This was the overt stance taken by the government in preparation of the Energy 
Review; a stance which the High Court decided, in its judgement of February 2007, did 
not reflect the reality of the review. The presiding judge, Sullivan J, based his discussions 
on what did and did not constitute a valid consultation exercise on the decision of the 
Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, in the 2001 Coughlan case.1099 Lord Woolf’s stated that: 
“A lawful consultation must (a) take place at a time when proposals are still at a 
formative stage, (b) give reasons for any proposal so as to permit intelligent 
consideration and response, (c) give adequate time for consideration and 
response and (d) give the product of the consultation conscientious 
consideration.”1100 
Using this as the basis for his decision, Sullivan J described the consultation process 
as “seriously flawed” 1101 “procedurally unfair… [and] unlawful.”1102 He also said that: 
“As an issues paper it was perfectly adequate. As the consultation paper on an 
issue of such importance and complexity it was manifestly inadequate. It 
contained no proposals as such, and even if it had, the information given to 
consultees was wholly insufficient to enable them to make “an intelligent 
response.”1103 
Interestingly, in an interview with the BBC shortly after the Energy Review was so 
heavily criticised by the High Court, the Prime Minister said “this won’t affect the policy at 
all”1104 perhaps suggesting that the new review would not be as open as it had been 
promised to be either, and raising the question of whether the purpose of consultation is 
to be seen to have consulted, or genuinely to seek consultation. 
 
5.4.1: Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy 2007 
The DTI published a new White Paper in May 20071105 which, although never explicitly 
mentioning the court case which had criticised the handling of the preliminary 
consultation, did make reference to a second consultation. The Paper stated that: 
“Alongside this White Paper, we are publishing a consultation document on 
nuclear power so that we can take a decision before the end of the year on 
whether it is in the public interest for companies to have this option available 
when making their investment decisions.”1106 
That document ‘The Future of Nuclear Power, The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low 
                                        
1096 Philpot, H., Judicial review: some practical guidance for local planning authorities, J.P.L. 2008, 11, 1551-
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1097 Morrow, K., op cit, n1016, p66. 
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Carbon UK Economy’ and ‘http://nuclearpower2007.direct.gov’ the website which 
accompanied it, were duly launched on 23 May 2007. Both parts of the process were 
prefaced by the promise that: 
“We want to hear from members of the public, industry, non-Governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or any other organisation or public body.  
We are seeking views on whether the Government has considered the relevant 
arguments; whether we have considered the arguments reasonably and whether 
there are other important arguments we have overlooked. 
Your views will contribute to the shaping of the policy on the future of civil 
nuclear power in the UK. They will help Government assess the arguments before 
it reaches its final decision on the future of new nuclear build. 
We will consider carefully the responses we get and this will enable us to take a 
decision on nuclear power later in the year.”1107 
The consultation period finished on 10 October 2007 (after five months this time, 
rather than twelve weeks) and an analysis of the consultation responses was published in 
January 2008.1108 The findings (by consultancy firm Dialogue by Design Ltd) show that: 
“2,728 organisations and individuals responded to some or all of the 18 questions 
in the main consultation. A majority of this self-selected group is in favour of 
allowing energy companies to invest in new nuclear power stations.”1109 
Although these numbers clearly represent a small proportion of the UK general public 
and, indeed, are less even than the 5 percent “usual suspects” category outlined by 
Bosworth and Donovan (see Figure 5.1), they are still larger than a similar, but two-stage 
consultation in 2002, which was also run by Dialogue by Design Ltd, and which had just 
over 150 respondents, although: 
“a total of 178 people went into the website to view the results and 78 people 
responded to the Session 2 questions.”1110 
Figure 5.1: Public Participation Pyramid1111 
 
Calls for improved consultation and access to information were part of the rationale 
behind the consultation and are based, in no small part, on the principles established by 
                                        
1107 DTI, 2007b, The Future of Nuclear Power: The role of nuclear power in a low carbon UK economy, London: 
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the Århus/Aarhus Convention1112, which was mentioned briefly earlier in the chapter. The 
Convention’s overall objective is: 
“In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present 
and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, 
public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”1113 
As mentioned above, the access to information provisions of the Århus Convention, 
and the regulations which implemented it in the UK,1114 overlap slightly with the Freedom 
of information Act 2000, but the right of “public-participation in decision making” is not 
found elsewhere in statute. These rights, though fundamental, are not absolute,1115 and 
the commercial interests of the EU have been used as a reason for not granting access to 
such information.1116  
However, whether it is through Freedom of Information type legislation, or by relying 
on Convention rights, or via the Internet, or at the gift of the authorities, the public has 
access to information at a level unprecedented in history. Coupled with this high level of 
accessibility, there is, at least at a surface level, far greater potential to have an impact on 
legislation and policy through some form of public participation.1117 In theory, this 
combination should result in high levels of public participation, however, according to 
Bosworth and Donovan, writing about participation in the field of urban planning, more 
than half of the population who are eligible for involvement: 
“were disinclined to become involved. Only fewer than fifteen per cent were 
prepared to take part and these include some five per cent who could be 
considered militant participants or the type who are always inclined to get 
involved in any issue.”1118 
Bosworth and Donovan’s argument essentially appears to be that public consultation 
is a blind alley, since the “silent majority” of the public never respond, whilst the “vocal 
minority” respond to everything. Figure 5.1 illustrates Bosworth and Donovan’s breakdown 
of the public by how they participate, and it is argued that even though the “2,728 
organisations and individuals” that Dialogue by Design claim responded to the 2007 
nuclear consultation is a respectable figure, they nevertheless represent the top end of 
“the usual suspects” category. Ian Ratcliff, the Solicitor for the New South Wales 
Environmental Defenders Office argues, echoing Teichmann and Jasanoff, that some 
“decisions are technical matters that do not gain from substantial community 
involvement.”1119 
If any element of the extended process of reintroducing discussions about nuclear 
power to the energy mix can be argued to be pragmatic, it is this second consultation 
process, which was reactively pragmatic. That the government did not want to carry it out 
is clear – they went to the High Court to deny there was anything wrong with the first 
                                        
1112 1998 UN/ECE Århus / Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 
1113 Article 1, Århus / Aarhus Convention. 
1114 The Environmental Information Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3240), as amended. 
1115 See, Lee, M., & Abbot, C., 2003, The usual suspects? Public participation under the Aarhus Convention. 
Modern Law Review, 66 (1). pp. 80-108 
1116 Case T-264/04. WWF European Policy Programme v European Union Council [2007] All ER (D) 235 
1117 This could be indirectly through membership of an NGO, or directly through a citizens’ jury, consensus 
conference, interactive panel, opinion poll or as a member of a research panel. Source: Grimston, M., 2002, 
Nuclear Energy: Public Perceptions and Decision-making, World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium 2002, 
London: World Nuclear Association. 
1118 Bosworth, M., Donovan, J., 2002, op cit, n1135, p383.  This point is echoed by Bell and Etherington, who 
state that less than 2 per cent of respondents to government consultations on waste were categorised as 
“general public.” Source: Bell , S., & Etherington, L., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: A Study of the Transposition 
and Implementation of the Groundwater Directive in the United Kingdom, Env L Rev, 2007 (9), 6-24 
1119 Ratcliffe, I., Wood, J., & Higginson, S., Technocratic Decision-Making and the Loss of Community 
Participation Rights, Sydney, NSW: EDO. 
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consultation – but when pressed to do so it introduced extra points which had not been in 
the original consultation. The not-very-surprising outcome of the consultation was 
revealed in the January 2008 publication of yet another Energy White Paper.1120 
 
5.4.2: Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear 
Power 2008 
This White Paper was produced in the light of the second consultation and despite the 
lengthier and more comprehensive consultation period (which, to date, no group has 
formally challenged), many environmental groups felt that their views had not been given 
sufficient weight. Friends of the Earth, for example, issued a press release saying: 
“Building new nuclear plants would be a costly, dangerous and ineffective way to 
cut UK carbon emissions. It would also divert valuable resources from sustainable 
solutions for tackling climate change. This White Paper should have set out 
ambitious policies on energy efficiency, renewable power, carbon capture and 
cleaner systems of transport. Unfortunately Ministers have been taken in by the 
nuclear lobby yet again.”1121 
Greenpeace, which triggered the second consultation, agrees that the nuclear lobby 
has exerted its influence on the decision and argues that “investment in nuclear energy 
and its infrastructure is a dangerous and expensive distraction”1122 from the wider issues 
around climate change. We have seen arguments earlier that NGO scientists are more 
likely to be trusted than government or industry scientists, but the Eurobarometer survey 
“Attitudes towards radioactive waste” carried out in all EU member states in the Spring of 
20081123 (i.e. in the months after the 2008 White Paper) suggested that those totally or 
fairly in favour of “energy production by nuclear power stations” had risen to 44 per cent, 
up from 37 per cent in 2005,1124 suggesting perhaps that government scientists are not as 
distrusted as previously thought. 
Whilst gaining criticism from some in the environmental lobby was no surprise, given 
the reaction to the Prime Minister’s November 2005 speech discussed earlier, it was 
equally no shock when the White Paper echoed the standpoint adopted by the 
Government after the earlier consultation that: 
“it is in the public interest that new nuclear power stations should have a role to 
play in this country’s future energy mix alongside other low-carbon energy 
sources; that it would be in the public interest to allow energy companies the 
option of investing in new nuclear power stations; and that the Government 
should take active steps to open up the way to the construction of new nuclear 
power stations.”1125 
What the White Paper effectively manages to do is steer a middle ground in relation to 
nuclear power. It does not say that nuclear will be the primary source of future UK 
electricity, and neither does it say that nuclear should be avoided at all costs. What it says 
is that nuclear will have a role to play in the energy mix for the future, and this is 
something which was echoed by the independent UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) in 
their 2009 report, which says that alongside developments in Carbon Capture and Storage 
technology: 
“Accelerated development of nuclear power allows for a more sustained nuclear 
                                        
1120 See also Morrow, K., op cit, n1016. 
1121 FOE, 2007, Energy White Paper Reaction, Friends of the Earth Press Release, 23 May 2007, London: Friends 
of the Earth. 
1122 Greenpeace UK, 2009, Nuclear Power, Greenpeace UK. Available at http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/nuclear, 
accessed on 22/03/10  
1123 EC, 2008, Attitudes towards radioactive waste, Special Eurobarometer 297, Brussels: European Commission 
1124 Ibid, p5 
1125 DBERR, 2008b, op cit, n1132, p10 at para 1 
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contribution over time than in non-accelerated scenarios.”1126 
The UKERC is a relatively new body, being formed only in 2004, but its roots are 
partly in the Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC), which 
itself grew out of the National Institute for Research in Nuclear Science (NIRNS), based at 
Harwell and Warrington, and which was discussed earlier in Chapter Two. 
 
Figure 5.2: UK R&D spend on Total Energy and Nuclear Power (US$m) 1974-20071127 
 
These figures show that investment in nuclear power research and development had 
fallen by over 95 per cent from a peak of around US$1.3 billion in 1974 to around 
US$50m by 1994, and has remained more or less constant since then. R&D spending on 
energy in total, also fell by over 90 per cent from a peak of close to US$1.5 billion in 1984 
to a low of US$100m in 2002, but since then it has doubled to about US$200m. 
By the time the White Paper had been published, and another reason why its 
suggestions were not surprising, the Health and Safety Executive had already issued 
version 1 of their guide to the regulatory processes1128 for the Generic Design Assessment 
(GDA) process for new nuclear power stations, which provided companies with details of 
how the GDA process would work, and presupposed that such a guide would be needed. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
Neither the Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 nor the Environment Act 1995, which 
were assessed first in this section were intended to have any great effect directly on the 
nuclear industry. Both touched briefly on the area of energy consumption and, as such, 
did have a bearing on the wider electricity market, of which nuclear plays a part. The do 
fit with one the threat from climate change however, which was to become one of the 
lines of justification used by Tony Blair in 2005 for reconsidering nuclear power. The 
Environment Act was a huge piece of legislation and focused primarily around the single 
aim of creating a new, unified Environment Agency; part of the role of which would be to 
take on the role of some of inspectors of nuclear sites. The wider rationale for both of 
                                        
1126 UKERC, 2009, Decarbonising the UK Energy System: Accelerated Development of Low Carbon Energy 
Supply Technologies: UKERC Energy 2050 Research Report No. 2, London: UK Energy Research Centre, p iv. 
1127 Source: UKERC, 2009, op cit, n1148, Figure 6.1, p66 
1128 The current version is v3, HSE, 2008, New nuclear power stations: Generic Design Assessment: Guidance 
to Requesting Parties, London: HSE/HMSO 
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these pieces of legislation may have been concerns about the environment, and the ideas 
of sustainability as outlined in the Rio Summit in 1992, however the elements of that 
legislation which impacted on the nuclear industry were instead pragmatic, cost-cutting, 
efficiency measures. 
Both of the other pieces of statute considered here had the same basic premise – to 
ratify an international instrument, and make it part of the legal makeup of the country. As 
such, they fit a pattern that has been established in previous chapters – that of reactive 
pragmatism triggered by external, and uncontrollable, events. Neither the Prohibitions and 
Inspections Act nor the Safeguards Act were particularly contentious and neither has 
really made it into the public awareness since their enactment – they were simply 
pragmatic measures designed to give effect to an earlier treaty signature. 
A further example of this type of reactive pragmatism was the creation of a new 
approach to countering terrorism in the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Punishment Act 2001, 
which was rushed through Parliament in the aftermath of 9/11. As with the Human Rights 
Act, this drew criticism from different quarters for being too hard and too soft but, unlike 
the HRA, sections of it were struck down as being unlawful by the House of Lords. This 
Act, again like the HRA, did not do a great deal that directly impacted upon the nuclear 
industry, but it did fundamentally affect the climate of security in which the industry would 
operate. 
Moving from areas of law which only tangentially affected the nuclear industry, the 
last three items considered here were the 2003 White Paper which said, inter alia, that 
there was no economic case for nuclear power, the Electricity (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 2003, which backed British Energy to the tune of £650m, and the Energy Act 2004, 
which brought into existence two new bodies – the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. As the sole body in charge of a £70bn budget over 50 
years to decommission the UK’s existing reactors, it might be thought that the NDA would 
satisfy the criteria for being a policy-making technocratic élite. It is clearly an élite, as it 
has sole charge of the next few decades of decommissioning, and the allocation of the 
budgets that go with that control. It can also accurately be described as a technocratic 
body, since the key members are all high-level people with considerable expertise in the 
field. However, as with the UKAEA, the NDA is expressly removed from the policy making 
sphere and, rather than becoming a technocratic decision making élite thus becomes a 
technocratic policy-implementing élite. The creation of the NDA was also a pragmatic 
move – partly, as with the previous examples, in a reactive sense to deal with the 
changing nature of nuclear sites themselves, both in terms of the requirements of security 
and decommissioning, but partly in a proactive way to try and shape the future 
development (and funding) of the remains of the old nuclear industry. For that is what the 
NDA really relates to, not the new, as-yet-unbuilt, clean and efficient twenty-first century 
nuclear industry, but the old, tired, worn out, potentially unsafe nuclear industry with its 
roots in the 1940s. 
The rescue of British Energy, which followed a long-established pattern of similar 
funding moves for BNFL, was a financially pragmatic move – the nuclear power industry 
could not be allowed to effectively go into liquidation, for the nuclear contribution to 
national energy production, though down from its peak, was still significant. 
Science played a role in this period too. Fully half of the legislation considered here 
relates to ideas about climate change which, even as early as 1995, had become one of 
the driving forces of policy. This despite the science not being as universally agreed as the 
politicians suggested, as we saw in previous chapters. NGOs played a significant role here, 
as Greenpeace was able to challenge the consultation process and force a re-run against 
the express wishes of the government. The fact that the result of the second consultation 
was essentially the same, and was predicted to be by the Prime Minister, only added to 
what Professor Worcester has called the public’s lack of faith in government science. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
This thesis began and ended with the announcement by the Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, that energy policy was back on the agenda with a vengeance, and that there would 
be a reconsideration of the previous policy relating to nuclear power. This announcement, 
the Prime Minister argued, was based on two key factors – the growing threat posed by 
climate change, and the issue of security of energy supply. Actually, it was argued, what 
the Prime Minister had done was to present a theory relating to climate change as though 
it was incontrovertible scientific fact, in order to justify a pragmatic decision about the re-
adoption of nuclear energy, and this is the thread that has run through this entire thesis. 
From the beginning, the thesis set out to show three things. Firstly, that the decisions 
made during this period in relation to nuclear power were all based on political 
pragmatism, and Diego’s idea of “what works.” Secondly, that in order to justify these 
decisions, politicians have consistently used scientific discourse as a justification, having 
first morphed the scientific data into a format that is presented as though it is unified, 
what Jordan and Davidson have termed the “political closure of scientific certainty.” and, 
finally, that the arguments of Jasanoff and Teichmann for the presence of a technocratic 
decision making élite do not hold water in this scenario, and that Technocratic Decision 
Making has not held sway. These arguments will now be expanded in turn. 
The first premise set out at the beginning of this work was that policy decisions made 
in the realm of nuclear power in the UK were based predominantly on politically pragmatic 
considerations, the idea that “what works” is the most important criteria. This idea was 
unpicked in the early chapters, and a temporal aspect was inserted, making the standard 
“what appeared to be most likely to work at the time,” and this led to ideas of proactive 
political pragmatism and reactive political pragmatism. 
Reactive political pragmatism is used to deal with situations that have either occurred 
outside the UK, or over which the UK has been unable to exercise any control. Often, the 
decisions need to be taken quite rapidly, as the cause is some sort of emergency (for 
example the Suez Crisis, the Yom Kippur War, or the accident at Chernobyl), which 
requires immediate action. In other examples, which are still classed as reactively 
pragmatic, there is no emergency, but the decisions still need to be taken. Examples that 
illustrate this point would include the need to enact the UK’s ratification of various 
international treaties by using the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 
1959, the Nuclear Materials (Offences) Act 1980 or the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000. 
There are several variables at play in the relationship between the impact of external 
events on the UK’s nuclear power policy and the decisions taken. Some of the events 
related directly to nuclear power, and some were only tangentially linked, however the 
decisions taken to either give them force, or mitigate their effects, were all reactively 
pragmatic. 
In addition to what has been termed “reactive political pragmatism,” many of the 
decisions covered here can be classed as “proactive” political pragmatism. These are 
decisions which are taken to shape the future direction of policy, and have not been 
triggered by any specific event or circumstance. As a result, they are not so time-
dependent as the others, and often have more far-reaching consequences. It has also 
been shown that within each time period there have been certain overriding 
considerations to which politicians have always returned. 
In the 1944-8 period, the considerations were financial, both because Britain was just 
starting to rebuild after the Second World War, and because there was a fledgling industry 
that Attlee wanted to nurture, and security-related, in terms of espionage and the 
beginnings of the Cold War. The legislation introduced in the period was partly reactive, as 
it was initially to create an industry to use the by-products of the weapons manufacturing 
process, and partly proactive, as it wanted to set out both how that industry would 
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develop, and who would have access to information about it (although, as we have seen, 
the UK didn’t approach this aspect with as much vigour as the USA). The selection of the 
Ministry of Supply to control the area illustrates this – if it had been truly intended to 
develop atomic energy as a useful, nationwide energy source, then control would 
doubtless have come under the remit of the Minister of Fuel and Power. The 1948 Act, on 
the other hand was proactive, and gave the radioactive materials industries a framework 
within which their commercial exports could flourish. 
The considerations in the 1973-8 period were also financial and security related, 
although the latter was less focused on international security, and more of safety and 
security of nuclear plants. The UK was in the grip of a recession, and some aspects of the 
nuclear industry had been hived off to operate on a semi-commercial basis, but with the 
continued financial support of the government. The need to keep putting money into BNFL 
was shown to be a driver for the extension of the credit and banking offered to (and taken 
by) the company. This decision was mainly a reactive one , as BNFL repeatedly found 
itself in financial hot water, although there are elements of proactive political pragmatism 
as well, since the intention was to leave the company in a state when it could survive 
without further assistance. The safety and security considerations of the period were 
mainly linked to the accidents that had occurred both inside and outside the UK in the 
preceding decade or so. The liability that operators of nuclear facilities faced was starting 
to become large enough that investors were dropping out of the nuclear sphere, as shown 
by the reduction in nuclear consortia from five to one. Faced with this, the international 
community drew up several agreements to limit operator liability in the case of an 
accident, and the UK adopted the ratifying instruments to these agreements in a reactive, 
politically pragmatic manner. 
The 1992-5 period was marked by underlying financial considerations which, given 
the title of the chapter, will come as no surprise. The concerns over plant safety and 
security, which had first surfaced in the previous chapter, were continued, and the period 
was also marked by the beginnings of concerns about what has subsequently been 
branded as “energy security.” The financial aspect of the period was again partly triggered 
by external events, in this case the slow recovery after the recession of the 1980s, but 
there were internal drivers as well, namely the Prime Minister’s determination to keep the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement as low as possible. To this end, the nuclear industry 
was excluded from the privatisation of the electricity network, and the two companies that 
had been hived off a decade or so earlier were finally sold into the private sector. 
The very real dangers posed by poorly operated and poorly maintained nuclear 
reactors were amply illustrated by the well-publicised accidents at Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl. Despite the UK not having any of the reactor types used at either site in 
operation, the accidents helped to create the background against which the announcement 
was made that any new nuclear reactors would be funded wholly by the private sector. 
Further safety concerns about the risks posed by transporting radioactive material by road 
led to new legislation to restrict and redefine the regulations in that area. This was an 
example of reactive political pragmatism, not in the sense of reacting to a specific crisis, 
but in terms of reacting to alleviate a set of concerns about risk. Energy security had also 
started to be a consideration in this period, as the flow of North Sea Oil made the 
country’s position with regard to energy self-sufficiency much stronger, thus weakening 
the case for any new nuclear programme.  
The underlying considerations in the final period, are partly continuations of previous 
considerations – financial, security, both international and energy-related and plant 
safety, but they were added to by a new consideration, that of the dangers of climate 
change. The financial consideration were given effect by the rescue of British Energy 
(BE)outlined in the Electricity (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003. This was a reactive 
move, as BE had found itself in financial dire straits, and it was politically pragmatic as the 
alternatives to bailing out BE would be either for the government itself to take on the cost 
of running the plants, or to somehow “switch off” the reactors – a potentially dangerous 
process that takes many months and is very expensive. 
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Another financial-based pragmatic measure was the creation of the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Agency and Civil Nuclear Constabulary in 2004. As has been shown 
above, this was proactively pragmatic insofar as it was an attempt to shape the future 
development (and funding) of the remains of the old nuclear industry. For, as we have 
seen, it is the old, tired, worn out, potentially unsafe nuclear industry which the NDA will 
be linked to, as opposed to the new, as-yet-unbuilt, clean and efficient twenty-first 
century nuclear industry. 
The various security considerations (international, energy, plant safety) were all in 
play during this period, and all triggered decisions that have been shown to be politically 
pragmatic. The Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and its impact, albeit limited, 
on nuclear sites was a reactively pragmatic measure, triggered by the terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington in 2001, and the perceived threat of similar occurrences in the 
UK. 
Energy security was part of the rationale given by Tony Blair for the reconsideration of 
nuclear power in 2005, as the increased reliance on imported energy would leave the UK 
more vulnerable, as illustrated in Figures 1.2 and 4.1, showing the rate at which the UK 
imports and exports oil. In 2005, the graph suggested, the UK would become a net 
importer of crude oil, and thus be reliant on the fluctuating global market to an extent not 
seen since the discovery of North Sea Oil. The push for non-fossil fuels, which is the wider 
agenda into which nuclear power has been placed, is a pragmatic attempt to increase 
indigenous energy supply and ensure greater stability in energy prices. It is partly 
reactive, as it is responding to the pre-existing levels of imports and exports, but it is also 
partly proactive, as it is an attempt to shape the future direction. It also marks the closure 
of a circle which began in 1955 with the government backing private companies to build 
new power stations based on technology that was largely unknown in the UK, and ends in 
2008, with the government backing private companies to build new power stations based 
on technology that is still largely unknown in the UK.1129  
The new consideration that was used in this period was that of climate change. The 
argument is that the anthropocentric effects on climate are going to cause severe 
problems in terms of weather patters, sea levels and so on, and that reducing emissions 
of carbon dioxide is the most effective way of tackling this. the scientific aspects of this 
will be discussed below, but the energy-related decision making was clearly a pragmatic 
move and was again partly reactive (this is what works to deal with the current situation) 
and partly proactive (this is what will work to shape the future energy mix of the UK). 
Having shown that decisions taken in this area of policy were politically pragmatic, 
either reactively or proactively – or in some vases, both – the second of the underlying 
themes of this thesis needs to be examined, that of the use of science by politicians. 
Science, Nowotny argues, has long since stopped being a single community and is 
now pluralistic in everything from status, to codes of conduct, to competence, to the 
willingness to go beyond the bounds of obtaining scientific data towards advocating 
particular courses of action. Others took up this idea of the fracturing of science, which is 
partly based around the ideas put forward by Thomas Kuhn1130 relating to periodic 
scientific revolutions, once the dominant and accepted ideas of the time are sufficiently 
challenged. Despite the clearly acknowledged fracturing of science, politicians have always 
displayed a desire, or even a need, to present scientific data as though it was the result of 
consensus - what Jordan and Davidson refer to as “the political closure of scientific 
certainty.” On some occasions this is done because a reactively pragmatic decision needs 
to be made in a relatively short space of time, and full scientific certainty is not something 
which can be awaited. The 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease covered in Chapter 
One is an example of this type of decision, as the “do nothing” option was clearly not 
feasible, either scientifically or politically. Other examples include the response to the 
                                        
1129 None of the type-approvals for generators has ever been used in the UK before. See Appendix III for more 
details. 
1130 Kuhn T.S., 1970, op cit, n41. 
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1957 accident at Windscale, where restrictions on the movement of milk were quickly 
imposed, and then quickly lifted, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
If some of the science was limited to rapid reactions to urgent crises, then other areas 
of science were, as we have seen, much more wide-ranging. In the early days of nuclear 
power, when it was still widely regarded as being an interesting if not commercial sideline 
from weapons production, led to an apparent acceptance of the science by the politicians 
themselves. Clement Attlee argued for the introduction of nuclear power because 
scientists had agreed that change was inevitable, and effectively that if the UK did not 
place itself in the vanguard of atomic generation, it would be “in the guard’s van.”1131 The 
1955 White Paper presented the scientific advice that nuclear power would be cheap, 
clean and safe, and did little to question the rigour of those assertions. Later decisions, 
such as the one made by Tony Blair in 2005, were much more explicit in their use of 
scientific rhetoric to justify the decisions. 
None of the Prime Ministers in office during the periods assessed here has had a 
background in science, with the exception of Margaret Thatcher,1132 and yet each has 
been willing to use the rhetoric of science to ‘trump’ dissenting arguments. Despite 
Worcester’s assertions that the public has a decreasing faith in ‘science,’ particularly that 
promoted by governments or industry, we have seen that there is very little difference in 
approach between government scientists, industry scientists and NGO scientists. We have 
also seen that the organisations themselves, whether government, industry or NGO are 
willing to present scientific theories as though they were mathematically certain. 
Greenpeace and the nuclear industry both presented their version of the scientific data to 
argue for the abandonment of Sizewell B, for example.  
As this area is without doubt a “technology-heavy” area of policy-making, some 
consideration of the more formalised Technocratic Decision Making model has been made 
throughout the piece. This assessment was based initially on Kantrowitz’s three decision 
types and then refined using the distinctions put forward by DeSario and Langton 
concerning the “what is” nature of technical decisions, and the “what should be” nature of 
value decisions.1133 To this model were added two further sets of ideas. Firstly those of 
Teichman about the actual process of Technocratic Decision Making which, although using 
examples from South America, hinged on “small technocratic élites [that have] insulated 
themselves from both extra and intra state pressures”1134 in order to make their decisions. 
Secondly, those of Jasanoff were added, foreseeing the eventual replacement of these 
technocratic élites by a system of rule by scientific experts. These ideas were overlain on 
key events of these periods, and two different outcomes were discerned. Firstly, the 
existence of a technocratic élite, which could feed the science to the politicians, but play 
no direct role in the decision making process. Secondly, a decision making élite which had 
direct input into the decision making process, but which was not technocratic in its nature. 
The decision in 1946, for example, to give the duty to promote nuclear power to the 
non-scientific Minister of Supply, supported from several high-ranking scientists, and 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister certainly created an élite, it was argued. This élite 
was also the primary force in creating new policy for the development of nuclear power. 
What was less clear is the extent to which this group could be classed as technocratic. 
Without the Minister, and without the oversight of the Prime Minister, the group would 
certainly have been able to be classed as technocratic and, as a policy maker, we would 
have had a situation that came under the TDM banner. In the event, it was felt that the 
group was semi-technocratic at best, and so there was felt not to be TDM. 
A similar situation arose with the Advisory Committee set up under the Radioactive 
Substances Act 1948 – there was undeniably an élite, and it was very much technocratic, 
                                        
1131 O’Neill, H., 1981, Back on the Job, Industrial and Commercial Training, 13(11)382-4 
1132 Thatcher obtained a Chemistry degree at Somerville College, Oxford. Source: Thatcher, M., 1993, op cit, 
n576. 
1133 Desario, J., & Langton, S., eds., 1997, op cit, n90. 
1134 Teichman, J., 1997, op cit, n93. 
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but it was not involved in the decision making process, as the statutory requirement on 
the Ministers was only to consult with the committee, not to follow their advice. That 
pattern continued with the creation of the UK Atomic Energy Authority in 1954, despite 
some initial fears that it would be “a new private empire ruled by the atomic knights.”1135 
The Board of the Authority was an eight-strong combination of scientists and 
industrialists, all of whom had been knighted at some point, and more than half of whom 
were subsequently ennobled, so again the existence of a technocratic élite cannot be 
denied. The Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 expressly stated that the Authority was a 
policy advisory body, and not a policy making body. This became a useful distinction in 
the 1970s, when the UKAEA became a 35 percent shareholder in the National Nuclear 
Corporation, which had been set up (at the UKAEA’s advice) to build the new generation of 
power stations. 
Both of these outcomes  - a technocratic élite and a decision-making élite – matched 
parts of the requirements of the models proposed by Teichmann and Jasanoff. However, 
since the models both presuppose the existence of a technocratic, decision-making, élite 
on order for TDM to be a factor, it was determined that, in this area of policy making, TDM 
did not apply. 
The theme that has run through this entire work is the way in which politicians are 
willing to use science when it suits their pre-existing agenda, and equally willing to ignore 
it, or even dismiss it as “crackpot” when it does not. In his speech to the Royal Society in 
Oxford in 2006, Tony Blair said that the future of the UK would be lit by the “brilliant light 
of science.” As it turns out, that brilliant light is favoured by politicians as they control the 
switch. 
 
  
                                        
1135 Freeman, J., 1954, op cit, n399. 
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Atomic Energy Act 1946 
Atomic Energy Act 1989 
Atomic Energy Act of 1957 
Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Act 1973 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1986 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995 
Brussels Convention 1963. 
Commission Regulation 3956/92 of 21.12.1992 on the accession of EURATOM to the 
International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (O.J. L409/10) 
Criminal Justice Act 1982 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 
Electricity Act 1989 
Energy Act 1983 
Energy Act 2004 
Energy Act 2004 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1973) 
Energy Authority Act 1986 
Energy Conservation Act 1996 
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Environment Act 1995 
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3240) 
Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/3391) 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 
European Communities Act 1972 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 
Home Energy Conservation Act 1995 
Housing Energy Conservation Act 1995 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Industry Act 1980 
Medicines Act 1968 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718) 
Northern Ireland Act 1962 
Nuclear Explosions (Prohibitions and Inspections) Act 1998 
Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 
Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1981 
Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965 
Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (Commencement No 1) Order 1965 (SI 1965/1880). 
Nuclear Installations Act 1969 
Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 
Nuclear Materials (Offences) Act 1983 (Commencement) Order 1991 (SI 1991/1716). 
Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 
Nuclear Safeguards Act Commencement (No. 1) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1252) 
Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 
Official Secrets Act 1911 
Official Secrets Act 1920 
Official Secrets Act 1939 
Official Secrets Act 1989 
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960 
Price Anderson Act 1957 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, 
Radioactive Material (Road Transport) (Definition of Radioactive Material) Order 2002, SI 
2002/1092 
Radioactive Material (Road Transport) Act 1991 
Radioactive Substances Act 1948 
Radioactive Substances Act 1960 
Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
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Radiological Protection Act 1970 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Authority, 1956 
Statute of the Nuclear Energy Agency 1957 
Supreme Court Act 1981 
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 
The Energy Act 2004 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2005 (SI 2005/442) 
The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/403) 
Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) 
Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/293). 
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 25 March 1957. 
UK Safeguards Agreement, Cmnd 6730 
UN Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal 1989 
UN Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 10th September 1996 
UN Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963 
UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
UN Resolution 1(I) on the Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems 
Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy. 
UN Resolution 31/102 – A Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism 
which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, 
and Study of the Underlying Causes of those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence 
which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which cause some people to 
Sacrifice Human Lives, including their own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, 
Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN A/RES/31/102. 
UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 
UN/ECE Århus / Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 1998 
UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 1998 
UK Atomic Energy Authority (Extinguishment of Liabilities) Order 1996/2511 
UK Atomic Energy Authority (Limit on Borrowing) Order 1991/1973 
Uranium Enrichment Technology (Prohibition on Disclosure) Regulations 2004/1818 
US Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
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Appendix I: 
A Glossary of Possibly Uncommon Terms & Abbreviations1136 
AEN Agence pour l’energie Nucléaire. See NEA. 
AERE Atomic Energy Research Establishment. Founded in Harwell, Oxfordshire, 
in 1946 by John (later Professor Sir John) Cockcroft, under the terms of 
the AEA 1946. Worked under the authority of the Ministry of Supply. 
Incorporated into UKAEA (q.v.) in 1954, and renamed as Harwell 
International Business Centre in 1996. Still houses the Headquarters of 
UKAEA. 
Almelo, Treaty 
of  
1970 Tripartite Treaty signed by the British, German and Dutch 
governments. The Treaty was “the basis for collaboration between the 
three countries for the development and industrial exploitation of 
centrifuge technology to enrich uranium.”1137 
BNFL (q.v.) was able to collaborate with international partners as a result 
of this Treaty. 
Alpha 
Radiation 
Alpha radiation (α) is the last penetrating of the three types of 
radioactive particles (alpha, beta (q.v.) and gamma (q.v.)). As alpha 
particles cannot penetrate the outer layer of human skin, it represents 
no danger as an external source. 
However, if alpha particles are emitted by a source which is inside the 
body, the radiation is taken up very close to the source of emission, and 
alpha particles are the most hazardous when internal.1138 
AWRE Atomic Weapons Research Establishment. The UK’s nuclear weapons 
design programme moved form Fort Halstead to AWRE in Aldermaston, 
Berkshire in 1950.1139 AWRE (together with a trials range at Foulness in 
Essex), became the UKAEA Weapons Group until 1973, when it was 
transferred to MOD ownership by the Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons 
Group) Act 1973. 
AWE Atomic Weapons Establishment. In 1987, the AWRE (q.v.) was combined 
with two Royal Ordnance factories (in Cardiff and Burghfield, Berks.) to 
become the AWE.1140 
Baruch Plan The plan was presented before the UN AEC (q.v.) on 14 June 1946, and 
proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority 
“to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of 
atomic energy” 
The Plan represented an offer by the United States to destroy all of its 
atomic weapons if other nations agreed to do the same, on the basis that 
“if we fail, we have damned every man to be the slave of fear”1141 
Unfortunately, the USSR rejected the plan, and detonated its first atomic 
bomb in 1949.1142 With the collapse of the plan, the International Atomic 
Development Authority was never created, and there are now seven 
                                        
1136 This phrase was taken from: Winchester, S., 2006, A Crack in the Edge of the World: The Great American 
Earthquake of 1906, London: Penguin Books, p387. 
1137 Boureston, J., 2004, Fuel Cycle: Tracking the Technology, Nuclear Engineering International Magazine. 
1138 Ramsay, C., & Modarres, M., 1998, op cit, n993, p76 
1139 MOD, 2009, op cit, n311 
1140 Ibid.  
1141 Baruch, B., 1946, Speech before the UNAEC on 14 June 1946 , United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 
Hunter College, NY: New York. 
1142 Norris, R. S., & Arkin, W. M., 1998, op cit, n284 
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states that have declared their nuclear weapons.1143 In addition, Israel is 
widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though officially denies 
this.1144 
Becquerel (Bq). A measure of radioactivity, equal to one decay per second, 
measured by a Geiger Counter.1145 
Beta Radiation Beta radiation (β), also called beta rays or particles, is more penetrating 
than alpha radiation (q.v.) but less so than gamma radiation (q.v.). It 
has a range of about a metre in air.1146 
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Limited. Set up by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 
1971, to take over part of the work of the UKAEA. 
CNPA Civil Nuclear Police Authority. Created by section 51(1) of the Energy Act 
2004 as a replacement for the UKAEA Constabulary (q.v.). The 
operational and oversight aspects of the CNPA are discussed above, in 
Chapter 5. 
CP-1 Chicago Pile-1. The name of the reactor which went critical in Chicago on 
2 December 1942, and was the first self-sustaining nuclear reactor. 
Curie (Ci). The main unit used to measure radioactivity. Initially defined as 
“the amount of radon in equilibrium with 1 gramme of radium”.1147 It is 
the equivalent to 3.7 x 1010 Bq (q.v.).1148 The Curie is a large unit of 
activity, and the submultiples, millicurie (mc) and microcurie (μc) are 
frequently used.1149 
EBR-1 Experimental Breeder Reactor-1. The name of the INEEL (q.v.) reactor 
built by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and which first produced 
electricity in 1951. It was partly destroyed by an accident in 1955.1150 
EFDA European Fusion Development Agreement. EFDA provides a framework 
for implementing European fusion research, development & design work. 
One of its primary activities is concerned with the use of the JET 
Facilities.  
The EFDA is intended to strengthen the co-ordination of work within the 
EU and Switzerland on controlled thermonuclear fusion. It will further 
develop the necessary scientific, technical and organisational basis in the 
EU fusion laboratories and in European Industry for the possible 
construction of an experimental fusion power plant and will reinforce the 
European capability for international co-operation. 
EFDA runs from 1999 until at least the end of 2004 and could be 
extended.1151 
See also Appendix IV for an explanation of nuclear fusion. 
Euratom European Atomic Energy Community. Founded in 1958 
Gamma Gamma Radiation (γ) is the most penetrating type of radiation, and is 
                                        
1143 The confirmed nuclear states are the USA, Russia, China, France, the UK, Pakistan, and India. North Korea 
and Iran are both believed by the UN to be working on secret nuclear weapons programmes. 
1144 See, for example, Sunday Times, 1986, op cit, n684 
1145 Czarnecki, L., 2002, Nuclear Physics, Homepage Wissenschaftlicher Themen. Available at 
http://www.hpwt.de/Kern2e.htm, accessed on 01/02/08. 
1146 Ramsay, C., & Modarres, M., 1998, op cit, n993, p76 
1147 Valentine, J.M., 1963, Teach Yourself Atomic Physics, London: The English Universities Press, pp76-7 
1148 Czarnecki, L., 2002, op. cit, n10. 
1149 Valentine, J. M., 1963, op. cit, n1179, p77 
1150 Weaver, 1995, op cit, n350. 
1151 All information taken from EFDA-JET, 2003, The European Fusion Development Agreement, Culham: 
European Fusion Development Agreement Joint European Torus  
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Radiation similar to that used in medical x-rays. “It comes in the form of 
electromagnetic waves that have only energy and no substance at 
all.”1152 
GLEEP Graphite Low Energy Experimental Pile. The first nuclear reactor 
operating in the United Kingdom. Built in 1946, and operating from 
1947, the reactor was closed in 1990. The decommissioning process for 
GLEEP began in 1994, and is expected to be completed in 2005.1153 
Heavy Water Heavy water (D2O) is chemically the same as normal (light) water (H2O), 
but with the two hydrogen atoms replaced with deuterium atoms. 
Deuterium is an isotope of hydrogen; it has one extra neutron. This extra 
neutron is what makes heavy water about 10% more “heavy”.1154 
HLW High Level Waste. HLW is extremely radioactive, and very long-lived. It 
in two types – spent fuel (not intended for reprocessing) and fission 
products released from spent fuel by reprocessing.1155 See also ILW and 
LLW 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency. Established in 1956 by the United 
Nations, which set the Agency’s objective as being to “seek to accelerate 
and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that 
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or 
control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.”1156 
The general aim of co-operation between members is illustrated in Article 
VII of the Statute, which states that members should make available all 
information that they feel would be useful, but shall make available 
scientific data developed with the Agency’s help.1157 
ILW Intermediate Level Waste. ILW requires some shielding, and generally 
consists of chemical sludge and equipment used in decommissioning. 
Treatment and disposal of ILW varies depending on the waste form and 
whether it is short- or long- lived.1158 See also HLW and LLW. 
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Site of the 
EBR-1 reactor (q.v.) which first produced usable amounts of electricity 
on 20th December 1951. 
JET Joint European Torus. A magnetic field used to speed up plasma in the 
development of nuclear fusion. The JET Joint Undertaking was set up in 
1978 as a separate legal entity.1159 
The Joint Undertaking ran the project until 31 December 1999, when JET 
was transferred to the UKAEA (q.v.), and the overall implementation and 
co-ordination of further scientific exploitation was carried out under the 
EFDA (q.v.).1160 
See also Appendix IV for an explanation of nuclear fusion. 
                                        
1152 Ramsay, C., & Modarres, M., 1998, op cit, n993, p76 
1153 UKAEA, 2004, op cit, n164 
1154 SNO, 2002, Heavy Water, Sudbury Neutrino Observatory, Kingston, Ontario: Queens University, available 
at http://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/sno/D2O.html, accessed on 01/02/08. 
1155 WNA, 2004, Radioactive Wastes, London: World Nuclear Association 
1156 Article II, Statute of the International Atomic Energy Authority 1956 
1157 Article VII, Statute of the International Atomic Energy Authority 1956 
1158 WNA, 2004, op cit, n1187 
1159 EFDA-JET, 2006, The History of JET, Culham: European Fusion Development Agreement Joint European 
Torus. 
1160 Ibid. 
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LLW Low Level Waste. LLW contains small amounts of short-lived 
radioactivity. Rags, gloves filters and so on are included in this category, 
which is usually incinerated or compacted1161. See also HLW and ILW. 
Marshall Plan The offer in June 1947 of American aid to help with the economic 
recovery of Europe. Britain and France accepted the aid, but the USSR 
rejected it. The aid, administered through the OEEC (q.v.), totalled $17 
trillion between 1948 and 1952.1162 
MAST Mega Amp Spherical Tokomak. A magnetic field used to speed up plasma 
in the development of nuclear fusion. Experimentation began in 
December 1999, when the MAST project took over from the START (q.v.) 
Project. 
See also Appendix IV for an explanation of nuclear fusion. 
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency. Created in 1957 by the OEEC (q.v.), as an 
intergovernmental organisation of industrialised countries, and now run 
by the OECD (q.v.). Its mission is to: 
“to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further 
developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, 
technological and legal bases required for the safe, 
environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes.”1163 
As with most OECD organisations, the NEA is also referred to in French 
as L'Agence pour l'énergie nucléaire (AEN). 
NIA Nuclear Industry Association. Formed in the early 1960s (as the British 
Nuclear Industry Forum), the London-based NIA currently has 94 
member companies in the UK.1164 It is a trade body, and also acts as a 
lobbying group in favour of nuclear energy. 
NIRNS National Institute for Research in Nuclear Science. Set up in 1957 with 
the establishment of the Rutherford High Energy Laboratory in 
Oxfordshire, and the Daresbury Laboratory in Cheshire five years later. 
Absorbed by the Science Research Council in 1965. 
NRPB National Radiological Protection Board. Established by section 1 of the 
Radiological Protection Act 1970. 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Took over 
from the OEEC (q.v.) in 1961 after the 1960 Convention on the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development was signed in 
Paris. The OECD has two official languages, English and French, and is 
referred to in both, so it’s other name is L’Organisation de coopération 
et de développement économiques (OCDE) It had a mission to: 
“help governments achieve sustainable economic growth and 
employment and rising standards of living in member countries 
while maintaining financial stability, so contributing to the 
development of the world economy”1165 
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. Founded in 1948, 
                                        
1161 WNA, 2004, op cit, n1187 
1162 US DoS, 2005, Basic Readings in US Democracy: Part IX – The Marshall Plan, Washington DC: United 
States Department of State. 
1163 NEA, 2005, op cit, n180. 
1164 NIA, 2010b, List of member companies, London: Nuclear Industry Association.  
1165 OECD, 2005, Overview of the OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris 
France. 
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under the Marshall Plan (q.v.). This Paris-based organisation was set up 
to: 
• promote co-operation between participating countries and their 
national production programmes for the reconstruction of Europe, 
• develop intra-European trade by reducing tariffs and other barriers 
to the expansion of trade, 
• study the feasibility of creating a customs union or free trade area, 
and  
• study multi-lateralisation of payments, and achieve conditions for 
better utilisation of labour.1166 
Replaced in 1961 by the OECD (q.v.) 
Quebec 
Agreement 
Name given to the 1943 “Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration 
Between the Authorities of the USA and the UK in the Matter of Tube 
Alloys” signed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in Quebec. 
Radioactivity The phenomenon whereby atoms undergo spontaneous random 
disintegration, usually accompanied by the emission of radiation.1167 
RCL The Radiochemical Centre Limited. Formed by the Atomic Energy 
Authority Act 1971 from the Radiochemical Centre, which had been 
established in 1940 to “work on the purification of radium for luminous 
paint on aircraft and submarine instrument faces”.1168 
The Radiochemical Centre had been absorbed by the UKAEA (q.v.) in 
1954.1169 In 1982 RCL was the first company to be privatised under the 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, as Amersham 
International.1170 
Rem Radiation Equivalent Man. Different radioactive elements and their 
isotopes emit different types of radiation. Beta (β) and Gamma (γ) 
radiation are far less damaging (by a factor of around 20) to living 
tissue than Alpha (α) radiation, and so measuring radioactivity in Curies 
(q.v.), Röntgens (q.v.) or Becquerels (q.v.) does not give an accurate 
picture of this difference.1171 
Röntgen 
(The) 
(or Roentgen) (R). A unit used to measure exposure, which can only be 
used to describe an amount of gamma and X-rays, and only in air.1172 
RPS Radiological Protection Service. Operated by the Medical Research 
Council from 1953, until it was subsumed by the NRPB (q.v.) in 1970. 
Not to be confused with the Dstl Radiological Protection Service, which 
is still operated by the Ministry of Defence in relation to Depleted 
Uranium weaponry.1173 
START Small Tight Aspect Ratio Tokomak. A magnetic field used to speed up 
plasma in the development of nuclear fusion. Work ceased on the 
Culham-based START Project in 1998, when it was replaced by the 
                                        
1166 OECD, 2004, op cit, n451  
1167 CORWM, 2006, Glossary of Terms, London: Committee on Radioactive Waste Management. 
1168 Amersham UK, 2004, op cit, n727 
1169 Ibid. 
1170 Ibid. 
1171 Source: Close, D., & Ledwidge, L., 2000, Measuring Radiation: Terminology and Units, Science for 
Democratic Action, 8 (4) 
1172 ISU, nk, Radiation Related Terms, Idaho State University Physics Department. Available at 
http://www.physics.isu.edu/radinf/terms.htm, accessed on 01/02/08. 
1173 MOD, 2003, Proposal for a Research Programme on Depleted Uranium, London: Ministry of Defence, 
Section 6.1.2. 
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MAST Project (q.v.) 
Not to be confused with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I 
and START II) between the United States and the USSR/Russia on 
reducing levels of nuclear weapons. 
See also Appendix IV for an explanation of nuclear fusion. 
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators. Organisation set-up in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl-4 reactor accident in 1986, and based in 
Chicago. Their mission is stated as being: 
To maximise the safety and reliability of the operation of nuclear 
power plants by exchanging information and encouraging 
communication, comparison and emulation amongst its 
members.1174 
WANO, which is non-governmental, claims as members all organisations 
operating nuclear power generating plant world-wide. 
U235 Uranium-235. The fissile isotope of natural Uranium, about 0.7% by 
mass. Chemically identical to U238 (q.v.), but slightly different in mass, 
which enables the isotopes to be separated. This makes possible the 
“enrichment” of the U235 percentage of Uranium – to 4% in civilian 
reactors, and 90% in weapons.1175 
U238 Uranium-238. The main isotope of natural Uranium, accounting for 
more than 99% by mass. 
UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. Established by the Atomic 
Energy Authority Act 1954. 
UKAEAC UKAEA Constabulary. Created under the Atomic Energy Authority Act 
1954. The force, of approximately 500 officers, protects UKAEA (q.v.), 
BNFL (q.v.) and Urenco sites in the UK. The UKAEC was replaced by the 
Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA) (q.v.) in the Energy Act 2004 
UNAEC United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Established in 1946 and 
tasked with ensuring the peaceful use of atomic energy. Reached an 
impasse in 1952, and was dissolved by the UN General Assembly. 
US AEC United Stated Atomic Energy Commission. Created by the Atomic 
Energy Act 1946, and charged with establishing health and safety 
regulations relating to atomic material. It was abolished by the Energy 
Reorganization Act 1974, and partly replaced by the UC NRC (q.v.) 
US NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Established by the 
Energy Reorganization Act 1974, to take over some of the role of the 
US AEC (q.v.). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
1174 WANO, 2004, The WANO Mission, Chicago, IL: World Association of Nuclear Operators. 
1175 Settle, F., 2003, op cit, n992  
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Appendix II: 
Nuclear Legislation 1946- 
UK Acts 
Atomic Energy Act 1946 
Radioactive Substances Act 1948 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1959 
Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance Act) 1959 
Radioactive Substances Act 1960 
Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 
Nuclear Installations Act 1969 
Radiological Protection Act 1970 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 
Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Act 1973 
Atomic Energy Authority (Special Constables) Act 1976 
Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1977 
Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 
Atomic Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1981 
Nuclear Industry (Finance) Act 1981 
Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1986 
Atomic Energy Act 1989 
Electricity Act 1989 
Radioactive Material (Road Transport) Act 1991 
Radioactive Substances Act 1993 
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995 
Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition and Inspections) Act 1998 
Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
Electricity (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003 
Energy Act 2004 
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Source: DTI, 2002b 
Appendix III: 
Current Types of Nuclear Reactor 
TYPE:   MAGNOX REACTOR1176 
UK EXAMPLES: Berkeley, Bradwell, Calder Hall, Chapelcross, Dungeness A, 
Hinkley Point A, Hunterston A, Oldbury, Trawsfynydd 
The first commercial nuclear stations in the UK were of 
the Magnox type named after the magnesium alloy used 
to make the fuel can containing the uranium fuel. 
Magnox reactors use natural uranium metal as the fuel, 
have a graphite moderator and use pressurised CO2 as 
the coolant. Early designs have the core contained within 
a steel pressure vessel surrounded by a steel and 
concrete biological shield over one metre thick and have 
the boilers located outside the shield. Later designs have 
a steel lined pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel, which 
also acts as the biological shield, with the boilers 
contained inside. 
TYPE:   ADVANCED GAS-COOLED REACTOR (AGR)1177 
UK EXAMPLES: Dungeness B, Hartlepool, Heysham 1, Heysham 2, Hinkley 
Point B, Hunterston B, Torness, Windscale 
The AGR design has only ever been used in the UK. AGRs 
use enriched uranium clad stainless steel cans and also 
have a graphite moderator and use pressurised CO2 as 
the coolant. These allow them to operate at a higher 
temperature than the Magnox reactor. The AGR is 
encased in a steel-lined pre-stressed concrete pressure 
vessel several metres thick which acts as the biological 
shield, with the boilers inside. The coolant conveys heat 
from the reactor to the boilers which, in turn, heats water 
in an isolated steam circuit which is then used to turn the 
turbines, just as in coal, oil or gas-fired stations. 
TYPE:   PRESSURISED WATER REACTOR 
(PWR)1178 
UK EXAMPLES: Sizewelll B 
The PWR is contained in a steel pressure vessel. 
Pressurised water, which acts as both moderator and the 
coolant, is pumped around the reactor and through the 
boilers. The pressure vessel, boilers and connecting pipe-
work form a sealed primary pressurised circuit, which is 
contained within a steel-lined pre-stressed concrete 
containment building, which also acts as a biological 
shield. The remainder of the generation process is similar 
to that for other power stations. Despite there only being 
one PWR in the UK, it is actually the most common 
reactor type used in the world. 
A further type of PWR is the Soviet-designed Light Water 
Cooled-Graphite Moderated Reactor (LGR) of the type 
                                        
1176 DTI, 2001, Nuclear Reactors, London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
1177 Ibid. 
1178 Ibid. 
 
Source: DTI, 2002b 
 
 
Source: DTI, 2002b 
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made infamous by the Chernobyl accident in April 1986. These reactors are also known by 
their Russian designation RBMK (for Реактор Болшой Мошкностай Каналнай, or Reactor 
Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny)1179 
TYPE:   PRESSURISED HEAVY WATER REACTOR (PHWR)1180 
UK EXAMPLES: NONE 
 
These reactors are also called CANDU Reactors (CANada Deuterium Uranium). CANDU is 
Canadian-designed power reactor of PHWR type that uses heavy water (D20, or deuterium 
oxide) for moderator and coolant, and natural uranium for fuel. 
CANDU is the most efficient of all reactors in using uranium: it uses about 15% less 
uranium than a pressurized water reactor for each megawatt of electricity produced. 
PHWRs can be refueled while at full power, which makes them very efficient in their use of 
uranium (it allows for precise flux control in the core). Most are in Canada, but units have 
been sold to Argentina, China, India, Pakistan, Romania and South Korea. 
TYPE:   LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER REACTOR (LMFBR) 
UK EXAMPLES: NONE 
The fundamental principle behind the fast breeder reactor concept were discovered before 
the end of World War II, and the potential impact of breeder reactors on future energy 
supplies was immediately recognized. EBR-1 (see chapter 1), which produced the world’s 
first nuclear-generated electricity, was an LMFBR.1181 The 
term "fast breeder" refers to the types of configurations 
which can actually produce more fissionable fuel than 
they use. 
France has made the largest implementation of these 
reactors with its Super-Phenix reactor and smaller BN-
600 reactor on the Caspian Sea for electric power and 
desalinization.1182 
 
                                        
1179 Source: INSC, 2006, Maps of Nuclear Power Reactors, International Nuclear Safety Center, Argonne, IL: 
Argonne National Laboratory. 
1180 OME, 2007, How Nuclear Energy Works, Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Energy. 
1181 Shi, R.R., 2003, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Berkeley, CA: 
University of California. 
1182 Nave, C.R., 2005, Hyperphysics: Fast Breeder Reactors, Atlanta, GA: Department of Physics and 
Astronomy, Georgia State University. 
 
Source: Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2007 
 
Source: Nave, 2005 
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Appendix IV 
Breakdown of the Nuclear Consortia 1954-801183 
Phase 1 
Atomic Power Group (1955-68) 
English Electric Co Ltd    40 per cent (merged with GEC, 1968) 
Babcock & Wilcox Ltd   40 per cent 
Taylor Woodrow Ltd   20 per cent 
Atomic Energy Group (1955-60, 1965-8) 
General Electric Co Ltd (merged with English Electric, 1968) 
Simon Carves Ltd 
Motherwell Bridge Eng Co Ltd 
John Mowlem Co Ltd 
Atomic Power Construction (1955-60, 1965-8) 
International Combustion (Holdings) Ltd 
Richardson Westgarth Co Ltd 
Fairey Co Ltd 
Crompton Parkinson (withdrew in 1961) 
Nuclear Civil Constructors—(a partnership of Trollope & Colls Ltd and Holland and 
Hannen and Cubitts) 
Nuclear Energy Company (1955-60) 
Associated Electrical Industries Ltd  
John Thompson Ltd 
Associated with this group (in the construction of Berkeley power station) were: 
Balfour Beatty & Co Ltd- 
John Laing & Son Ltd 
Morgan Crucible Co Ltd 
Nuclear Graphite Ltd 
The Nuclear Power Plant Company Ltd (1955-60) 
Clarke Chapman & Co Ltd 
Head Wrightson Processes Ltd 
Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd 
C A Parsons & Co Ltd 
Whessoe Ltd 
Alexander Findlay & Co 
A Reyrolle & Co Ltd 
Strachan & Henshaw Ltd 
Parolle Electrical Co Ltd (Parson & Reyrolle) 
Phase 2 
United Power Company (1960-5) 
General Electric Co Ltd 
Simon Carves Ltd 
Motherwell Bridge Eng Co Ltd 
John Mowlem Co Ltd 
International Combustion (Holdings) Ltd 
Richardson Westgarth Co Ltd 
Fairey Co Ltd 
Nuclear Civil Constructors—(a partnership of Trollope & Colls Ltd and Holland, 
Hannen & Cubitts (bought by Tarmac, 1976)) 
                                        
1183 Source: MMC, 1981, op cit, n483, p359-61 
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The Nuclear Power Group (1960-9) 
Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd 
Associated Electrical Industries Ltd (bought by GEC, 1967) 
Clarke Chapman & Co Ltd (merged with John Thompson Ltd, 1970) 
John Thompson Ltd (merged with Clarke Chapman & Co Ltd, 1970) 
C A Parsons & Co (merged with A Reyrolle & Co Ltd, 1968) 
A Reyrolle & Co Ltd (merged with C A Parsons & Co, 1968) 
Head Wrightson Processes Ltd 
Strachan & Henshaw Ltd 
Whessoe Ltd 
The Nuclear Power Group (1969-1973) 
UKAEA    20 per cent 
Reyrolle Parsons    20 per cent 
Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd  15 per cent 
John Thompson Ltd    10 per cent (to 1970) 
Clarke Chapman & Co Ltd   10 per cent (to 1970) 
Clarke Chapman John Thompson Ltd 20 per cent (post 1970) 
Industrial Reorganisation Corp  10 per cent (sold 5 per cent to Sir Robert 
McAlpine and 5 per cent to Head Wrightson in March 1971) 
Head Wrightson & Co Ltd   5 per cent 
Strachan & Henshaw Ltd   5 per cent 
Whessoe Ltd     5 per cent 
Phase 3 
British Nuclear Design & Construction Ltd (BNDC) (1968-73) 
UKAEA    20 per cent 
Babcock & Wilcox Ltd   25 per cent (sold its boiler making 
business to Clarke Chapman John Thompson Ltd in 1973) 
English Electric Co Ltd   25 per cent (merged with GEC, 1968) 
Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd 4 per cent 
Industrial Reorganisation Corp  26 per cent 
Phase 4 
National Nuclear Corporation Ltd (NNC) (1973-80) 
GEC Ltd     30 per cent 
UKAEA    35 per cent 
British Nuclear Associates Ltd  35 per cent 
(in which the shareholding is: 
Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd 14.3 per cent 
Clarke Chapman John Thompson Ltd 28.6 per cent 
Babcock & Wilcox Ltd   34.3 per cent 
Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd  7.1 per cent 
Head Wrightson & Co Ltd   8.6 per cent 
Whessoe Ltd     5.7 per cent 
Strachan & Henshaw Ltd   1.4 per cent) 
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Appendix V 
Initial members of the UKAEA 
Sir John Cockcroft was the Member for Scientific Research.1184 He had set up, and 
been the Director of, the AERE in 1946 and, amongst many other achievements, had also 
been a joint winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1951.1185 
Sir William Penney was the Member for Weapons Research and Development.1186 He 
had been head of the team which had designed Britain’s first atomic bomb, and was 
himself to become Chairman of the UKAEA Committee in 1964. 
Sir Christopher Hinton (later Lord Hinton of Bankside) was the Member for 
Engineering and Production.1187 He had been Deputy Controller of Atomic Energy 
(Production) at the Ministry of Supply since 1946.1188 Hinton, along with Penney and 
Cockcroft, were often referred to in Whitehall as “England’s Atomic Knights”.1189 
Sir Donald Perrott was the Member for Finance and Administration,1190 and has since 
been lost to posterity. 
Lord Cherwell, as Frederick Lindemann, was made a Professor of experimental 
philosophy (the name by which physics was known at Oxford at that time) at the 
University of Oxford in 1919.1191 He was made Baron Cherwell in 1941, and worked as 
Churchill’s Paymaster General from 1942 until 1945 and, again, between 1951 and 1953. 
In July 1945, Major-General Groves (of Manhattan Project fame) had written to Cherwell 
in an attempt to get his help with discrediting Leo Szilárd, who had previously worked at 
Oxford. Szilárd was the force behind a petition against the use of atomic weaponry, which 
had been signed by 69 fellow scientists and sent to President Truman in 1945.1192 
Cherwell’s response was that Szilárd had “rather a bee in his bonnet about the awful 
implications of these matters”, but that he did not represent a security risk.1193 Baron 
Cherwell was promoted to Viscount in 1956. 
Sir Luke Fawcett had been President of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade 
Workers between 1935 and 1945. 
Sir Ivan Stedeford was to make his name as the Group Managing Director of Tube 
Investments Ltd which, in 1958, had mounted the first hostile takeover of a public 
company, wresting British Aluminium (which had had Lord Plowden as its Chairman) from 
the bid put together by of Lord Portal of Hungerford.1194 In an interesting circle, when Lord 
Portal was with the Ministry of Supply, he had been the first controller of production of 
atomic energy.1195 Stedeford had also been variously on the Boards of the Bank of 
England and the Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation and was also a 
Governor of the BBC. In 1960, at the invitation of Harold Macmillan, he was to relinquish 
his post in the UKAEA to take on the Chairmanship of an Advisory Group on the State of 
British Transport (the Stedeford Committee).1196 Stedeford was created a KBE1197 in 1954 
                                        
1184 UKAEA, 1955, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority: First Annual Report for the Period 19th July 1954 – 
31st March 1955, London: HMSO. 
1185 Nobel, 2003, op cit, n262 
1186 UKAEA, 1955, op. Cit, n1216. 
1187 Ibid. 
1188 Cockcroft, J.D., 1959, The Miracle of Atomic Energy, in Empire Club, 1960, The Empire Club of Canada 
Speeches 1959-1960, Toronto: The Empire Club Foundation, pp. 82-91. 
1189 Hennessey, P., 2003, n218, p52. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 OP, 2006, Physics at the University of Oxford, Oxford: Oxford Physics, available at 
http://www.physics.ox.ac.uk/history, accessed on 01/02/08. 
1192 Szilárd, L., 1945, A Petition to the President of the United States, Independence, MO: Truman Presidential 
Museum and Library 
1193 Dannen, G., 1998, Groves seeks evidence against Szilárd, July 4, 1945. Available at 
http://www.dannen.com/decision/lrg-fal.html, accessed on 01/04/10. 
1194 Hatch, S., & Fores, M., 1960, The Struggle for British Aluminium, The Political Quarterly, 31 (4) 477-487. 
1195 Gray, P., 2002, op cit, n228, pp11. 
1196 IDEA, 2006, Lessons from History: Sustainable Transport, London: Improvement and Development Agency 
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and a GBE1198 in 1964 for his work in public service. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
1197 Often incorrectly referred to as “Knight Commander of the British Empire”, but actually “Knight Commander 
of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire”. Source: Robertson, M., 2002, United Kingdom: The Most 
Excellent Order of the British Empire. Available at http://www.medals.org.uk/united-kingdom/united-
kingdom024.htm, accessed on 01/02/08.  
1198 Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. This is the highest rank which is 
available within the Order. 
Nuclear Unclear 
Page 199 
Appendix VI: 
The Nuclear Chain Reaction1199 
Nuclear Fission: Basics 
When a nucleus fissions, it splits into several smaller fragments. These fragments, or 
fission products, are about equal to half the original mass. Two or three neutrons are also 
emitted. The sum of the masses of these fragments is less than the original mass. This 
‘missing’ mass (about 0.1 percent of the original mass) has been converted into energy 
according to Einstein’s equation. Fission can occur when a nucleus of a heavy atom 
captures a neutron, or it can happen spontaneously. 
Nuclear Chain Reactions 
A chain reaction refers to a process in which neutrons released in fission produce an 
additional fission in at least one further nucleus. This nucleus in turn produces neutrons, 
and the process repeats. The process may be controlled (nuclear power) or uncontrolled 
(nuclear weapons). If each neutron releases two more neutrons, then the number of 
fissions doubles each generation. In that case, in 10 generations there are 1,024 fissions 
and in 80 generations about 6 x 1023 (a mole) fissions.  
 
 
  
                                        
1199 Atomic Archive, 2010, Nuclear Fission. Only available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Fission/, accessed 
on 12/04/10 
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Appendix VII: 
Key nuclear sites in the UK1200 
SITE NAME REACTOR 
TYPE 
OPERATOR START 
DATE 
POWER (MW) END 
DATE1201 
Berkeley Magnox BNFL 1962 Decommissioning 1989 
Bradwell Magnox BNFL 1962 Decommissioning 2002 
Calder Hall Magnox BNFL 1956 Closed 2003 
Capenhurst Fuel 
Production 
BNFL/Urenco 1949 Decommissioning 1991 
Chapelcross Magnox BNFL 1959 200 2005 
Culham  Fusion 
Research 
UKAEA 1963 n/a 2007 
Dounreay Experimental UKAEA 1955 Decommissioning 1994 
Dungeness A Magnox BNFL 1966 Decommissioning 2006 
Dungeness B AGR British Energy plc 1983 1110 2018 
Hartlepool AGR British Energy plc 1983 1210 2014 
Harwell IBC Experimental UKAEA 1966 Decommissioning  
Heysham 1 AGR British Energy plc 1983 1150 2014 
Heysham 2 AGR British Energy plc 1988 1250 2023 
Hinkley Point A Magnox BNFL 1965 Decommissioning 2000 
Hinkley Point B AGR British Energy plc 1967 1220 2016 
Hunterston A Magnox BNFL 1964 Decommissioning 1990 
Hunterston B AGR British Energy plc 1967 1190 2016 
Oldbury Magnox BNFL 1968 600 / 434 2008 
Sellafield Fuel 
Production 
BNFL 1947 Decommissioning  
Sizewell A Magnox BNFL 1966 Decommissioning 2006 
Sizewell B PWR British Energy plc 1995 1188 2035 
Springfields Fuel 
Production 
BNFL 
Westinghouse 
1946 n/a 2023 
Torness AGR British Energy plc 1988 1250 2023 
Trawsfynydd Magnox BNFL 1965 Decommissioning 1993 
Windscale AGR UKAEA 1962 Decommissioning 1990 
Winfrith Experimental UKAEA 1957 Decommissioning 1990 
Wylfa Magnox BNFL 1971 1180 / 980 2010 
 
  
                                        
1200 NIA, 2009, Nuclear Energy: Locations in the UK, London: Nuclear Industry Association. 
1201 Sources: DTI, 2003, op cit, n822, London; WNA, 2006, Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities – Berkeley 
Magnox UK, London: World Nuclear Association; BNFL, 2002, Decommissioning, Warrington: British Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd; JESS, 2006, op cit, n1099; Ham, A., & Hall, R., 2006, op cit, n573. Where sites are listed with two 
power capacities, the higher figure is the maximum load, and the lower figure is the standard operating load. 
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Appendix VIII: 
Project Plowshare 
Despite the growth in awareness of the potential for injury or harm attributable to 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the licensing and liability regimes that were to 
spring up around it, the mid to late 1950s saw a number of plans being discussed at quite 
high levels for the use of the least acceptable member of the nuclear family, nuclear 
weapons. One of these plans was the US programme known as Project Plowshare, which 
was established in the summer of 1957: 
“[O]ne of the great visions of the [Plowshare] programme is a sea-level ‘Panama’ 
canal, which could be produced by a number of explosions… in each case the cost 
would be much lower with thermonuclear explosive.”1202 
As the existing Panama Canal was opened to traffic in 1914, it may be assumed that 
this plan (which never came to fruition) was for a second canal in the same style as the 
Panama Canal. The Sandia Corporation considered the use of nuclear explosives to create 
this second canal, using the plans drawn up for a second canal by the Panama Canal 
Company in 19471203 (see Figure 5.1). The proposed route was further Southeast in 
Panama, “away from any cities of 5000 or more inhabitants”1204 and would require the use 
of “651 nuclear devices with a combined yield of 42 megatons.”1205 Other plans were 
being mooted along similar lines elsewhere in the world. A group known as ARTEMIS 
(Association de Recherche Technique pour l’Étude de la Mer Intérieure Saharienne) was 
set up in 1957 with the intention of opening up the Sahara for transport and agriculture: 
“a twenty megaton hydrogen bomb buried at a depth of 750m would create a 
crater 3km in diameter; fifty such bombs, detonated simultaneously, would within 
seconds blast the world’s largest man-made waterway and flood almost 5,000km2 
of desert.”1206 
The ARTEMIS project failed to attract enough support and went into liquidation in 
1959, having never achieved anything more than to create the plans.1207 Unlike the 
Plowshare Program discussed below, the ARTEMIS project and the plans of the Sandia 
Corporation were privately financed, and neither possessed their own atomic weapons. 
These were serious flaws to achieving their aims. 
This period also saw an interesting divergence of government opinion regarding the 
dangers of nuclear technology. On the one hand, the governments of the UK, US and 
other signatories of the Paris or Vienna Conventions were creating a liability scheme which 
would cover any damage attributable to an accidental release of radiation. On the other 
hand, we have seen that the US government was seriously giving thought to the use of 
nuclear explosions in shaping (and improving) the world, in the belief that the issue of 
radiation was not problematic: 
“With the data now available, however, we can say that radioactive contamination 
in a nuclear explosion should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle to the 
use of such explosions in mining and construction. On the basis of the many 
advantages of nuclear explosions, we conclude that the time is ripe to begin 
actual experiments in this field.”1208 
This belief was not initially restricted to the United States government. Indeed, the 
quotation above was actually nothing more than a translation of a statement by Professor 
                                        
1202 Gaines, M., 1969, Atomic Energy, London: Hamlyn, p151. 
1203 Sanders, R., 1962, op cit, n355 pp120-1. 
1204 Ibid. 
1205 Ibid. 
1206 Fleming, F., 2004, The Sword and the Cross, London :Faber and Faber Limited, p309. 
1207 Ibid. 
1208 US Congress, 1960, Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research: Hearings before the Sub-committee on Research 
and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, p75. 
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Pokrovskiy, an engineer in the Soviet Union, writing in the Gornyi Zhurnal (Russian 
Journal of Mining) in 1956.1209 Despite this initially common (though not shared, in the 
traditional sense) belief in the possibilities of using peaceful nuclear explosions, the USSR 
missed no opportunity in lambasting their opponent’s activities once Plowshare became a 
reality. 
The Chief Soviet Delegate to the Second International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1958 “disavowed past statements by Soviet scientists, 
engineers and politicians expressing interest in such applications and condemned such 
explosions”1210 by the United States. Despite this professed lack of belief in such systems, 
research carried out by the University of California on behalf of the US Department of 
Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory asserts that “between 1965 and 1988, 
the Soviet Union’s ‘programme for Utilization of Nuclear Explosions in the National 
Economy’ carried out 122 nuclear explosions to study and put into use some 13 
applications.”1211 
Potential Routes for second “Panama Canal” (1962)1212 
 
The Plowshare Program, named from the New Testament passage Isaiah 2:4 (“they 
shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall 
not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more”), was spawned by 
the Manhattan Project of the 1940s. The project ran from 1957 until 1975 and carried out 
a total of 29 explosions. mainly on the Nevada Test Site; ranging from 0.03kt (Flask-Red, 
in 1970), to 105kt (Flask-Green, also 1970).1213 To put these tests into perspective, over 
the same time period the United States carried out nearly 600 atomic weapons tests of 
                                        
1209 Pokrovskiy, G.I., 1956, On the use of nuclear explosives for industrial purposes, Gornyi Zhurnal, Vol 1, p29-
36. 
1210 Nordyke, M.D., 2000, The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions, Livermore, CA: US 
Department of Energy / Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, p4. 
1211 Ibid, p70. 
1212 Sanders, R., 1962, op cit, n355, p121. 
1213 Ibid. 
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various types, with a combined yield of over 90Mt.1214  
The US Atomic Energy Commission’s information film about Project Plowshare begins 
with the enthusiastic introduction: 
“To bring water and food where there is only parched earth. And people where 
there is desolation. To bring freedom of movement where there are imposing 
barriers. And commerce where nature has decreed there will be isolation. To bring 
forth a wealth of material where there are vast untapped resources. And a wealth 
of knowledge where there is uncertainty. To perform a multitude of peaceful tasks 
doe the betterment of mankind, man is exploring a source of enormous 
potentially useful energy. The nuclear explosion.”1215 
The film continues in much the same vein, extolling the virtues of such a programme, 
both within the US, but more likely in other countries and, although the potential threat 
from radiation is mention in passing toward the end of the film, the level of risk is greatly 
underemphasised. 
Despite the enthusiasm of the nuclear industry for the use of Plowshare development, 
the project never came to fruition. A combination of public opposition and the lack of 
willing sites for further tests led to the abandonment of Plowshare on 30th June 1975.1216 
Later, the signature by the United States of and Russia of the 1996 UN Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty would make the resurrection of any similar ideas increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible. 
 
  
                                        
1214 DoE, 2000, United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992, Document Number DOE/NV-
209-REV 15, Las Vegas, NV: US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, pp9-61. The largest single 
test (codenamed Poplar), was part of Operation Hardtack I, detonated on 12 July 1958, and had a yield of 
9.3Mt. 
1215 US AEC, 1965, Peaceful uses of Nuclear Explosions, U.S. San Francisco, CA: Atomic Energy Commission, 
San Francisco Operations Office 
1216 BBC, 2002, Project Plowshare – ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosions’, BBC, London. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A685109, accessed on 12/04/10. 
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